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IV
m0tdph\ sicsl theories of moddlitv' in p^rticuldr. And I suggest ^ solution ttiken
from Lewis himself. I also argue that any purported unintelligibilitv' is due to
illegitimately assimilating the relation to spatiotemporal relations.
Finally, I consider some difficulties with a version of ersatzism that aims to
reduce modality to impure set-theory. One concerns the accommodation of
intuitions about properties that are not, but might have been, instantiated.
Another concerns accommodation of intuitions about relations of exclusion and
entailment among properties. I suggest that these difficulties are due to faulty
assumptions about the nature of properties rather than any fundamental flaws in
this ersatz approach. So I propose an account of properties that when
incorporated into ersatzism circumvents these difficulties and allows it to claim
the advantages of modal realism without its drawbacks. Unlike traditional
accounts, this takes the essence of a property to consist in its role in imposing a
certain classificational structure on the particulars that instantiate it, rather than
in any unique and irreducible "quiddity".
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CHAPTER 1
AIMS AND METHODS
The aim of this dissertation is to explain and evaluate various
metaphysical theories of modality. In this chapter I attempt to make explicit
what I will be presupposing in this inquiry. In section 1.1 1 outline what I will be
taking metaphysical theories to be, and in section 1.2 1 outline what criteria I will
adopt for evaluating them. In section 1.3 I attempt to outline some of the facts of
modality. In the final section, 1.4, 1 briefly preview the subsequent chapters.
1.1 Metaphysical Theories
Throughout I will assume that a metaphysical theory consists of three
parts.
First, there is a collection of sentences, called the theorems. Some subclass
of theorems is designated as the set of axioms of the theory. These constitute a
minimal set of sentences of which all the others are logical consequences.^ They
must be regarded as being asserted or assumed without proof.^
The theorems cannot be just a collection of sounds or marks on paper -
they must say something, they must be interpreted. To interpret all the theorems
it suffices to interpret the axioms. And to interpret the axioms it suffices to
provide domains for the quantifiers and other referential devices to range over,
and to provide interpretations for the predicates.
To make explicit the domains presupposed by the quantificational and
referential parts of a theory is to give an account of the theory's ontology. Some
of the entities or kinds referred to or quantified over may be constructed or
defined in terms of others. But this cannot be so for all of them on pain of
circulant}’; some must be assumed to be antecedently grasped. list of them
constitutes the primitive ontology of the theor\\ The primitive ontology is a
minimal, exhaustive and exclusive list of the kinds of things that must be pre-
theoretically grasped if the cjuantificational and other referential parts of the
theory^ are to be intelligible.
To understand the claim that all so-and-so^s are F or that some are, it is
not necessary to know how many so-and-so^s there are; we can understand the
quantifiers perfectly well without knowing how many things are in the various
domains.^ So in specifying the primitive ontology we need only specify the
domains of quantification by saying what kinds of thing the theory presupposes
that there are. I will assume that it is the job of the theorems, and ultimately the
axioms, rather than the ontology to tell us how many members of the various
ontological kinds there are. If a theory is committed to the existence of any
entities of the kinds permitted by the ontology, it is because its axioms contain
some existential claims. These may be categorical assertions of existence: e.g.
there are tables and chairs, there are seventeen physical objects, etc. Or they may
be conditional assertions of existence: e.g. if there are husbands, then there are
wives; if there is smoke, then there is fire. But if the theory is committed to the
existence of any entities at all, some of its axioms must be categorical existential
axioms.'*
Some predicates of the theory may be defined in terms of others. But this
cannot be so for all of them on pain of circularity. So the meanings of some
predicates too must be antecedently grasped. These are the conceptual
primitives of the theory. A list of them constitutes the theory's ideology. The
ideology is a minimal list of predicates that appear in the axioms of the theor}'
the interpretation of which suffices for the interpretation of all their other
predicates.^
3The second part of a metaphysical theor\' consists in its primitive
ontology and ideology; to say what these are is to make explicit what is required
for the intelligibility of the theorems.
It should be noted however that there is in general no principled way to
draw a sharp line between the ontology and the ideology of a theory. Suppose,
for instance, that among the theorems is the sentence 'some As are Bs'. We could
think of this as having the form 3aBa i.e. as involving a quantifier which is
understood as ranging over As and a single predicate which expresses the
property of being a B. Or we can think of it as having the form 3x (Ax D Bx) i.e.
as involving an unrestricted quantifier which ranges over everything, and two
predicates to express the properties of being an A and being a B. Thus we can re-
interpret sentences of the theory that involve a number of primitive types of
quantifier as involving a single unrestricted quantifier by the addition of extra
predicates.^ In many cases we could just as easily move in the other direction —
banish various predicates A, B, C etc. in favour of various primitive quantifiers
3a..., 3b..., 3c... etc.
The final part of a metaphysical theory consists of certain sentences called
the definitions, analyses and logical constructions of the theory. Often the terms
'definition', 'analysis' and 'logical construction' are used interchangeably, but I
will co-opt them to refer to different things.
As I will use the term, a definition is the result of writing some expression
(the definiendum) followed by '=df.' followed by some other expression (the
definiens). There are no restrictions on the grammatical category of definiendum
expressions. Any expression containing the definiendum is to be understood as
a mere orthographic variant of an expression that differs from it only in that it
contains the definiens expression in positions that the former contains the
4definiendum expression. A definition is simply a piece of shorthand, a
stipulated convention of notational abbreviation”.^ The point of definitions is
merely to make a theory easier to read and comprehend. In particular, no
philosophical significance is to be read into the fact that the definiendum
expression may be already familiar and endowed with philosophical
associations.^
As I will use the term analysis^, analyses are just like definitions except in
the following respects. First, they are intended to have philosophical significance,
they are not mere stipulations about the use of words. To mark this difference
syntactically I will state analyses in such a way that they have 'if and only if
('iff) where definitions have '=df.' Second, analyses are governed by certain
grammatical restrictions; flanking the 'if and only if in an analysis must be open
sentences in one or more free variables. This justifies us in saying that what gets
analyzed is a concept.
As I will use 'logical construction', a logical construction is an analysis.
But it is also more. A logical construction should also guarantee the existence of
(though it need not specify) what Quine calls ''a proxy function"; a total function
from the entities satisfying the analysandum concept to those satisfying the
analysans.^
Since, unlike definitions, analyses and logical constructions are not mere
stipulations but are intended to have philosophical significance, there are certain
criteria they must satisfy. I will take an adequate analysis of some concept to be
any biconditional in any number of free variables that satisfies the following
criteria. First, the analysis must express a necessary truth; it must be that
necessarily an entity or tuple of entities satisfies the analysandum condition iff it
satisfies the analysans condition. The biconditional 'x has kidneys iff x has a
hearf fails to satisfy this criterion because although it is actually the case that
son'iething has kidneys iff it has a heart, intuitively, this is not necessarily the
case. Second, the analysis must be tiou-circiildr: the condition expressed bv the
analysans must not involve the concept expressed in the analysandum either
explicitly or implicitly - it must be graspable without a prior grasp of the
analysandum condition. The biconditional 'x is a circle iff x is circulaT fails this
criterion because, intuitively, we cannot grasp whether or not x is circular
without a prior grasp of what it is to be a circle. It is only by appeal to our pre-
theoretical intuitions that we judge whether a purported analysis satisfies these
first two criteria. Third, I will assume that the analysans must have a more
complex logical structure than the analysandum; this justifies us in saying that
the analysis decomposes the concept being analyzed into its conceptual parts.
The biconditional 'x is a lawyer iff x is an attorney' fails this condition; logically,
both analysans and analysandum are atomic (open) sentences.^ ^ Finally, the
analysans condition should involve reference only to members of the official
ontology of the theory and utilize only official conceptual primitives. Or it
should at least be possible to replace the analysans expression by such a
condition by a process of definitional, analytic or logical replacement. Whether
or not a biconditional satisfies this criterion depends on what the metaphysical
theory in question is.
To illustrate: the analysis 'x is a brother iff x is male and x is a sibling'
qualifies as adequate according to the above criteria relative to certain theories.
It expresses a necessary truth; both the concept of maleness and the concept of
siblinghood can be grasped without a prior grasp of brotherhood; 'x is male and
X is a sibling' has greater logical structure than 'x is a brotheh - it is a
conjunction rather than an atomic (open) sentence; and if the theory contains
maleness and siblinghood among its primitives (or analyses of them in terms ol
Its primitives), then its analysans involves reference only to official primitives of
the theor\\
Logical constructions specify collections of entities. One way to specifv
a collection is extensionally. simply list its members. However, this method is
verv' limited: it is practical only if the number of members is small, and onlv
possible, even in principle, if the collection is finite. So a collection is usually
specified intensionally: some condition or set of conditions is specified
satisfaction of which is necessary and sufficient for membership. Sometimes
satisfaction of this condition is simply a matter of instantiating some property or
relation. But often the condition is recursive. First, some set of base elements is
specified; then some operation is specified. Being either a base element or
something that results from operating on one of the members is necessary and
sufficient for membership. Logical constructions must meet similar conditions of
adequacy to analyses: they must be necessarily true, non-circular, display
increased structure (in some sense) and utilize or involve reference only to
official members of the ideology and ontology. But they must also meet an
additional requirement: they must guarantee the existence of a function from the
entities being constructed to their constructions. Frege's reduction of numbers to
set-theory provides an example: this guarantees the proxy function that takes
each of the "old" numbers n into the class of n-membered classes.
We can think of the fact-stating part of our ordinary discourse as itself a
theory — some of its sentences are logical consequences of others and it is has a
set of primitive concepts and quantifiers. But the list of primitives is long and
the quantifications prodigal. And many of the kinds of things referred to and the
primitives used are philosophically troublesome for one reason or another.
It is the analyses and logical constructions of a metaphysical theor}- that
provide the bridge between it and the theor\' embodied in our ordinar\^
discourse: they link the set of its theorems with the antecedently familiar but
philosophically troublesome notions and entities of our ordinary' discourse.
Indeed it is only in virtue of a theory's analyses and logical constructions that it
is about the troublesome entities and notions involved in our ordinar\' discourse.
The philosophical significance of any particular analysis will var\' from
theory to theory. If the analysandum concept is, despite its familiarity, obscure,
then its analysis can be viewed as providing illumination or understanding. It
displays the parts of the concept and how they are put together and to grasp this
is one way to understand something. Another purpose might be elimination of
some concept. The idea is that an analysis permits replacement of all
occurrences of the analysandum concept by the analysans. It thereby provides a
way to regard use of the expressions which ostensibly express the analysandum
concept as mere shorthand for expressions for logical compounds from
conceptual primitives. There may be any number of reasons for wanting to do
this. Perhaps the analysandum concept is thought to be epistemologically
dubious and the analysans raises no such epistemological difficulties. Perhaps
for reasons of conservativeness or conceptual economy the analysandum
concept ought not to appear as a conceptual primitive of the theory, even
though it is perfectly clear and epistemologically respectable. Finally, perhaps,
despite playing an important role in our thought and language, the ordinary
concept being analyzed has unclear rules of application or "fuzzy borders". By
contrast, the analysans may be precise and yet still be suited to play the same
systematic role in our thought and language. The analysans may then be
regarded as a replacement for analysandum concept; something more precise that
is suited to do all the theoretical work previously performed by that which it
8replaces. ( Fhough in this case the requirement on analyses that they be
necessarily true may be hard to apply.)
For a logical construction to have philosophical significance the kind of
entit\ being constructed must also be antecedently familiar and the logical
construction must show how to construct it in terms of other entities and
properties. Logical constructions permit clarification of the nature of certain
kinds of things and they allow the elimination of certain kinds of entities,
perhaps in favour of epistemologically less dubious entities, or in the interests of
minimizing the ontology, or in order to supply more exactly delimited
replacements for familiar but ill-behaved entities, etc. But because they
guarantee the existence of proxy functions, logical constructions permit the
replacement of the entities of ordinary discourse without disrupting its truth-
functional or quantificational structure. virtue of its logical constructions, a
metaphysical theory will often entail various identities between the "old" and
the "new" entities. So logical constructions also permit us to regard the
antecedently familiar entities as having been ontologicallj/ reduced in Quine's
sense.
1.2 Criteria for Evaluating Metaphysical Theories
The aim of this section is to explain briefly some of the criteria by which
to evaluate and adjudicate among competing metaphysical theories. These
criteria may be summarized broadly as a requirement of maximum explanatory
power: one theory is preferable to another if it has greater explanatory power.
But this is vague and in what follows it will helpful to separate out various
aspects of this criterion. In particular, certain epistemological criteria can be
distinguished from criteria of theoretical utility. The epistemological criteria
concern: (1) the intelligibility of the theory's primitive ontology and ideology; (2)
the plausibilih' of its theorems; and (3) the extent to which the theor\' permits an
explanation of the origin of our knowledge of its ontology, ideology and axioms.
The criteria of theoretical utilitx^ concern: (4) the degree to which the theory
maximizes the accommodation of the pre-analytic data; (3) the simplidU^ of its
axioms, analyses and logical constructions; (6) the parsimoniousness of its
primitive ontology and ideology; and (7) the degree of systematization it
imposes on this data.
Ideally, we would be able to extract some numerical measure of the
degree to which the initial probability of a theory is enhanced or diminished by
its degree of satisfaction of these various criteria. Unfortunately, our
understanding of each of them is very primitive. Moreover, our understanding
of how to weigh and balance the various criteria is also very limited; it is far
from clear if they are of equal importance, or, if not, how to order them. The
problem is further exacerbated by the fact that some of the criteria pull in
opposite directions — a high degree of satisfaction of one may be possible only if
there is a low degree of satisfaction of some other. It is also complicated by the
fact that some of these criteria are linked, perhaps inextricably. So there is no
immediate prospect of any calculus of theory evaluation. I will state the criteria
with built-in ceteris paribus clauses to reflect a position of neutrality on their
relative importance. And I will treat them as if they were separable.
The first epistemological requirement on a theory is that its theorems and
the left-hand sides of its analyses and logical constructions be intelligible. So the
terms in which they are stated must be intelligible. This entails at least that it
must be plausible to say that we have some pre-analytic grasp on the domains of
the quantifiers and the conceptual primitives since these are presupposed by,
rather than defined within the theory.
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But intelligibilitv' is a matter of degree and we have pre-theoretical
opinions about which kinds of entities and which notions are better understood.
So not all kinds of entities and concepts are on a par as far as eligibility for the
status of primitive ontological category or conceptual primitive is concerned. A
theory should aim to analyze or logically construct traditionally or pre-
theoretically puzzling entities or concepts in terms of kinds of entity or
conceptual primitives which are as intuitively clear as possibled^ To the extent
that the entities over which the theory quantifies are obscure or its ideology
contains obscure primitives, the theory itself is obscure and fails to illuminate or
explain. So of tivo theories which aim to analyze or construct the same concepts
or kinds of entities, the one whose ontology and ideology is clearer is to be
preferred, other things being equal.
The second epistemological requirement on a metaphysical theory is that
its theorems should be as plausible as possible. And here special attention needs
to be paid to the existential axioms. Much of the dispute about metaphysical
theories, and especially metaphysical theories of modality, concerns the
plausibility of their existential axioms. However, judging the plausibility of the
theorems is not in general possible independently of the analyses and logical
constructions they permit. For the prima facie plausibility of a collection of
theorems may well be enhanced by the illumination and explanatory gain
conferred by the analyses and constructions they permit.
A final epistemological requirement is that the origin of our purported
knowledge or understanding of the members of a theory's primitive ontolog)’,
its conceptual primitives and its axioms must be as improblematic as possible
One source for this understanding is causal acquaintance with members of the
kinds of entities posited by the ontology, instances of the fundamental
properties or relations contained in the ideology and facts asserted by the
11
axioms. A second source is for such a primitive ontology and ideology and
axiom set to be part of the best explanation of the data, where what counts as
best is decided by the other criteria of theor>^ evaluation.'^
The questions concerning plausibility and those concerning origins are
separate issues. In particular, the existence of a certain kind of entity may be
intuitively plausible despite its being causally isolated from us. In such a case,
one traditional strategy is to logically construct the kind of entity from other less
epistemologically suspect members of the ontology. This permits quantification
over and reference to entities whose existence we did not doubt, while still
respecting our epistemological scruples. Russell's attempt to logically construct
ordinary material objects such as tables and chairs from sense-data illustrates
this strategy.'^ The point of such a construction is not to eliminate reference to
tables and chairs; no-one seriously doubts that there are such things. Rather, it is
to legitimize such reference by showing why it is not epistemologically suspect.
Following this tradition, I will just assume that a theory that substitutes logical
constructions for entities and notions that are in principle causally isolated from
us and whose axioms are such that we can give a causal explanation of how we
know them is preferable to one that lacks these features, other things being
equal.
Next let us consider the criteria having to do with theoretical utility. The
analyses and logical constructions are analyses and constructions of some pre-
analytically familiar notions — it is these that the theory is a theory of- so to
assess them for adequacy we need to compare what the theory says about the
notions and entities analyzed or constructed with pre-analytic data involving
them.2" To be genuinely explanatory the axioms should aim to entail as much of
the pre-theoretical data about them as possible. This is simply because the more
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that the axioms of a theor\' entail, the more the theor\- explains. So the first
criterion of theoretical utilitx' is that the axioms should be as strong as possible,
where the strength of the set of axioms is a measure, roughly, of how much of
the data they entail.
But the set of axioms should also be as simple as possible. The simplicity
of a single axiom is a measure of the complexity of its internal logical structure.
The simplicity of the set or axioms consists in how many axioms it contains and
in how simple each one is; the fewer and simpler the axioms, the simpler the
set.2i Theories that assume less to accommodate the same data are preferable
because, intuitively, such theories are more genuinely explanatory; they are less
ad hoc. If, for instance, a number of intuitive principles are all logical
consequences of a single axiom, then, although this single axiom may be
unexplained, the principles have been accounted for - they are true because
they must be true, given the axiom.
The requirement that the set of axioms be as simple as possible tends to
conflict with the requirement that they be as strong as possible. One way for a
theory to accommodate the data is for it to add them individually to its set of
axioms. Such an axiom set would, trivially, have maximum strength. But it
would not be very simple. It would be very ad hoc; it would not explain the data.
On the other hand, one way to guarantee maximum simplicity would be to have
as axioms only those required to guarantee the logical truths. But such an axiom
set would entail, and so explain, nothing about the subject matter. It would be
consistent with any data. Roughly then, the simplicity of a set of axioms is
inversely proportional to its strength. So in part what is needed is that the axiom
set achieve some kind of optimal balance of simplicity and strength; it must be
as simple as it can be consistently with entailing as much of the data as possible.
However, the pre-theoretic data itself is often a mixed bag of common
sense opinions, rough principles, and perhaps also some rudimentary^
theorization. And these elements may vary- greatly in plausibility'. Some
opinions and principles may have the status of Moorean facts: any theory
inconsistent with them is thereby refuted. Others may have a high degree of
intuitive plausibility without being Aloorean facts; a theory's plausibility' is
severely diminished by contradicting one of these, but is not refuted. There may
also be initially plausible but not compelling data; the plausibility of any theory
that contradicts these is diminished in inverse proportion to the strength of their
intuitive support. Finally, there are mere “off-hand" opinions, those that we are
inclined to hold but can easily be disabused of, and these carry very little
weight.22
In short, one theory should be preferred over another, if, ceteris paribus,
its axioms have a higher degree of strength-cum-simplicity with respect to the
pre-analytic data, where the notion of strength is thought of as weighted with
respect to the degree of intuitive support that the data receive.
Third, the theory should be as parsimonious as possible. In particular it
should respect Occam's Razor and avoid postulating kinds of entity or
conceptual primitives beyond necessity Of two theories that explain the same
data, the one that does so on the basis of a smaller ontology-cum-ideology is,
intuitively, more explanatory and so is to be preferred.
Finally, the theory should be as systematic as possible: we should prefer
theories that impose a greater uniformity of logical structure on the data. A
good theory of, e.g. modality, by this criterion would entail that all the data of
modality have a similar underlying logical structure. Among other things this
helps to illuminate the logical interrelations among the data of modality, our
opinions about what is possible and what is not.
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1.3. Modality
All the metaphysical theories to be considered in this dissertation are
metaphysical theories of modality. So it will be helpful before considering any of
them to set out some of the pre-theoretical data of modality that they aim to
accommodate.
Intuitively, some states of affairs or propositions must be the case, others
might, or couldn't be the case; some are necessary, others possible, still others
impossible, and so on. For instance, the state of affairs of there being blue swans
is a possible one; the proposition that two plus three is five must be the case; and
the state of affairs that consists in there being colourless blue frogs is impossible.
To so classify any state of affairs or proposition is to assign to it a modality
or a modal status. Throughout this dissertation I will assume that the bearers of
modalities or modal statuses are "states of affairs" or "propositions" and I will
assume that every proposition may be modally classified, may be assigned some
modal status. Quite what propositions or states of affairs and modal statuses are
will be something that an adequate theory of modality must tell us.
But modal discourse is actually conducted in sentences. Indeed, any
ordinary declarative sentence of English can be converted into a modal claim
either by prefixing the adverb 'possibly' (or the adverbial phrases 'it is possible
that', 'it might be that', 'it could be the case thaF etc.) or by restating it in the
subjimctive mood. Call the result of either transformation, a "modalization" of
the original sentence. Modalizations of e.g. 'There are blue sw^ans' include
'Possibly, there are blue swans', 'It might be the case that there are blue swans',
'There might be blue sw’^ans', 'There could be [or could have been] blue sw'ans',
and so on. It is by means of modalizations that we actually express our modal
thoughts. So if propositions are taken to be the bearers of modalities, what is the
relation between the operation of modalization on sentences and the modal
classification of propositions?
Consider first adverbial modalizations of the form 'Possibly, s', where s is
an ordinary' declarative sentence. Usually, sentences are said to "express"
propositions. It is the job of the philosopher of language not the metaphysican to
explain this relation and I will not discuss it further. Now, if sentence s
expresses proposition p, then the adverbial modalization of s, 'Possibly, s' is true
iff p is possible. Thus an account of the modal statuses of propositions yields a
straightforward explanation of the semantic effect of this type of adverbial
modalization.
Notice next that many other forms of modalization may be regarded as
mere stylistic variants of this adverbial form. Often saying that it is possible that
something be the case, or that it could be the case, or that it might be the case is
just another way of saying that possibly it is the case. And still other modal
idioms are straightforwardly explicable in terms of 'possibly' and negation, e.g.
something is necessarily the case iff it is not possibly not the case. In this
dissertation I will take the adverbial form 'Possibly, s' (where s is an ordinarv’
declarative sentence) as the basic modal idiom. I will assume that the others are
either mere stylistic variants of this form or are definable in terms of it and
negation. This allows a straightforward connection between the assignment of
modal statuses to propositions and the semantic effect of modalization in
general, thereby permitting us to concentrate on the modal statuses of
propositions, ignoring modalized sentences. Each declarative sentence simply
"inherits" the modal status of the proposition or state of affairs that it expresst's.
This assumption does, however, involve an important simplification. For
it it is far from clear that all modal idioms can be regarded as stylistic variants ot
the adverbial form or as definable in terms of it together with negation. In
1 ()
particular sorrie of the modal claims that vve tv'pically express by sentences in the
subjunctive mood resist straightforward assimilation to the adverbial form.^^
The justification for this simplification is that no analysis of modalit\' will be
considered that could not be complicated so as to deal with these problem cases,
if this is really needed, and none of the problem cases will actually arise.25
We do not learn the modal statuses of states of affairs one by one. For we
can all assign the correct modal status to a potentially infinite number of states
of affairs which we have never pondered before. Yet we cannot learn an infinite
number of facts one by one. So our classification of states of affairs according to
the various modal statuses must be governed or generated by certain general
principles. I find it helpful to think of them as falling into positive and negative
principles. The positive principles concern how vast the range of possibilities is;
the negative principles concern what is impossible.^^ The remainder of section
1.3 will consist in a rough characterization of some of these principles. There is
no point attempting to be precise here because the principles themselves can be
tested only by comparing them with the data and this varies in its degree of
intuitive support. I will aim merely to characterize possibilities and
impossibilities that must be recognized, leaving it open whether there are more.
It is the job of the various theories to be more precise about the middle ground.
1.3.1 Positive Principles of Modality^^
The positive principles of modality are usually called principles of
“plenitude" because they tell us that the space of possibilities, "logical space", is
complete; that it contains no gaps or non-arbitrary boundaries. Thus they
involve universal quantification: they say that logical space consists of all
instances of a certain kind. Among them must be the way the world actually is --
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if something is actually the case, then it must be possible. I he other possibilities
are supposed to be alternatives to the way the world actually is. This suggests
that logical space consists of all other instances of the kind of which the way the
world actually is is just one instance.
So as a first step towards a more detailed characterization of these
principles, let us start with a characterization of how the world actually is.
According to Lewis
...the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one
little thing and then another...We have a geometry: a system of external
relations of spatiotemporal distance between points. Maybe points of
spacetime itself, maybe point-sized bits of matter or aether or fields, or
maybe both. And at those points we have local qualities: perfectly natural
intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be
instantiated. For short: we have arrangement of qualities. And that is
all. ..All else supervenes on that.^^
The actual world then can be seen as articulated in a certain way: it can be
seen as built up from certain materials — a spatiotemporal framework and a
stock of perfectly natural properties - by means of an instantiation relation
which determines the way these properties are arranged within this framework.
The rest supervenes.
It is natural to think that a full characterization of the actual world must
specify not just its arrangement of properties, but also the stock of individuals
that have locations within the framework and which instantiate these properties
and stand in various relations. However, since every individual must have a
location, and since the spatiotemporal framework itself can be thought of as
consisting of a collection of points together with a system of external relations of
spatiotemporal distance among them, Lewis simplifies by identifying the
individuals with their locations. Indeed, since the above characterization aims
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only to capture the basic" facts of the actual world on which "all else
supervenes we may as well identify the simple particulars with the points.
Intuitively, the complex particulars and their properties will supervene on the
point-particulars of which they are composed and their intrinsic properties and
interrelations.
But in order to be fully explicit let us deviate slightly from Lewis and
think of the actual world as consisting offour elements: a stock of individuals or
point-instants, a stock of perfectly natural intrinsic properties, a system of
external relations among these point-instants that defines the actual
spatiotemporal structure, and an instantiation relation that determines how the
intrinsic properties are actually distributed among the individuals within this
framework.
It is this articulation into four elements that provides the key to a more
detailed understanding of the kind, ways that the actual world might be, of which
logical space contains all instances. For each of these four elements can be
thought of as itself just one instance of a kind.
Consider first the actual spatiotemporal framework. Intuitively this is just
one possible framework among many, one instance of the kind possible
spatiotemporal framework. If current physics is right, the actual spatiotemporal
framework is non-Euchdean and has four-dimensions and a certain curvature.
But, intuitively, it could have been Euclidean. Or it could have had a different
number of dimensions or a different curvature. Intuitively, the kind possible
spatiotemporalframework comprehends a vast array of structures. And each of
these should be included within logical space if logical space is to constitute a
plenitude. I will call the claim that logical space contains every instance of this
kind, the "Principle of the Plenitude of Structures" (PS).^^
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Consider next the actual stock of individuals. Intuitively, this too is just
one instance of a kind of which there are many other instances, in this case the
kind possible stock of individuals . Of most individuals that actually exist it is
clearly a contingent matter that they do exist. It is possible, for instance, that my
car. New York or even the Earth should fail to exist.^» Intuitively then, the world
might have been more impoverished in its stock of individuals than it actually
is. So intuitively any proper subset, or contraction, of the stock of actual
individuals is also a possible stock of individuals.
It also seems that there might have been more or other individuals than
there actually are, that the kind possible stock of individuals also comprehends
instances that are "augmentations" in some sense of the actual stock. In other
words, among possible stocks of individuals are those of which the actual stock
is merely a proper subset. This is more controversial than the previous claim,
but once we have granted the previous claim, it is hard to deny. For if the world
might have been impoverished in its stock of individuals relative to how it
actually is, symmetry demands that it is actually impoverished relative to how it
might have been. To deny this, to hold that our world is as rich as possible in
terms of its stock of individuals, is to hold that the possibility instantiated by the
actual world is special in some way. And this is unacceptable. The actual world
may well be special — it may quite a different kind of thing from a mere
possibility. But not in this way. For this is to subscribe to a form of modal
parochialism about actuality (or, perhaps, implicitly to assume some theological
premise). Hence, we must admit that there might have been particulars in
addition to or other than those that actually exist.^^ The kind possible stock of
individuals comprehends not just any contraction of the actual stock but also any
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niii^nientatum of this stock; any stock that contain individuals that do not but
might have existed.
Moreover, intuitively the kind possible stock of individuals should
comprehend also any stocks that result from some combination of contraction
and augmentation. It should comprehend stocks of individuals that contain only
some of those individuals that actually exist but which also contain other
individuals that do not actually exist.
Intuitively, the kind possible stock of individuals comprehends all these
stocks of individuals. And each of them should be included within logical space
if logical space is to constitute a plenitude. I will call the claim that logical space
contains every instance of this kind, the "Principle of the Plenitude of
Individuals" (PI).
Intuitively, the stock of perfectly natural intrinsic properties that aire
actually instantiated is also just one possible stock among many, just one
instance of the kind possible stock of perfectly natural intrinsic properties?^ Of most
of the properties that are actually instantiated, it seems to be a contingent matter
that they are actually instantiated; it seems possible, for instance, that nothing be
blue or that nothing have a mass of 5g. So the actual world could have been
more impoverished in its stock of instantiated properties.
But again — though this too is more controversial than the previous claim
— it also seems possible for there to have been instances of properties which are
not actually instantiated; perhaps Hume's missing shade of blue, perhaps some
"missing physical value", perhaps some different properties entirely beyond our
ken.^3 Jo deny this, to hold that our world is as rich as possible in its stock of
instantiated properties, is to subscribe to an intolerable parochialism about
actuality (or implicitly to assume some theological premise). So we should also
admit there might have been instances of properties other than those that are
actually instantiated.^*^
Moreover, if it is possible for there to have been fewer instantiated
properties than there actually are and it is possible for there to have been more,
then It seems also possible for there to have been combinations of these: stocks
of properties which contain only some of those properties which are actually
instantiated but which also contain other properties that are not actually
instantiated.
Intuitively then, the actual stock of properties is not the only possible one;
the kind possible stock of properties comprehends many possible stocks of
properties. Some of these are contractions of the actual stock, others are
augmentations of the actual stock and still others are contraction-augmentation
mixes. Each of these should be included within logical space if logical space is to
constitute a plenitude. I will call the claim that logical space contains every
instance of this kind, the “Principle of the Plenitude of Properties" (PP).35
The final element in Lewis's characterization of the actual world is the
relation of instantiation. This specifies how the actual stock of perfectly natural
intrinsic properties is distributed among the actual stock of individuals within
the actual spatiotemporal framework; how the actual world is “stitched
together". Once again this seems to be just one possible arrangement among
many, one instance of a kind. Intuitively, all sorts of variations in the actual
arrangement of properties are possible — if something is red, it might have been
blue; if something is Ig, it might have been lOOg; some properties may have
fewer instances, some may have more; and so on. Intuitively then, the kind
possible arrangements comprehends a vast array of alternative arrangements. And
the plenitude of loj;icdl space requires that ail such alternative arrangements be
included.
However, even this is only half the story. For we saw that the actual
spatiotemporal framework, the actual stock of properties and the actual stock of
individuals are not the only possible ones. And, intuitively, for each possible
framework, each possible stock of individuals and each possible stock of
properties, there are many possible ways for those individuals to instantiate
those properties and be arranged within that framework. And the plenitude of
logical space requires that it contain not just all the possible alternative
arrangements of the materials of the actual world, but also all the possible
alternative arrangements of all possible materials. It contains a plenitude of
"recombinations" of any given inventory of materials, whether this is the actual
inventory or a merely possible one. I will call the claim that logical space
contains every instance of this kind, the "Recombination Principle" (RP).
1.3.2 Negative Principles of Modality
Not everything that can be said, thought or otherwise represented
expresses a genuine possibility. The negative principles of modality concern this
gap between what can be said, thought or represented and what is genuinely
possible. For simplicity I will consider only sentences rather than any other sort
of representors; whatever is said about sentences applies mutatis mutandis to
the rest.
Sometimes it is an individual sentence that expresses what is, intuitively,
an impossibility, e.g. Tt is both raining and not raining.' But sometimes a
number of sentences each of which on its own expresses a genuine possibility,
may collectively express an impossibility. For instance, even though each of 'It is
raining' and 'It is not raining' might be true, they cannot both be. So in the
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interests of generality let us think of the negative principles of modality as
applying to collections or sets of sentences rather than to individual sentences.
These principles tell us which sets of sentences could not all be true together.
VVe can categorize such sets of sentences roughly into four classes
according to why, intuitively, they could not all be true together. This is rough
because it is left open whether the categorization is exhaustive or exclusive.
First, there are sets of sentences - “logically incompatible sets" - that
could not all be true together because if they were, then there would be a
violation of logic. Examples include {'it is raining', 'it is not raining'}, {'if it is
raining, then it is cold', 'it is raining', 'it is not cold'}, {'Bill is chubby', 'Nobody is
chubby'} and so on. The members of these sets could not all be true together on
pain of violating logic.
Second, there are sets of sentences — "mathematically incompatible sets" -
- that could not all be true together because if they were, then there would be a
violation of mathematics. Mathematical sentences are necessarily true or
necessarily false and any sentences whose joint truth would contradict a
mathematical theorem jointly express an impossibility.^^ The sets {'2 + 2 = 5'}
and {'some natural number is the greatest prime'}, for instance, are
mathematically incompatible sets.
Third, there are sets of sentences that could not all be true together in
virtue of facts about the meanings of the subsentential parts of their contained
sentences. Sets of such sentences are what we might call “semantically
incompatible". Since it is impossible for anyone to be both hairy and not hirsute
any set which contains the sentences 'Plato is hairy' and 'Plato is not hirsute' is
semantically incompatible. And since it is part of the meaning of 'bacheloT that
anyone who is a bachelor is unmarried any set that contains both 'Plato is a
bacheloT and 'Plato is married' is also semantically incompatible.
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Finally, there are sets of sentences - what we might call "metaphysically
incompatible sets"- which could not all be true together because if they were,
then there would a violation of some true metaphysical principle.^^ One such
principle concerns the relation between the stock of individuals and the
spatiotemporal framework: simply put, the framework must be the right size
and shape to accommodate all the individuals. It cannot be, for instance, that
there are continuum-many individuals within a spatiotemporal framework that
contains only denumerably-many points. Nor can there be three-dimensional
individuals within a framework that has only two dimensions. So any set of
sentences that contains sentences the joint truth of which would violate such a
requirement is metaphysically incompatible.
Another principle concerns so-called w-consistency. Suppose that 0 has a
property P, 1 has the property P, 2 has it, and so on. Consider the infinite set of
sentences {T(0)', T(l)', T(2)',...., '3n ~Px'}. For each natural number n, this set
contains a sentence which means that n has P. But it also contains a sentence
which means that there is some natural number which does not have P. There is
no violation of logic in supposing that all the sentences in such a set be true
together. But intuitively this would not represent a genuine possibility; it cannot
be true that there is some natural number that is not P unless some particular
natural number is not P. At least it is not possible if we assume that 0, 1, 2,... are
all the natural numbers. As it is sometimes put, existential claims should be
"witnessed".
There are also principles that concern the pattern of instantiation of the
stock of perfectly natural intrinsic properties. Such properties are not in general
logically independent of each other but stand in complicated relationships.
Some pairs of properties are such that any individual instantiating one cannot
instantiate the other; they are contraries. No individual can be both red all over
and blue all over, for instance; or both Ig and Sg in mass. On the other hand,
some pairs of properties are such that any individual instantiating one must
instantiate the other; some properties entail others. Any individual that is
scarlet, for instance, must be red; and any individual that is red must be
coloured. There are also relations among determinables and their determinates.
If some individual is coloured, for instance, then it must either be red or orange
or yellow or...; and if some individual is red, it must either be scarlet or
Vermillion or... Finally there are relations among the determinables themselves;
some entail one another, and maybe others exclude one another. Examples are
controversial, but perhaps anything coloured must have some area or other, and
perhaps anything coloured must not be abstract. So the sets, {'x is red', 'x is
blue }, I X is scarlef, 'x is not red'}, {'x is coloured', 'x is neither red nor orange
nor yellow nor...'}, {'x is coloured', 'x has no area'} and {'x is coloured', 'x is
abstract' } are all metaphysically incompatible sets.
A final type of principle concerns the relations between the properties of
a complex individual and the properties and arrangements of its parts.
Intuitively it is impossible that the particles that compose my desk-lamp should
have exactly the same intrinsic properties that they in fact do and be arranged
exactly as they in fact are without my lamp having just the colour and shape
that it in fact does. So {'my lamp is black', 'each of the parts of my lamp is red'
}
is a metaphysically incompatible set. We might express this in general by saving
that the intrinsic properties of a complex individual supervene on the intrinsic
properties of and the arrangement of its parts. Perhaps some intrinsic properties
of complex individuals, e.g. colour properties, supervene solely on the intrinsic
properties of their parts, while others e.g. shape properties, supervene solely on
the arrangement of their parts. Still others, e.g. aesthetic properties, perhaps
supervene on both.
1.4 Preview of Subsequent Chapters
The rest of this dissertation will be devoted to an examination of various
metaphysical theories of modality. 1 will present them in accord with the scheme
outlined in section 1.1 and I will evaluate them according to the criteria outlined
in section 1.2. In assessing the adequacy of their analyses and logical
constructions I will refer in the main to the pre-analytic data summarized in the
principles of section 1.3.
In the next chapter I present and evaluate a version of one of the clearest
metaphysical theories of modality - Lewis's modal realism. Although this is
now a familiar theory, much of the critical literature on modal realism is unclear
about precisely what parts of the theory are objectionable. I hope that
presentation and evaluation of it according to the scheme of this chapter should
help to clarify exactly what is problematic about it.
As I hope will become clear in the final chapter, an understanding of
modality is closely bound up with an understanding of the nature of properties
and relations. And before considering alternative metaphysical theories of
modality to modal realism in detail, I will devote a couple of chapters to giving
an account of the nature of properties and relations. In chapter three a theory of
basic properties is developed and defended against objections. In chapter four
this account is extended to cover non-basic properties and relations and certain
other loose-ends are tied up.
The remaining chapters are devoted to a discussion of what Lewis calls
"ersatz" theories of modality. Like modal realism these theories endorse the
familiar quantificational analysis of the modal statuses of propositions: for any
proposition p, possibly p iff there is some world at which p is true. But they
differ from modal realism in their accounts of the nature of the entities
quantified over, the worlds. In particular, they hold that we quantify only over
abstract entities of some kind, where modal realism holds that rve quantify over
concrete entities.
In chapter five I outline the ersatz strategy, and consider a very general
form of ersatzism. Lewis has presented a puzzling and abstract argument
against even this generic form of ersatzism. The argument is dilemmetic and I
respond by arguing that neither horn is dangerous. This clears the path for
development of an adequate form of ersatzism.
In the sixth and final chapter I present a rather crude form of ersatzism
and discuss some powerful objections to theories of this kind due to Bricker and
Lewis. Drawing on the analyses of properties and relations of chapters three and
four I then refine this theory so that it is immune to these criticisms. I tentatively
endorse this theory as the best metaphysical theory of modality.
In order to reduce this dissertation to a manageable size I have had to
impose certain restrictions. First, I do not discuss any theories that reject a
quantificational understanding of the modal statuses of propositions.^^ There
are a number of such theories and they are very interesting, but there is just not
space to do them justice here. Indeed, I do not even attempt to discuss all such
quantificational theories by any means. I discuss only what seem to me the most
promising few proposals. Second, I do not discuss the role of quantification over
"merely possible" individuals, individuals that are "less than" whole worlds, in
the analysis of modality. So I do not deal with issues concerning essentialism, de
re modality and so on. Although this considerably simplifies the presentation,
explanation and evaluation of the various theories to be discussed, these
theories are incomplete and the evaluations can only be provisional.
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There are a number ot ways of understanding the notion of logical consequence and quite
which IS being employed by a given metaphysical theory may prove crucial. In such cases thetheory will need to make its understanding of the notion of logical consequence clear. For
instance, in chapter six we will examine a metaphysical theory of modality that cannot
succeed if it employs a purely proof-theoretic notion of logical consequence.
A proof requires premises, so, on pain of infinite regress, there must be some non-null set of
axiorns. However, there may not be a unique smallest set of axioms. For instance it may be
that t^he theo^ contains three sentences A, B and C such that assuming any two we can prove
the third, and none is provable from any other sentences. Thus, a set which includes two of
the three as axioms is as minimal as any other, but there is no one smallest set. Usually
however, it will not matter which we adopt as the axioms.
^Though perhaps there must be at least one if the kind is to exist at all, and so quantification
over, or reference to, members of that kind is to be intelligible.
^ Usually, of course, quantification theory is formulated in such a way that its theorems
include all and only those sentences that come out true in all interpretations in all non-empty
domains. And then it follows from the semantics alone that there are some entities without
the aid of any axioms. However, this way of developing quantification theory so that the
empty domain is ignored is a mere technical convenience; it could easily be reformulated so
that the empty domain is included. Since the above characterization of metaphysical theories
is intended to be taken in as philosophically netural a way as possible, such technical
conveniences are not being presupposed. Think of the logic being presupposed here as one
that is free of existential assumptions, a so-called "free logic".
5 Again there may not be a unique smallest set of conceptual primitives. Sometimes a theory
will contain a circle of definitions
- perhaps predicate A is defined in terms of B and B in
terms of A and neither defined in terms of anything else. Then the ideology must include
either A or B but it need not include both. In such cases, we can think of there being a number
of equally minimal axiom sets and ideologies, though, in view of their simple
interconvertibility, it will not usually make any difference which we adopt as the axioms or
the ideology of the theory.
^ Perhaps, though, this is not generally the case. For perhaps some quantifiers are not unary
but essentially binary (see e.g. S. Neale, Descriptions, (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, MIT
Press, 1990), Chapter two). 1 will ignore this issue from now on.
^ W. V. O. Quine, 'Truth by Convention", in his The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, (New
York: Random House, 1966), p.71; see also B. Russell, The Principles ofMathematics, Second
Edition, (New York: Norton & Co., 1902), p. 249
^ It is perhaps best to think of definitions as correlating the language of the theory with a
more compact, easier-to-read, parallel language, rather than as a part of the theory proper.
But if we like we can add the results of definitional substitution into the axioms and their
consequences and regard them as additional theorems. Perhaps, we add the definitions to our
list of axioms, or perhaps we could think of all substitution instances of the logical
consequences as logical consequences of the original axioms by courtesy. It does not really
matter since definitions do not add anything new; they have no philosophical significance.
See W. V. O. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism", in his From a Logical Point of View, Second
Edition (revised), (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 20-46.
^ See W. V. O. Quine, "Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers", in his The Ways of
Paradox and Other Essays, (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 199-207.
Here the priority involved is supposed to be epistemic rather than logical or metaphysical.
It must not be that we could grasp or understand the analysans only if we grasp the
analysandum.
Sometimes two purported primitives of a theory are identified e.g. states of affairs with
propositions — perhaps in order to achieve some minimization of the ontology or ideology,
perhaps because one is more familiar than the other. But e.g. 'x is a proposition iff x is a state
of affairs' would not qualify as an analysis according to the above construal because there is
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no
IV" ‘TV*
- However, disqualify
,ng th,s as an acceptable analysis is not
really problematic: for one thing, the issue will not actually anse m the course of this
dissertation; for another, the biconditional could be treated simply as a definition or as a wavto provide an alternative ideology or primitive ontology.
I intend the notion of a kind or a collection to be understood ,n as neutral a way as possible
and I assume that it is pre-theoretically understood. The notion of a kind or collection should
not be automatically identified with the notion of a class for classes are controversial in many
ways. (Are there really any? Is there a universal class corresponding to unrestricted
quantification? etc.) However, if the legitimacy of classes can be secured, it may turn out that
this IS an theoretically attractive identification to make. And I will do so in chapter two.
Here I assume that the idea of a mereology of concepts is workably clear. It is not to be
assumed that a concept has a unique decomposition into conceptual parts.
Note that in saying that the analysandum concept and the entities to be logically
constructed must be "antecedently familiar" I am not saying that they need be either more
familiar or less familiar than the notions involved in their analysans or logical constructions.
The idea is only that we must have some grasp of them that is independent of the analyses
and constructions under consideration; we must know what it is that is being analyzed or
constructed.
It is this aim that provides the rationale for the requirement on logical constructions they
guarantee the existence of proxy functions. Often philosophical analyses are assumed to be
expressible in first-order theories. However, one version of the Skolem-Lowenheim theorem
entails that for any first-order theory T there is a translation f from T into R such that (i) R is
ontologically committed only to the natural numbers, and (ii) f is truth-preserving i.e. for any
sentence s of T, f(s)—a sentence of R— is true iff s is. Yet clearly such "reductions" as the
translation of T into R will not in general be adequate. It is this additional requirement of
structure-preservingness that rules out such unacceptable translations as are guaranteed to
exist by the Skolem-Lowenheim theorem from qualifying as reductions. This is because the
theorem does not guarantee the preservation of structure in the translation.
What is meant by 'preserving the structure' here is difficult to say in abstraction from
any particular theory, but a minimal requirement is that each of the existential claims of the
theory to be reduced be translated into a corresponding existential claim of the reduction:
'The reduction is not intended to provide a restructuring of logical form, only a switch of
underlying ontology" (P. Bricker, "Reducing Possible Worlds to Language", Philosophical
Studies, 52 (1987), p. 334).
See W. V. O. Quine, "Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers", in his The Ways of
Paradox and Other Essays, (New York; Random House, 1966).
^^To require that the primitive enhties or concepts should be as clear as possible is not the
same as requiring that they be more familiar to the layman. Highly theoretical entities and
concepts are often far clearer than their more prosaic cousins, even though mastery of a
complex theory may be required to grasp them.
^^The direct method of causal acquaintance may seem to have an advantage over the indirect
method of mference to the best explanation: the latter requires a premise that is almost
impossible to establish with certainty, viz. that it is indeed the best explanation. However, it
seems that when the subject-matter of the theory is a priori, causal acquaintance with all the
entihes or notions contained in the primitive ontology and ideology will just be out of the
question — every remotely plausible metaphysical theory requires positing at least some
entities that are beyond the possibility of causal acquaintance.
See B. Russell, "The RelaHon of Sense-Data to Physics", in his Mysticism and Logic, (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1917), pp. 140-73.
According to the stipulations 1 made above, the theorems are to be stated entirely in terms
of the primitive ontology and ideology whereas the kinds of entities constructed and the
notions analyzed do not appear in the primitive ontology and ideology. So to test the
analyses and constructions we must add the analyses and constructions to the set of axioms
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and then compare what the theory entails about these pre-theoretically familiar kinds of
entity and notions with the pre-theoretical data about them. To this end it is helpful evenbefore beginning the theory briefly to outline the set of pre-analytic data against which its
claims are to be compared. And in section 1.3 1 will attempt to outline some of the basic pre-
theoretical data about modality. ^
Note that conjoining all the axioms to give a single axiom does not simplify the set
according to this characterization since the resulting conjunction has a more complex logical
structure than any of the originals. Nor will the introduction of artificial predicates to
simplify the axioms, analyses and constructions succeed in enhancing a theory For although
this will result in an increase in simplicity, it does so only by decreasing the theory's value in
other ways: if, for instance, these artificial predicates are taken to be conceptual primitives,
our grasp on the ideology will generally be decreased in proportion to the artificiality of the
primitives. So 1 will assume that some sense can be made of the idea of the simplicity-cum-
strength of some axiom set that is not language-relative. This of course is highly controversial.
However, in this dissertation this criterion will be appealed to in order to adjudicate among
theones only when the verdict is very clear. In such cases it should be clear that one theory
has a definite advantage over the other that is not obviously covered by the other criteria,
whether or not it is aptly described as a matter of greater simplicity
-cum-strength. So I will
Ignore the interesting but tricky problems that surround the notions of simplicity and
strength.
Moreover, there can be no a priori guarantee that the best theory can entail all the data.
Perhaps, the data is confused or even incoherent. Nor is it clear that it should entail all the
data even if that data is coherent. To the extent that we are natural theorists, for instance, our
intuitions probably incorporate crude folk-theoretical elements, and clearly there should'be
no presumption in favour of accommodating these especially if our aim is to produce a new
and better theory.
This construal of Occam's Razor involves a slight departure from tradition. Traditionally
Occam s Razor is taken to dictate only that the ontology should be as minimal as possible.
But, as we saw above, it is often the case that reference to some kind of thing may be
eliminated in favour of reference to some thing in general together with the appropriate
adjective or adverb. This may seem to provide an easy recipe to cut down on ontological
commitments — we avoid naming or quantification, and so additional ontological
commitment in our theory, by introducing the right sort of adjectives or adverbs into it. But
clearly any appearance of explanatory gain is illusory if the notions expressed by these
adjectives and adverbs are taken to be conceptual primitives; if they remain unanalyzed.
Buying off ontological commitments with additional conceptual primitives generates no extra
explanatory power. Moreover, the reverse is also sometimes the case: the introduction of new
primitive quantifiers may permit the elimination of certain conceptual primitives. But again
any appearance of explanatory gain would be illusory. So, in view of their exchangeability,
the fact that we can often achieve a more minimal ontology at the cost of an expanded
ideology or vice versa, Occam's Razor should be seen as applying to the ontology and
ideology both: it dictates their joint minimization.
For interesting discussions of arguments to the effect that certain subjunctive modal claims
cannot straightforwardly be assimilated to the adverbial claim see P. Bricker, "Quantified
Modal Logic and the Plural De Re", in MidWest Studies in Philosoplty XIV: Contemporary
Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language II, Peter A. French, Theodore Uehling, Howard K.
Wettstein (eds.), (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 372-94; C.
Parsons, "Sets and Modality", in his Mathematics in Philosophy, (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1983), pp. 298-341; A.P. Hazen, "Against Pluralism", in Australasian journal of
Philosoplry, vol. 71 No. 2, (1993), pp. 132-44; and others.
Sometimes it seems to be properties (or predicates) to which modal statuses apply -
swans, e.g., may be said to have the property of possibly being blue. I will, however, ignore
this issues raised by such properties in the remainder ot this dissertation. T he simplihcation
will not make any difference to the subsequent discussion.
A little care must be taken in how we interpret the claim that there are "principles
concerning what is impossible". This is not to be taken to imply that there are states of affairs
that have a certain feature - they are impossible. For most standard accounts of propositions
or states of affairs entail that there is only a single impossible state of affairs. So at the very
least the implication of plurality is misleading. A better, though rather rough-and-ready, way
to interpret this claim is to construe it as a claim about which sentences correspond to
possible states of affairs: the negative principles tell us which sentences don't correspond to
possible states of affairs.
“^Throughout this discussion of the positive principles I rely on the lead of P. Bricker,
"Plenitude of Possible Structures", loiiriml of Philosophy
,
No. 11, (1991), pp. 607-22.'
D. K. Lewis, Philosophical Papers vol II, (Oxford, New York: University Press, 1986), pp. ix-x.
1 do not wish to discuss here whether this really is all there is to the world, but certainly there
IS this much whether or not there is more. It should be pointed out that this characterization
is controversial in many ways. First and most obviously many would disagree with Lewis's
claim that all else supervenes on the local distribution of qualities. Second, many would find
the claim that perfectly natural intrinsic properties need nothing larger than a point-instant to
be instantiated dubious; indeed, some would doubt the intelligibility of the idea thatniiy
intrinsic property be instantiated at a point-instant. I do not wish to enter into debate about
these issues here and so 1 will just assume that Lewis’s characterization is intelligible.
Notice also that the characterization makes no mention of relations other than the
spatiotemporal relations among the points of spacetime. This is because Lewis believes that
ail relations supervene either on the intrinsic properties of their relata considered separately
or on the spatiotemporal relations among them. I will discuss and explain this claim more
fully in chapter six. For now I will just assume that he is right, but if this is considered
doubtful all mention of properties in what follows can be understood as implicit mention of
relations too. Whatever is said about properties extends easily and naturally to relations also.
Just think of an n-place relation as a property of n-tuples.
Although 1 will continue to refer to possible "spatiotemporal" structures, structures that
are temporal but not spatial or vice versa may also be possible ways for the structure of the
actual world to have been (see D.K. Lewis, On the Pluraliti/ of Worlds , (Oxford, New York:
Basil Blackwell, 1986), section 1.6).
1 have illustrated this point with examples that are non-simple individuals because we do
not usually have names for simple individuals. But the point is unaffected.
Another way to motivate this intuition is to appeal to considerations of cardinality.
Presumably there is some definite number of particulars n which actually exist. But any
specific number of particulars is arbitrary and so contingent. If there are n particulars,
intuitively there might have been n -h 1. Thus, there might have been more particulars than
there actually are.
This is not conclusive. There may be infinitely many actual particulars. But for
infinite numbers, adding one does not yield a set of greater cardinality. The argument fails to
show that there might have been more particulars than there actually are in any clear sense of
'more'.
In response, it might be said that the intuition is that there might have been 2*^
individuals and for any x, 2^ is greater than x.
Maybe there is such an intuition, but it is unclear whether this can be construed as a
^rrp-analytic intuition, one that must be accommodated by any adequate theory. To deny it is
not obviously to deny any Moorean fact.
Another way to motivate the intuition that stocks of individuals that are
augmentations of the actual stock are possibilities that does not appeal to cardinalities turns
on the idea of "otherness". It might be urged that it is perfectly intelligible that there be
individuals that are other than any that actually exist. And if it is intelligible, it is possible. But
a stock of individuals that contains all actual indiv iduab and soinv ihai arc other than each otthese would be an augmentation ot the actual stock.
If we think of individuals as distinct from their locations, then there is a third wav to
motivate this intuition. Intuitively, not every location is occupied by an individual; some areempty But intuitively whether or not one point-instant is occupied or vacant is independent
of whether any other is. Thus, it is possible for all to be occupied. And then there would beindividuals that don t actually exist. This motivation is, however, not available if point-
instants are taken to be the individuals. And it does not justify us in holding that there mighthave more individuals than there actually are spacetime points.
Roughly, the perfectly natural properties are those that features of particulars that
correspond to some genuine objective similarities among them; the intrinsic properties are
those features of particulars that they have regardless of the state or existence of any distinct
particular. Quite what it really is for a property to be perfectly natural or for it to be intrinsic
will be extensively discussed in chapter three.
D. M. Armstrong, for instance, denies this (see his A Combimtorml Theory of Possibility,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 54-7. See 6.5.1 below for a discussion,
and rejection, of his arguments.
Again this intuition may be motivated by appeal to considerations of cardinality or,
perhaps more convincingly, to considerations of otherness. Suppose that the actual world
instantiates a certain set of properties. The set of properties has a certain cardinality. But for
any specific cardinal number it seems contingent that the set should have this cardinality
rather than some greater cardinality. Further, it seems perfectly intelligible that there be some
property that is other than each member of this set.
In the case of properties there is perhaps also another way to motivate this intuition,
a motivation that parallels the third type of motivation in fn.31. Many properties belong to
families or determinables that exhibit some kind of internal structure. TTiis structure can be
thought of as a "space" of a certain kind, some of whose locations are actually empty. The
colours, e.g., form a circle, they generate a circular space; the masses can take any positive
real value, they generate a one-dimensional continuous space; and so on. Above we
distinguished individuals from their locations, allowing us to think of extra individuals as
filling the empty spaces. Here we can distinguish instances from their properties, and think of
some properties as empty locations in their property-spaces. Perhaps, for instance, nothing is
exactly 3.761 g; perhaps nothing is some absolutely specific reddish hue. TTiese two properties
would correspond to the "empty" locations in the mass- and colour-spaces respectively.
Intuitively, though, it is possible that something instantiate such empty properties. And
stocks of instantiated properties that contain such properties would be augmentations of the
actual stock. Again however this sort of reasoning provides only limited support for the
intuition. It doesn't justify the intuition that there might have been more thoroughly alien
properties, properties drawn from determinables none of whose determinates are actually
instantiated.
In chapter six (section 6.5.3) I will briefly discuss the doctrine of "anti-Haecceitism". Anti-
haecceitists hold that (PI) is subsumed under (PP). At this stage I state both principles leaving
it open whether or not the anti-haecceitists are correct.
Note that this is not dependent on whether we know of a proof or even whether there
could be a proof.
As Quine has emphasized in a number of places (see e.g.'Two Dogmas of Empiricism"), it
is difficult and maybe even impossible, to draw a principled line between questions of fact
and questions of meaning. So it is not to be assumed that there is a hard-and-fast principled
difference between the metaphysically and the semantically incompatible sets of sentences.
The distinction should be treated as heuristic only at this stage. Indeed, Quine seems to reject
any notion of inompatibility other than a logical one.
Indeed, I discuss only those theories of modality that adopt an understanding of the modal
statuses of propositions that employs singular quantifiers over worlds. This restriction is
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traditional though, as far as I can tell, unmotivated. A number of philosophers have argued
or the need to recognize plural quantifiers m addition to singular quantifiers (e.g. G. BoolosTo Be IS to Be he , Variable (or to Bo Some Values of Some Xanables)'' louJofPhilosophy 81 (^984), pp. 430-449 and "Nominalistic Platonism", Philospluail Revieiu, 94, (198-)
pp. 3-7-44) Arid Bncker argues for the need for plural quantifiers in analyzing modality (PRncker, Island Lniverses and the Analysis of Modality ", forthcoming in Rca/,hy and Hmnmu
Supciimuence: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. 1 ignore this issue for simplicitv' only.
CHAPTER 2
A METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF MODALITY: MODAL REALISM
In his magnificent On the Plurality of Worlds David Lewis presents
perhaps the boldest and best worked-out metaphysical theory of modality.
i
Lewis calls the theory "modal realism". The aims of this chapter are to explain
a version of this theory, \IR
,
and to evaluate it according to the criteria set
out in chapter one. I hope this helps to separate out the problematic aspects of
the theory and so avoids some misguided objections that have tended to
obscure both its strengths and weaknesses.
2.1 A Version of Modal Realism (MR)
2.1.1 Definitions, Analyses, Logical Constructions
The principal aim of a metaphysical theory of modality is to account for
the modal statuses of propositions .2 MR adopts the familiar account in terms of
quantification over worlds. Where p is any proposition,
(A1 ) Possibly, p iff there is some world at which p is true.
One of the most striking features of modal realism is that (Al) is intended
as a reductive analysis of modality: IVER attempts to account for all the notions and
entities involved, viz. propositions, worlds and the relation of truth-at, without
employing any "modal" notion, either implicitly or explicitly.^
Propositions are set-theoretically constructed from worlds:
(1 .Cl ) X is a proposition iff x is a class of worlds.
And the true-at relation between propositions and worlds is identified with the
membership relation of set-theor}’:
(Dl) A proposition p is true at a world w =df. w is a member of pd
To define world
,
MR appeals to the mereological notion of a "fusion",
something that has proper parts:
(D2) X is a world =df. x is a maximal fusion of world-matesd
where a fusion f of world-mates is maximal iff any world-mate of any part of f is
itself a part of f.
The world-mate relation is a relation that holds among concrete
particulars (or individuals) and is defined in terms of their spatiotemporal
connectedness:
(D3) X and y are world-mates =df. they are spatiotemporally connected.
From (D2) and (D3) it follows that a world is a fusion of concrete particulars each
part of which is spatiotemporally related to every other part (it is
spatiotemporally interrelated) and no part of which of which is spatiotemporally
related to any non-parts.
As I hope to show in chapter six, there is an intimate link between our
understanding of properties and relations and our understanding of modality. In
particular, there seems to be Little prospect for a fully explanatory reductive
analysis of modalit}' without logically constructing properties and relations in
non-modal terms. So MR also contains the following logical constructions:^
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(LCla) F is a property in the abundant sense of 'property' iff F is a class of
particulars.
(LCls) F is a property in the sparse sense of 'property' iff F is a class of
particulars and F is perfectly natural.
(LC2a) R is an n-place relation in the abundant sense of 'relation' iff R is a
class of n-tuples of particulars.
(LC2s) R is an n-place relation in the sparse sense of 'relation' iff R is a class
of n-tuples of particulars and R is perfectly natural.^
Having logically constructed properties, it is a straightforward matter to
define the very useful relation of duplication:
(D4) X is duplicate ofy =df. for every perfectly natural property P, Px iff Py.^
It will also prove useful to define two further notions:
(D5) For any particular x and world w, x exists at w =df. some part of x is a part
of w.
(D6) For any particular x, x is a possible particular =df. there is some world w
and every part of x exists at w.
2.1.2 Axioms
Whether (Al) constitutes an adequate analysis of modality depends in
part on whether MR's theorems are true. Some may be provable from others; but
since a proof needs premises, on pain of circularity, MR must accept some
theorems without proof. These are its axioms.
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Several of MR's definitions and logical constructions employ notions
drawn from mereology and set-theor>\ And modal realism contains the axioms
of some standard mereology and the axioms of some standard impure set-theor\'.
The mereological axioms include at least the following: (1) If x is a part of
some part of y, then x is a part of y (i.e. parthood is transitive); (2) Whenever
there are some things, there exists something - their "fusion" or "sum" - which
has all of them as parts and which has no part distinct from all of them (i.e.
composition is unrestricted);^ (3) It never happens that the same things have two
different fusions (i.e. composition is unique).
There are a number of different axiomatic bases for impure set-theory each
of which would serve MR's purposes equally well; for instance the axioms for
ZF set-theory plus individuals or the axioms for BGN set-theory plus
individuals.!^ These differ in some respects that are important to various
questions about the metaphysics of modality. However, I will not choose among
them as I will not be discussing any of the questions to which these differences
are relevant.
Finally, there are the axioms that have to do specifically with modality.
Lewis explicitly mentions only one axiom - the "principle of recombination". It
consists of two parts, the first of which
Roughly speaking.. .is that anything can co-exist with anything else, at
least provided they occupy distinct spatiotemporal positions...Thus if
there could be a dragon, and there could be a unicorn, but there couldn't
be a dragon and a unicorn side by side, that would be...unacceptable.!2
This is rather sketchy and several interpretive remarks are in order. First,
the quantifiers are to be understood to range over all, but only, possible
individuals, simple or complex; they are not restricted to actual individuals, but
they are restricted to "world-bound" individuals. Second, "co-existence" is to be
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understood in terms of duplication rather than identip' (or some related notion
such as Lewis's own counterpart relation); to say it is possible for x to co-exist
with y, is to say that it is possible that there be both a duplicate of x and a duplicate
of y.i3 Third, the principle is to be understood to apply not just to any tav
possible parHculars, but to any number of them; roughly, it allows that for any
collection of possible particulars, it is possible for duplicates of all of them to co-
exist. And it is to be understood also to allow that for any possible individual, it
IS possible that there be multiple duplicates of that particular. Finally, although
spatiotemporal arrangements are not explicitly mentioned, it is clear that Lewis
intends the principle to say not just that any possible individuals can co-exist, but
that they can co-exist within any possible spatiotemoral arrangement.
So the first half of the recombination principle might be more
perspicuously expressed as:
For any collection of possible individuals, and any possible spatiotemporal
arrangement, it is possible that those individuals co-exist according to that
spatiotemporal arrangement.
Even though this is not quite adequate as it stands, it whll suffice for our
purposes.
The second part of the recombination principle concerns the relation of
failing to co-exist with. Lewis intends it as an expression of Flume's famous
denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. It says roughly that
"anything can fail to co-exist with anything else." Again the quantifiers are
understood to range over all possible individuals, "co-existence" is understood in
terms of duplication, and the principle is understood to apply not just to any two,
but to any collection of possible individuals whatsoever. Additionally, it must be
qualified in two w^ays. First, since to duplicate anything is thereby to duplicate all
Its parts, in general x can tail to co-exist with y only if x and y do not overlap.
Second, since to duplicate anything is thereby to duplicate any of its duplicates,
in general, x can fail to co-exist with y only if x and y are not duplicates. The
second half of the recombination principle then might be more perspicuously
expressed as follows:
For any collection of non-overlapping world-mates none of which are
duplicates, it is possible that a duplicate of any one of them exists without
duplicates of any of the others.
This too is not cjuite adequate as it stands, but again it will suffice for our
purposes.
2.2 Evaluating MR
In chapter one I adopted seven connected criteria for evaluating a
metaphysical theory. First, there were a group of broadly epistemological criteria.
These concern: (1) the pre-theoretic intelligibility of the theory's primitive
ontology and ideology; (2) the plausibility of its theorems; and (3) the extent to
which the theory permits an explanation of the origin of our knowledge of its
ontology, ideology and axioms. Second, there were some criteria of theoretical
utility. These concern: (4) the degree to which the theory maximizes the
accommodation of the pre-analytic data; (5) the simplicity of its axioms, analyse^
and logical constructions; (6) the parsimoniousness of its primitive ontology and
ideology; and (7) the degree of systematization it imposes on this data.
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Z 2.1 The Intelligibiht\- of MR's Primitives and the Plausibilit\’ of its Hieorems
2.2.1 .1 The Acceptability^ of Set Theory-
MR employs various unexplained elements drawn from impure set-
theory^ In particular, it presupposes the intelligibility of quantification over
classes, it presupposes the intelligibility of the membership relation, and its
axioms properly include the axioms of impure set-theory.i‘^
However, with respect to its set-theoretical parts, there should be no
philosophical objection to MR. For set-theor\' is an entrenched branch of
mathematics and mathematical knowledge is at least as secure as any collection
of premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary So set-theory should
be granted Moorean status: philosophers may attempt to explain it, but they
should not reject it. Philosophers are just not entitled to reject the intelligibility of
the primitives of set-theory or the truth or knowability of its theorems. Lewis:
Mathematics is an established, going concern. Philosophy is as shaky as
can be. To reject mathematics for philosophical reasons would be absurd...
ThaF s not an argument, I Imow. Rather, Tm moved to laughter at
the thought of how presumptuous it would be to reject mathematics for
philosophical reasons .. .22
2.2. 1.2 The Intelligibility of MR's Non-Set-Theoretic Quantifiers
But even if quantification over sets is intelligible, Lycan argues that some
of MR's other quantifiers are not. He points out that some of the quantifiers that
appear among the theorems of MR - what he calls "Relentlessly Meinongian"
quantifiers — take merely possible individuals as values of their variables. And this,
he claims, is objectionable:
I have to take my place among those who find Relentlessly (i.e.
genuinely or primitively) Meinongian quantification simply unintelligible...!
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mean that I really cannot understand Relentlessly Meinongian
quantification at all; to me it is literally gibberish or mere noise.
The problem is supposed to be that to existentially quantify over things
that do not, but might have existed is tantamount to saying that there are things
that do not (actually) exist. And this, Lycan seems to be saying, is just gibberish.
But the intelligibility of the referential portion of a theorv’ presupposes
only that we understand the kinds of entity it refers to or quantifies over. And
inspection of the above presentation of MR reveals that the domains of the
quantifiers were not specified as consisting of particulars that do not but might
have existed. So the intelligibility of its quantifiers does not presuppose a grasp
of such a notion. In the presentation of MR the only kinds of entity referred to or
quantified over in addition to classes are what were called “concrete particulars“.
To play the roles assigned to them by MR these concrete particulars must be
memberless and they must have some location in space and time.^^ [\-
just obvious that we grasp the kind concrete particulars thus understood? We all
quantify over such things every day. Indeed, to reject such quantification as
unintelligible is to reject the most mundane claims of the ordinary person as
unintelligible. And the philosopher has no more right to do this than she has to
reject the intelligibility of mathematics.
Modal realists do however make some very unusual claims about quite
how many concrete particulars there are, how many maximal fusions of them
there are, what their other properties and relations are, and so on. And if the
theorems of modal realism are to be true, then the domain of concrete particulars
will include more than just actual particulars. But the intelligibility of a theorem
is one thing, its truth quite another. Quantification over possible individuals —
worlds and their parts — is intelligible because they are concrete particulars and
quantification over concrete particulars is intelligible. And even if we strongly
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disagree u'lth the various other claims that MR makes about concrete particulars,
such disagreement does not show that we don't grasp quantification over them.
In particular, a grasp of haiu many members there are in a given domain is clearly
not required for the intelligibility of quantitynng over such things. I grasp
quantification over all sorts of domains whose cardinality I just don't know -
galaxies, ants, bacteria, electrons. Lycan's objection is misguided.
2.2. 1.3 The Intelligibility of MR s Non-Set-Theoretic Primitives
MR appeals to a primitive mereological relation, parthood, and it includes
the axioms of some standard mereology.25 Parthood is the relation that the leg of
my table bears to my table, the 1960s bears to the twentieth century, poetry bears
to literature, and so on. It is about as basic, familiar and pervasive a relation as
there is. And it is hard to object to any theory on the grounds that it presupposes
the intelligibility of this relation. Indeed, it is hard to see how any metaphysical
theory could do without it (or at least without cognate notions such as, e.g.,
overlap, or fusion). Moreover, the axioms of mereology can be regarded as a
partial explication of our intuitive grasp of parthood. I will also assume that these
axioms are plausible.^^
The intelligibility of MR also presupposes the intelligibility of the tw'o-
place relation of spatioternporal connectedness among concrete particulars. Concrete
particulars are spatiotemporally connected whenever, intuitively, there is some
relation of spatioternporal distance between them.^^ New York City, the sun, the
farthest galaxies and everything in betw^een are aU at some distance in space from
me, so they are all spatiotemporally connected to me. The individuals that
comprise the Big Bang, the Second World War, the Big Crunch (if there will be
one) and everything in between are all at some distance in time from me, so they
are all spatiotemporally connected to me. Even if there are things which lack
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spatial locations - spirits, thoughts, Cartesian egos - they are still
spatiotemporally connected to me by virtue of being at some temporal distance
from me. The city' of Atlantis, Hamlet and people with telepathic powers,
regardless of how complete and plausible their descriptions, are not at any
distance in space or time from me and so are not spatiotemporally connected to
me.2« Spatiotemporal connectedness is an equivalence relation.29 Again such a
relation seems to be pre-theoretically intelligible and something like it is perhaps
indispensable in any complete metaphysical theory. At least there are compelling
reasons to think that spatiotemporal relations cannot be analyzed solely in terms
of the intrinsic properties of their relata.^o
The final primitive of MR is the property of naturalness. Intuitively, some
things "go together", they are similar in some respect; while others do not, a
collection of them is arbitrary in some way. Naturalness can be thought of as a
measure of how well some collection of things goes together, how similar they
are.^^ The collection of all and only the things that are some specifically reddish
hue, for instance, is more natural than a collection that consists of most reddish
things. And this in turn is more natural than the collection that consists of one
particular piece of dust, the first person to shop at Wal-Mart and the city of
Florence in the fourteenth century.
MR takes naturalness to be a property that comes in degrees and applies
only to classes. When a class has the highest degree of naturalness, it is said to be
perfectly natural, and when it has no degree of naturalness, it is said to be non-
natural. Most classes are non-natural. naturalness of a class is supposed to
be a language- and mind-independent fact about it; a measure of how genuinely
and objectively similar its members are.
However, a tradition that derives in part from Goodman rejects the notion
of objective similarity and with it any related notion such as naturalness.
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Although things might ^ecm to us to be similar or dissimilar, there is nothing, it is
argued, to license us in thinking of such appearances as grounded in any mind-
or language-independent facts about reality. For similarity is a matter of sharing
properties, and any two things share vast numbers of properties and fail to share
vast numbers of others. There is just no good reason for thinking that similarity is
anything but a matter of which shared properties are of interest to us. Goodman
writes that “Similarity, ever ready to solve philosophical problems and overcome
obstacles, is a pretender, an imposter, a quack."^^
But if we do not suppose that there are objective facts of similarity or that
some properties are genuinely perfectly natural (or at least more natural than
others), a wide range of philosophical problems will be completely unsolvable.
So there must be something to play the role of naturalness or similarity; the
alternative
— permanently unsolvable philosophical difficulties — is just
unacceptable. And in that case it is perfectly in order for MR to adopt naturalness
as one of its primitives. This is not to say that naturalness is self-explanatory or
that it could not be further analyzed. Adopting it as primitive amounts merely to
putting off an explanation to another day. In fact, the modal realist need not
claim that naturalness is anything other than a place-marker for whatever plays
the needed role. And in that case, it is unfair to call it a pretender; on the
contrary, it is the real McCoy whatever that should turn out to be!^^
(This is intended only to establish the legitimacy of assuming a pre-
theoretically understood primitive of naturalness. It doesn't establish that MR is
correct to take naturalness as a property of classes of particulars or that it is
correct to think of it as a property that comes in degrees. In chapter three I w ill
suggest a slightly different and, I believe, clearer understanding of naturalness
that takes it to apply to rather more complicated classes than MR's candidates.)
4 .')
In short, there should be no objection to MR's primitive ontology and
ideology or to its set-theoretical and mereological axioms. Mowever, it is only by
virtue of (Al) that these unobjectionable parts of MR have any relevance at all to
what MR is supposed to be a theor\^ of: our intuitions about modality. So let us
turn next to an examination of the adequacy of this analysis. In section 2.2.2 I
consider some of its advantages. In section 2.2.3 I consider and reject some
purported difficulties with this analysis. And in section 2.2.4 I consider some
genuine problems.
2.2.2 Some Advantages of MR's Analysis of Modality
(Al) analyzes modality in terms of quantification over worlds. This permits
MR to treat the traditionally recalcitrant idioms of modality within the kind of
simple extensional languages that have been so extensively studied in the last
century or so. Moreover, this quantificational model can be extended to many
other intensional contexts e.g. scientific contexts, ethical contexts and
propositional attitude contexts. These other contexts can be illuminatingly
treated as involving restricted quantification over worlds: physical possibilities
can be explained in terms of quantifiers that are restricted to worlds that share
the same physical laws as our own; moral necessities or obligations, as involving
quantifiers restricted to worlds as they should be; beliefs, as involving quantifiers
restricted to worlds which we could not distinguish from the actual world. Thus
the quantificational model of modal idioms, if extended to intensional contexts
generally, permits the unification of many superficially disparate types of
discourse. MR imposes great systematicity on the data.^^
However, many other metaphysical theories also account for modality in
terms of quantification over entities they call "worlds". So they too can claim the
benefits of systematization claimed by MR. What is characteristic of MR, what
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distinguishes it from these rivals, is its account of the nature of its worlds. MR
identihes its worlds with certain concrete particulars; specifically, with maximal
fusions of spatiotemporally interconnected particulars that are supposed to exist
quite independently of what we say or think.
One advantage of this is that it keeps MR's ontology to a minimum. The
modal realist draws her worlds from a category^ of entities - concrete memberless
particulars having some location in space or time - to which we are already
committed by our ordinary, mundane claims. Thus a commitment to worlds
represents no expansion of the basic everyday ontology. Nor is the modal realist
committed to additional ontological categories of propositions, properties and
relations, or even to any additional mathematical objects. These are all simply
classes.37 Moreover, all the terms involved in (Al) and the logical constructions
are defined or logically constructed in terms of a very short list of conceptual
primitives. And each of these too has a good claim to pre-theoretical intelligibility
and, indeed, indispensability. So MR's minimal ontology is not achieved at any
ideological cost. MR can claim an extremely parsimonious ontology-cum-
ideology. In fact, there is good reason to think that no complete ontology and
ideology could be more minimal. In this respect IVIR is clearly preferable to
many other metaphysical theories of modality (e.g. the version of magical
ersatzism to be considered in chapter five).
But again this does not represent an advantage for MR over all its
quantificational rivals. The version of mathematical ersatzism to be considered in
chapter six, for instance, locates its worlds among the other entities to which both
it and MR are committed: (impure) sets. And it too attempts to give a reductive
analysis of modality and to logically construct propositions, properties and
relations without employing any primitive predicates other than those employed
by MR.
4Where the identification of worlds ivith concrete particulars does confer a
unique advantage on MR is with respect to accommodating the "negative data"
of modality.
In chapter one (section 1.3.2) I characterized the negative data as
consequences of principles that tell us what is impossible. Rival attempts to
analyze modality in terms of quantification all construe the domain of
quantification as consisting of representational entities; what is true at them is a
matter of what they represent. But it is all too easy to represent what is not really
possible. And in his discussion of these rival theories Lewis emphasizes just how
difficult it is for them to accommodate the negative data of modality, at least if
they eschew appeal to modal notions (which they must in order to achieve a
reductive analysis of modality). I will discuss his arguments in chapter six.
IVIR s worlds are concrete entities whose existence is independent of how
we think about them. MR, by contrast to its rivals, does not attribute the
theoretical roles of its worlds to any representational powers they might have.
MR's worlds play their theoretical roles simply in virtue of their ordinary
properties. In effect MR identifies what is true at its worlds with what is true of
them. And notice that although we can say things that do not express genuine
possibilities, and there can be entities that otherwise represent what is impossible,
no thing can itself be impossible. So since it cannot be that impossibilities —
contradictions, violations of metaphysical principles etc. -- are true of any of
MR's worlds, it cannot be that any impossibilities are true at any of them.^‘^ It is
the "thing-like" rather than representational nature of the worlds of modal
realism that automatically guarantees the pre-theoretic negative modal intuitions;
that automatically excludes "impossible worlds".
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2 3^ Does MR \Hsrepresent the Meanings of Ordi nal- Laneuaoe \[oddl
It IS sometimes argued that MR, by virtue of treating modalit\' as a matter
of quantification over maximal spatiotemporally interconnected concrete
particulars, is already a w/sanalysis of the ordinary language idioms of modality.
If asked, most perfectly competent users of modal idioms in natural
language would be ver>^ surprised to learn that using these idioms commits them
to the existence of maximal spatiotemporally interconnected concrete particulars.
So the modal realist's analysis of modality (Al) foists on ordinary speakers
unsuspected ontological commitments. And so, it is argued, (Al) misrepresents
what the idioms of modality mean - we know what we mean and that's not it.
Moreover, (Al) seems to distort English grammar. Stalnaker points out
that possible worlds are usually introduced as "ways the actual world might
have been but is not".4« Indeed, Lewis himself introduced them in this way.^t But
in English a way things might have been' seems to be a property-expression
rather than an expression for a particular. There are many ways that I might have
been and one of them is the way that I actually am. But none of these, not even
the latter, can plausibly be identified with me: I am a individual thing, not a way.
Similarly, there are many ways that the universe as a whole might be and one of
them is the way that it actually is. But it too is an individual thing, not a way. So
MR's identification of the entities quantified over in modal discourse — worlds —
with concrete particulars is tantamount to identifying ways that the actual world
might have been with concrete particulars. And that just obliterates the
fundamental and maybe irreducible distinction between particulars and
properties.
Such objections are not compelling. First, because appeals to notorious
creatures of darkness like meanings are clearly suspect. Indeed, on one
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understanding of the notion of a meaning, meanings need not be fully accessible
even to competent users of the language - meanings “ain't in the head". So
perhaps, on one understanding of 'meanings', (Al) really does give the meaning
of ordinary modal statements however surprising this might be to competent
users of modal idioms.
But second, MR is a metaphysical theory of modality not a theor\' of the
semantics of natural language modal idioms. As such it aims to explain the pre-
theoretical data of modality, rather than give the meanings of the idioms by
means of which we express this data. A good explanation must maximize
ontological and conceptual economy, axiomatic simplicity and so on. Natural
languages, however, have many other uses than simply explaining and should
aim, for instance, to maximize communicative efficiency among speakers, even if
this diminishes ontological and conceptual economy. And these other non-
explanatory functions may well be reflected in the meanings of the idioms we use
to express the data of modality. In short, there is just no good reason to think that
to explain the data of modality is at once to give the meanings of the idioms by
means of which we express this data. In particular, if our business is to give a
metaphysical theory, then any presumption in favour of respecting ordinary'
language distinctions is at least defeasible by considerations of theoretical
economy. So it is quite in order for Lewis to argue, as he does, that if theoretical
economy is thereby enhanced, ways things could have been should be identified
with concrete particulars, regardless of whether this gives the meanings of
ordinary language modal idioms or obliterates the distinctions built into English
grammar:
Given modal realism, it becomes advantageous to identify 'ways a
world could possibly be' with worlds themselves. Why distinguish two
closely corresponding entities: a world, and also the maximally specific
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way that world is? Fconomy dictates identifying the 'wavs' with the
worldsd^
Indeed, when it comes to analyses, the explanatory' aim of a metaphysical theory'
seems quite at odds with the aim of giving the meanings of our ways of
expressing the data. For one way in which an analysis explains is by
decomposing its analysandum concept into its parts and displaying how these
parts are connected.^3 But then the analysans and analysandum differ in their
logical structure. .“\nd in that case it is hard to see how they could mean the same.
The complaint that (Al) fails to give the meaning of our modal idioms should not
worry the modal realist.
2.2.4 MR and The Positive Data of Modality
But there are some genuine problems with MR's analysis of modality.
These all have to do with the "positive data" of modality and, or so it seems to
me, they point to two problems with MR: iFs analysis of properties, and its
analysis of modality in terms of quantification over maximal spatiotemporally
interconnected concrete particulars (rather than over classes).
Obviously, MR is adequate to the pre-theoretical positive data of modality'
only if every instance of (Al) is true; it must be that there really exists one of
MR's worlds at which so-and-so whenever, intuitively, it is possible that so-and-
so. If, for instance, there is just one of AER's worlds, or just seventeen, then (Al)
gets the positive facts of modality badly wrong; for, intuitively, there are many
more possibilities than that. In 1.3.1 1 suggested that we can be a little more
precise about the range of possibilities that any adequate metaphysical theory
must recognize. For we can think of the way the actual world is as the result of a
particular combination of various elements — a spatiotemporal framework, a
collection of particulars, and a collection of (perfectly natural intrinsic)
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properties. c:)ther possibilities are supposed to be alternatives to the way the
actual world is. We can think of some of them as the result oi alternative
combinations of these very' same elements. But, intuitively, each of these three
elements is itself just one instance of a kind of w'hich there are many other
instances. So the full extent of logical space can be thought of as delimited by all
the possible ways of combining or recombining all the various instances of all the
kinds. In 1.3.1 I summarized this account of the extent of logical space in four
principles, (PS), (PR), (PP) and (RP).
Since MR is adequate to the pre-theoretic positive data of modality only if
there really exists one of \IR s worlds at which so-and-so whenever it is possible
that so-and-so, the four principles of chapter one may be recast so as to yield
conditions ofadequacy on MR. MR is adequate to the pre-theoretic positive data of
modality only if the following are true:
(PS') For each possible spatiotemporal structure, S, there exists at least one
of MR's worlds having S as its spatiotemporal structure.^^
(PF) For each possible stock, I, of individuals, there exists at least one of
MR's worlds having I as its stock of individuals.
(PP) For each possible stock, P, of properties, there exists at least one of MR's
worlds having P as its stock of properties.
(RP') For any spatiotemporal framework S had by any of MR's worlds, any
stock of individuals I had by any of MR's worlds, any stock of
properties P had by any of MR's worlds, and any possible combination of
members of P and I within S, there is at least one of MR's worlds having
just that combination.
This means that if MR really is adequate to the positive data of modality,
there is an extremely vast and infinitely varied plurality of what the modal realist
calls "worlds". (PS') entails the existence of enough worlds to instantiate an
infinite variety of spatiotemporal structures. One of these is familiar — the one
that is actually instantiated; but, intuitively, many of the others are very different
indeed from the actual spatiotemporal structure -- some have five or five-
hundred dimensions, others quite different curvatures, and so on. (PI') and (PP')
entail that among these worlds are to be found vast infinities of individuals and
instantiated properties. Some of these individuals actually exist and some of the
properties are actually instantiated and there will be worlds that include
unicorns, cities of cheese, and talking donkeys among their parts. But the vast
majority are "alien" to the actual world and are indescribably strange. Finally,
(RP ) entails, roughly, that there are enough worlds to instantiate every possible
combination (permutation, distribution or arrangement) of possible individuals
and properties within any possible spatiotemporal structure - worlds with cities
of cheese talking donkeys, worlds with fifty spatial dimensions and mile-high
purple cows, and so on. The actual world instantiates one such combination;
other worlds instantiate various recombinations within the actual spatiotemporal
structure of the actual particulars and actually instantiated properties; still others,
combinations of alien individuals and properties within alien spatiotemporal
structures.
But notice that each of MR's worlds is a maximal fusion of
spatiotemporally interconnected concrete particulars; worlds are all — actual and
merely possible alike — the same kind of thing: real, concrete memberless
particulars having parts instantiating properties and relations.
2.2.4.1 The Incredulous Stares
Many, if not most, philosophers think that all this is just wildly
implausible; that it offends against what Russell famously called a "robust sense
of reality". “^5 jg jygt incredible, they argue, that such a vast plurality of
particulars really exists in as full-blooded and concrete a way as you and I, the
chair I'm sitting on, and the stars, puddles and horses I can see. Intuitively, such
things as five-hundred dimensional spacetimes, cities of cheese and purple cows
are "mere possibilities".^ Indeed the existence of such a vast plurality of concrete
particulars strikes so many people as implausible that Lewis reports that his
presentations of modal realism used to meet with "incredulous stares" more
often than arguments.47 And even he frankly acknowledges its prima facie
incredibility:
Modal realism does disagree, to an extreme extent, with firm
common sense opinion about what there is...small wonder if you are
reluctant to believe it.4«
Perhaps the modal realist will be tempted to reply as follows. This all
seems surprising only because it is not obvious that modality is really
quantificational in nature. But there is good reason to think that modality must be
accounted for in terms of quantification. And if so, then our modal intuitions
must be interpreted as carrying ontological commitment to worlds. Re-
examination our pre-theoretic intuitions about the truth-values of various modal
claims, specifically (PS), (PI), (PP) and (RP), in this light reveals a commitment to
a surprisingly vast plurality of worlds. But this should not be grounds for
rejecting the theory; at least not in the absence of a viable non-quantificational
account of modality.
But this reply will not do. For it is not the mere fact of a vast plurality of
entities that is being objected to here. After all, mathematicians are committed to
at least as great a plurality of entities. Nor is the objection a terminological one -
that these entities do not deserve to be called 'worlds'. What is objectionable
about MR is its account of their nature: MR identifies this plurality of worlds with
a vast plurality of maximal spatiotemporally interconnected concrete particulars. Yet
from the fact, if it is a fact, that modality is quantificational in nature nothing
follows about the nature of the entities quantified over. So the quantificational
S4
nature of modality itself provides no reason for believing in this vast plurality of
ctmcrete particulars. The modal realist must show that understanding modality
in terms of quantification over maximal fusions of spatiotemporally
interconnected concrete particulars confers on MR some peculiar advantage over
to its quantificational rivals.'^^^
2.2A.2 Does MR Really Explain the Positive Data of Modality?
A genuinely explanatory theory should entail as much of the pre-theoretic
data as possible. It is (Al) that connects the theorems of MR, its entailments, with
the pre-theoretical intuitions about what is and is not possible, the data; (Al) says
that so-and-so is possible iff there is a world at which so-and-so.
Now, if Lewis is right and there really is this vast collection of maximal
spatiotemporally interconnected concrete particulars, then every instance of (Al)
may well be true. But for MR genuinely to explain some positive modal datum,
it's axioms together with (Al) must entail that datum. It is not enough merely that
the relevant worlds exist (and the relevant instance of (Al) be true); MR's axioms
must say they exist. Otherwise, (Al) would amount merely to a translation
scheme, not an explanation of the data.
The positive data of modality comprehend a potentially infinite number of
distinct possibilities. So the data must be the consequences of a (short) list of
general principles of modal reasoning. These will take the form of "generating"
principles; they will tell us that if the having of feature F is a possibility, then so is
the having of any feature G that is related to F in a certain way. These principles
allow us to "generate" certain possibilities from certain others. Our specific
modal intuitions, those concerning specific individuals, properties and relations,
are generated by applying these generating principles to what we have learnt,
from experience, about the actual world. The idea is this: by experience we know
that the actual world has a certain feature F (and so that the having of this feature
is possible); second, we apply one of these general principles to conclude that the
having of any features G generated from F is also possible; finally, we conclude
that there are also worlds that have such features G.
Above, and in 1.3.1, 1 suggested that the way the actual world is can be
thought of as a particular way of combining a particular stock of particulars, and
a particular stock of (perfectly natural, intrinsic) properties within a particular
spatiotemporal framework. And I suggested that each of these features is itself
just one among many possible such combinations, stocks of particulars, stocks of
properties and spatiotemporal frameworks. If this is right, then any
C[uantificational theory that is really to capture all our infinitely many (positive)
intuitions about modality should contain among its theorems some instance of
each of the following generating principle-schemata:
[PS*] For any S*, if there is a world having S as its spatiotemporal framework,
and Gs(S*, S) there is also world having S* as its spatiotemporal
framework.
[PI*] For any I*, if there is a world having I as its stock of individuals, and
Gi(I*, I), then there is also a world having I* as its stock of individuals.
[PP*] For any P*, if there is a world having P as its stock of (perfectly natural,
intrinsic) properties, and Gp(P*, P), then there is also a world having
P* as its stock of (perfectly natural, intrinsic) properties.
An adequate quantificational theory should also guarantee a plenitude of
combinations (and recombinations) of these various possible elements by
containing among its theorems some principle of the form.
(RP*) For any spatiotemporal framework S had by any world, any stock of
individuals I had by any world, any stock of (perfectly natural, intrinsic)
properties P had by any world:
For any A*, if there is a world at which I, P and S are combined
according to arrangement A and Ga(A*, A)
,
then there is also a
world at which 1, P and S are combined according to
arrangement A*.
Here Gs, G^ Gp, and Ga are the “generating" relations; it is these that
allow the inference from spatiotemporal frameworks, stocks of individuals etc.
that are known to be possible, to new possible frameworks, stocks of individuals,
etc. To illustrate the idea, consider spatiotemporal frameworks. In the next
section I udll suggest that if there is a world having S as its spatiotemporal
framework, then for any instance S* of any natural generalization of the
geometry instantiated by S, there is also world having S* as its spatiotemporal
framework. Physicists tell us which geometry is instantiated by the
spatiotemporal framework of the actual world; and mathematicians tell us which
geometries qualify as natural generalizations of this geometry. The
metaphysician then applies the principle to the geometry instantiated by the
spatiotemporal framework of the actual world to tell us that instances of any
natural generalizations of this geometry are also possible spatiotemporal
frameworks, ones had by various worlds. Clearly, this generating principle is an
instance of instance of [PS*]: in this case, Gs(S*, S) iff S* is an instance of a natural
generalization of the geometry instantiated by S.
Theories of modality should aim to explain our general modal intuitions.
So they should contain as theorems some such "generating" principles. But such
theories should not aim to entail the specific data of modality; for these should
follow from the theory only when it is supplied with specific facts as input, viz.
manifest facts about the actual world (much as theories of physics, e.g.
Newtonian mechanics, aim to state only general laws which entail particular facts
when given other particular facts — boundary conditions etc. — as "input").
However, collectively the general principles of modality should be such as to
entail all the general facts of modality; and they should entail all the known
specific modal facts when supplied with certain facts about the actual world as
"input".
Notice that if this approach to accommodating the positive modal data is
correct, MR must not only entail instances of the above schemata, it must do so
without appealing to any modal notions. Otherwise, its proposed analysis of
modality would be reduced to circularity. In particular, each of the generating
relations involved in the above principles - Gs, Gp, and Ga - must be
characterized in entirely non-modal terms.
Now let us return to MR.
Lewis offers only a single principle to do the work of all of the above - his
"principle of recombination":
For any collection of possible individuals, and any possible spatiotemporal
arrangement, it is possible that any number of duplicates of those
individuals co-exist according to that spatiotemporal arrangement.
and
For any collection of non-overlapping possible coexisting individuals none
of which are duplicates, it is possible that a duplicate of any one of them
exists without duplicates of any of the others.
Is this sufficient to generate a sufficient plenitude of possibilities to do justice to
all the positive data of modality? In particular, does it entail (non-modal)
instances of each of the above generating principles?
As I noted above, Lewis's actual presentation of the recombination
principle is a little sketchy. However, even in the above form it does not seem to
entail adequate versions of the generating principles. Since I wdU discuss the
problems that an adequate version of [PS*] raises for MR in the next section, and
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since Lewis endorses a position known as "anti-haecceitism" which effectively
subsumes [PI ] under [PP*]50 ^g concentrate only c>n [PP*] and [RP*].
I argued in 1.3.1 that there might have been properties that are other than
those that are actually instantiated. So, when applied to the stock of actually
instantiated properties as input, an adequate version of [PP*] should entail this.
I also argued in 1.3.1 that there might have been alternative combinations
of the properties that are actually instantiated. Perhaps there is actually nothing
that is both gold and has a mass of 10^ ^kg, but, intuitively, there might have
been. So, when applied to the stock of actually instantiated properties as input,
an adequate version of [RP*] should entail this.
However, neither of these intuitions follows from Lewis's recombination
principle (even when combined with the other axioms of MR). For the
recombination principle tells us only about possibilities involving duplicates of
particulars drawn from various worlds. So it will not generate any possibilities
involving "new" or "alien" properties. In particular, given facts about the
properties instantiated at the actual world as input, it will not entail the existence
of worlds at which there exist instances of properties that are not actually
instantiated. Nor will it generate any new intrinsic natures obtained by
rt^combining the properties that constitute a given intrinsic nature; it will not
allow us to "break up" whole intrinsic natures into their constituent properties
that can then be recombined. In particular, given facts about the properties
instantiated at the actual world as input, it does not entail the existence of worlds
at which there exist particulars that instantiate two or more properties unless
these are actually co-instantiated. So it does not entail the existence of a world at
which something is both gold and has a mass of 10^ ^kg.
In short, Lewis's recombination principle is inadequate to explain all the
modal intuitions we do have; it fails to explain fully the positive data of modality.
Can the principle be modified so as to accommodate these intuitions?
There is a problem. The troublesome modal intuitions both involve properties.
But properties stand in complex logical relations to one another: some properties
entail others - being red, for instance, entails being coloured, and being Ig entails
having a mass; and some properties exclude others - being red excludes being
blue, being Ig in mass excludes being lOg in mass. So not every describable
combination of properties is a genuinely possible one, for nothing can be red
unless it is coloured and nothing can be simultaneously red (all over) and blue.
How then can the recombination principle be reformulated so as to guarantee an
adequate version of [RP*], one that entails all and only those recombinations of
properties that are, intuitively, possible without any appeal to modality?
Lewis himself seems to think it cannot be done. As we will see in chapter
six, he argues that to formulate a version of the recombination principle that
entails all and only those combinations of properties that are genuinely possible,
we would have kncrw which combinations really are possible. But concerning at
least the incompatibility of (perfectly natural, intrinsic) properties,
there seems to be no way at all of fixing our modal opinions, and we just
have to confess our irremediable ignorance... Is it absolutely impossible for
one particle to be both positively and negatively-charged?...! do not see
how we can make up our minds...Whatever the truth may be, it isn't up to
us.
The only safe course is to resort to primitive modality. The declaration
must be conditional: //it is impossible for any one particle to be both
positively and negatively charged, then let there be an axiom of unique
charge.51
Perhaps then MR is not to be faulted for failing to entail intuitions about "new"
combinations of properties. For intuitions about which combinations of
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properties over and above the recombinations of duplicates are just not secure
enough that they need to be accommodated. MR is required to explain only those
intuitions that we do have, not those that we don't and couldn't have.
But this response is not acceptable. An adequate version of the
recombination principle should entail all the general facts about modality.
Lewis's formulation of his recombination principle, since it applies only to
duplicates, entails no worlds that involve new combinations of properties. So to
reject the charge that the recombination principle fails to entail all the general
modal intuitions, Lewis needs to argue that there are no known general facts
about entailments and incompatibilities among properties. But to point out that
we do not and could not know whether or not it is possible for some particle to
be both positively- and negatively charged does not establish this. For this not a
general modal fact ~ it concerns two specific properties. Indeed, in the next
chapter I will suggest that we do know certain general modal facts concerning
the relations among properties; we know, for instance, that it is impossible that
any particular instantiate distinct determinates from the same determinable and
that it is impossible that any particular instantiate a determinate without also
falling under the corresponding determinable. Since these are general modal
facts, they must be explained by any theory that is adequate to explain all our
pre-theoretical modal intuitions. The ignorance Lewis highlights is merely
ignorance of the specific modal claim that these properties are determinates of the
same determinable; it is not ignorance of the general modal fact that determinates
of the same determinable exclude one another. (And notice that prima facie, the
notion of a determinable is a modal notion. So it cannot legitimately be referred to
in reformulating the recombination principle.)
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To summarize; we can grant that MR provides an illuminating
regimentation or systematization of our modal intuitions in non-modal terms.
But it does not thereby explain them. For a full explanation of the (general) modal
data requires not merely that the theory show how to rewrite our modal claims
in non-modal terms, it must provide for axioms to entail them. .A.nd MR,
specifically Lewis's recombination principle, fails to explain all the (general) data
of modality. For it fails to entail the existence of worlds at which certain
properties are instantiated even though these are not actually instantiated. And it
fails to entail worlds at which different combinations of properties are
instantiated from the actual world. In the latter case it is particularly hard to see
how the recombination principle could be reformulated so as to entail such
worlds, for to do so requires some non-modal characterization of the relations of
entailment and exclusion among properties. And Lewis seems to rqect the
possibility of such a characterization, arguing instead that we really do not have
firm intuitions about such combinations and hence that MR need not
accommodate them. This response however rests on an appeal to our ignorance
of specific modal facts and so is not to the point. We do have knowledge of
certain general modal facts about the relations among properties and these
should be accommodated by any adequate account of modality. MR's failure in
this regard points to an inadequacy in its account of properties.
One final problem: even if the data of modality could be fully
accommodated by some entirely non-modal version of the recombination
principle, MR would still have to regard this principle as axiomatic. For it does
not follow from the axioms of set-theory or mereology. So even if MR does
succeed in showing how to interpret modal reasoning so that it involves no
modal notions, this reasoning must still be seen as involving certain (otherw^ise
incredible) additional axioms. At best then the modal realist can claim to have
shown how to exchange an ideology of modal notions for certain additional
principles that are irreducible further to the axioms of logic, mathematics, or
anything else. It can claim perhaps to have shown how to define modal reasoning
without appealing to any modal notions but only at the cost of endorsing certain
distinctive axioms. MR would still have to regard modal reasoning as
constituting a stubbornly irreducible or autonomous subject matter.^2
2.2.4.3 Does MR Render the Origin of Modal Knowledge Mysterious?
Clearly we have extensive modal knowledge. One constraint (criterion (3))
on an adequate metaphysical theory of modality is that it should not render the
origin of such knowledge mysterious.
MR will explain our modal knowledge as originating in our knowledge of
the recombination principle. But just how could we have come to know the
recombination principle itself?
Presumably, we did not come to know it by causal acquaintance with its
subject matter. For one thing, this would conflict with the traditional
classification of modal knowledge as a priori. For another, the entities whose
existence it asserts are for the most part spatiotemporally unconnected with us
and so in principle beyond the possibility of causal acquaintance. Nor can our
knowledge of it be justified in the same sort of way a physicist might justify our
knowledge of the existence of electrons viz. that positing them is the best
explanation of the phenomena that we do observe. For, as Hume emphasized,^^
modal facts are not among the observed phenomena to be explained — we
observe only that something is the case, not that it might or must be the case.
Indeed, there is a clear tension between the classification of modal
knowledge as a priori and MR's understanding of the recombination principle.
For if MR is right, supposing that modal knowledge is a priori amounts to
supposing that we can have a priori knowledge of the existence of and facts
about concrete entities. But knowledge of concrete entities is traditionally
classified as a posteriori. Whatever the abstract /concrete distinction amounts to,
it at least entails that concrete entities are not by their nature unknowable a
posteriori.54 To suppose that we have knowledge of them a priori anyway is at
least unprecedented, and perhaps just plain implausible. Notice that the axioms
of modal realism even entail facts about how many such causally isolated concrete
entities there are. Lewis:
modal realism tells you. ..that there are uncountable infinities of donkeys
and protons and puddles and stars, and of planets very like Earth, and of
cities very like Melbourne, and of people very like yourself.. [^ly italics]
And just how could we know a priori how many concrete Melboumes there are?
Nor can Lewis appeal to our pre-theoretic intuitions about modality to
explain our knowledge of the new axioms, as some sort of "projections" of our
ways of thinking about modality. First, this conceptualist approach to modality is
quite at odds with his intentions. For the existence of MR's worlds is supposed to
be a mind- and language-independent fact about reality. Second, since our modal
intuitions and the vast plurality of worlds posited by modal realism are
supposed to be mutually causally independent, there seems to be just no reason
to trust any intuitions we do have. At least not unless we are prepared to posit a
mysteriously trustworthy faculty of modal intuition or some kind of pre-
estabhshed harmony between our thought and extra-mental concrete reality
Tliird, and connectedly, to appeal to knowledge of our modal intuitions to
explain our knowledge of the fundamental modal principles would be to reverse
the proper order of explanation. How do we have intuitions about a potentially
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infinite number of possibilities if not by deriving them from the general
principles in the first place?
Finally, as we have just seen, the recombination principle must be taken to
be an axiom of modal realism; it does not follow from the axioms of set-theory or
mereology even when supplemented with axioms to guarantee the existence of
actual entities. So our knowledge of it and its consequences - and according to
modal realism this includes all the facts of modality - cannot be explained in
terms of knowledge of principles to which we have an antecedent commitment
e.g. the axioms of impure set theory.
In chapter six I will examine an alternative to N^IR, mathematical ersatzism.
The mathematical ersatzer also adopts the quantificational analysis of modalit)'
but she defines the entities quantified over, worlds, to be impure sets of a certain
kind. By judicious choice of her other definitions, analyses and logical
constructions, the mathematical ersatzer attempts to show that no additional
existential axioms to those of impure set-theory are needed to entail all the data
of modality. Thus, apart from its analyses and logical constructions, it actually
dispenses with any specifically modal axioms altogether. Modal reasoning is
shown to result from the application of mathematical operations to the material
of the actual world, given the appropriate analyses and logical constructions.
Mathematical ersatzism attempts, in effect, to reduce modality to impure set-
theory in much the same way as Russell attempted to reduce mathematics to
pure set-theory. And that really would count as an adequate explanation of the
data of modality.
Moreover, if successful, mathematical ersatzism also ameliorates the
second, epistemological problem. It is true that the problem of explaining quite
how we know the axioms of impure set-theory has also proved peculiarly
recalcitrant. But, as I argued in 2.2.1. 1, thut they are known should not be
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disputed; the knowledge-claims of mathematicians are not to be rejected on
philosophical grounds. Yet the axioms of impure set theor\' already guarantee a
plenitude of sets. So given the mathematical ersatzer's analyses and logical
constructions, the plenitude of logical space is simply a logical consequence of
the axioms of set-theory. So now to explain how we know the facts of modality
the mathematical ersatzer has to explain only how we know her analyses and
logical constructions. And surely explaining how we know them, indeed how we
know them a prion, seems to be relatively unproblematic. For knowledge of our
own definitions, analyses and constructions is the least problematic type of a
priori knowledge, a prioricity is preserved under logical consequence and it is
agreed on all sides that knowledge of the axioms of set-theory is a priori. So the
mathematical ersatzer also has a ready explanation of how it is that modal
knowledge is a priori. It is because MR identifies its worlds with concrete entities
rather than classes, that this explanation is just not available to it.^^
2.2AA Island Universes: Is MR even Consistent with the Positive Data?
But there is an even more serious problem: MR may even be inconsistent
with some of the positive data of modality. MR's worlds are maximal fusions of
spatiotemporally interconnected particulars and spatiotemporal connectedness is
an equivalence relation. So all the modal realist's worlds will have to be
spatiotemporally unified: any two parts of any world are spatiotemporally
connected. Thus MR is forced to deny that it is possible for the actual world to
have had spatiotemporally disconnected parts.
And this is very controversial. Intuitively, all sorts of weird and wonderful
spatiotemporal structures seem to be possible ways for the spacetime of the
actual world to have been. We can, for instance, imagine spacetimes that consist
of two regions connected by a "wormhole" such that to pass from one region to
another it is necessar>' to go through the u’ormhole.5« Indeed the spacetime of the
actual world may be thought of in this way if we don't assume that the
wormhole has to be spatially or temporally "narrower" than the regions it
connects. But it seems clear that the wormhole could be narrower, much
narrower. Indeed, it even seems possible that the two regions should be
connected by a single spacetime point. .\nd if it is possible for a single world to
have this spatiotemporal structure - consisting of two regions that are connected
by a single spacetime point - then is it not possible for a single world to be just
like this but lacking the one connecting point? The spacetime structure of such a
world would be that of two disconnected regions. Things in one region would
coexist with things in the other but not be spatiotemporally connected to them.
Yet MR rules out the possibility of such a spatiotemporal structure ci priori.
Bigelow and Pargetter give a similar argument for the possibility of such
"island universes" within a single world based on the possibility of "branching"
spatiotemporal structures.^^ Since Lewis accepts such structures, this is a
powerful ad hominen.^^^
We can certainly imagine worlds with branching time,. ..Worlds
where there is one past, but different futures. By parity of reasoning, we
should have worlds with merging times, that is where different pasts
merge and have a single future. Thus, it seems we should have worlds
with parts that just share a time segment - where their times merge and
then branch. And finally there is the world where they come together for
just a moment. An unusual world with effectively two temporally
disconnected parts, sharing just an instant in common...
We are struck by the arbitrariness of denying that they must at least
share the moment in common. What about worlds where there is some
objective chance that they will share that moment in common, a chance
that of course may not lead to an actual shared moment?^^ [Lewis also
accepts objective chances.^2]
In reply, Lewis bites the bullet; he simply denies the possibility of such
isolated spatiotemporal regions, such island universes, within a single world. But
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he says that he would rather not and admits some inclination to agree to their
possibility. So he devotes his energy to explaining a^vay this inclination.
A theory is not refuted by failing to accommodate all the data. Rather its
plausibility is diminished in proportion to the degree of intuitive support that the
supposed possibility being denied has. The possibility of such island universes is
not, Lewis argues, a Aloorean fact. Nor, he says, is it a consequence of any
principle which is central to our reasoning about modality. So a denial of such
possibility is not a damning objection to the theory. Moreover, he points out that
modal realism entails the existence of worlds which, although they do not
contain island universes, do contain parts that are "world-like" in their
separation from each other. These include worlds whose spatiotemporal
structures are n-dimensional but which have n-1 dimensional parts spread out
along these n-dimensions "like a stack of flatlands in three-space"; worlds which
have world-like parts sharing a common space-time without interacting; worlds
where the metric structure of time is not that of the real line, but of many copies
of the real line laid end-to-end; worlds where, even though the metric structure
of time is that of a single real line, history is divided into many epochs lying end-
to-end but where events sp>eed up as the end of each epoch approaches. Each
such world has parts which are causally isolated from one another, or infinitely
spatiotemporally separated from one another, or inaccessible to one another. So
each mimics the possibility of island universes within a single world by having
disconnected parts; though this disconnection is, in each case, something other
than spatiotemporal disconnection. But then, Lewis asks,
...how sure can you be that you really had in mind the supposed
possibility [of island universes] that 1 reject? Are you sure that it was an
essential part of your thought that the world-like parts were in no way
spatiotemporally related? Or might you not have had in mind, rather one
of these substitutes I offer? Or might your thought have been sufficiently
lacking in specificity that the substitutes would do it justice?^^
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This reply is not entirely convincing.
For one thing, even having been appraised of these ersatz island
universes, it still seems that there might also have been genuine island
universes .^4
But there is more fundamental objection.^5 if source of the
intuition that there might have been genuine island universes were direct
contemplation, imagination or picturing of them, then it really would be hard to
be sure that we really are thinking of island universes rather than one of Lewis's
substitute worlds with their (differently) isolated world-like parts. However,
even if this is one source of the intuition, it does it seem to be the the only or even
the most fundamental one. For the intuition that island universes are possible
may also be arrived at by reasoning as follows:
The spatiotemporal framework of the actual world is an instance of a
certain mathematical type, a geometry. If current physics is right, the actual
spatiotemporal framework is an instance of a four-dimensional, non-
Euclidean geometry having a certain curvature. But this geometry is not
the only (consistent) geometry. Mathematicians recognize countless
others, some similar in many ways to the geometry of the actual world,
others very different. In particular, they recognize geometries that may be
thought of as generalizations of the actual geometry. For we can abstract
from the various elements that go into characterizing the actual geometry -
- how many dimensions it has, what its "fifth postulate" is, and so on —
and treat them as parameters. And then by instantiating each such
parameter to a different value from the actual value, we can generate other
geometries — geometries with five or five hundred dimensions, geometries
with different curvatures, geometries with different fifth postulates, and
so on. Perhaps not all the structures generated in this way deserve to be
called "geometries" — perhaps only certain values are permissible as
instantiations of the parameters. So let us refer to those that do as natural
generalizations of the actual geometry, leaving it open what it is that
makes one generalization natural and another not.
Notice next that there just does not seem to be anything
mathematically special about the geometry instantiated by the actual
spatiotemporal framework; in particular, it does not seem to enjoy any
special mathematical privilege over geometries that result from it by a
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process of natural generalization. Hence, if it is one possible ivay for theframework of the actual world to have been, so surely are instances of
these other geometries. And since logical space constitutes a plenitude of
ways that the world might have been, every instance of these other
geometries should be represented in logical space. But what good reason
is there to deny that among them is the sort of geometry that would be
instantiated by a world containing island universes? Yet MR rules this out
a priori!
Indeed, the question of the possibility of island universes does not really
seem to be one for the metaphysician, or at least not entirely. For if reasoning
about a plenitude of structures is a matter of applying mathematical operations
to mathematical entities, a matter of taking natural generalizations of the
geometry instantiated by the actual world, then, presumably, it is to the
mathematician rather than the metaphysician that we must look to see if an
island universe structure qualifies. At least it is not for the metaphysician to rule
out the possibihty of such structures a priori as modal realism does.^^
Anyway, it seems plausible to suppose that reasoning thus from certain
general or recursive principles such as 'any instance of any natural generalization
of the actual geometry is a possible way for the structure of the world to have
been is an alternative way to argue for the possibility of certain structures from
making definitive decisions on a one-by-one basis by comparison with our pre-
theoretical intuitions. So maybe, contra Lewis, the possibility of island universes
IS a consequence of some principle central to our modal reasoning. In fact, it is
hard to see how we could have intuitions about an infinite number of
possibilities for the spatiotemporal structure of the actual world unless they were
grounded in such general principles.
Notice, moreover, that this approach to accounting for our reasoning
about spatiotemporal structures suggests a way to explain the origin of our
knowledge of (PS*). And we have already seen that accounting for such
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knowledge is problematic for \fR. This approach suggests that such knowledge
is derived on the one hand from seeing the actual spatiotemporal framework as
an instance of a mathematical entity, and on the other from our knowledge of
mathematical entities and operations viz. geometries and natural generalizations
of them. Furthermore, since our knowledge of mathematical entities and
operations is a priori, it also suggests an explanation of why modal knowledge
about possible structures is a priori. (Indeed, if this account is not even roughly
correct, it is hard to see how we could even contemplate, imagine or picture any
alternative spatiotemporal structure. Where would such an idea come from?)
Is there any way to modify MR so that it does not rule out island universes
a priori and thereby avoid trespassing on the mathematician's domain? One
obvious way would be to take the world-mate relation as primitive instead of
defining it in terms of spatiotemporal connectedness. This would increase the
number of conceptual primitives but even such a slightly expanded ideology
would be appealingly small. However, the world-mate relation is clearly the
modal realists' version of the traditional notion of compossibility. And
compossibility is a paradigmatically modal notion: x and y are compossible iff it
is possible that they co-exist. So the world-mate relation cannot legitimately
appear in the ideology of any theory that aims to analyze modality.
Are there then any non-modal notions other than spatiotemporal
connectedness in terms of which to analyze the world-mate relation? Nothing
springs to mind.^^ Causal relations for instance seem to be modal — for x to cause
y is in part for x's occurrence to necessitate y's occurrence -- and anyway this
would not be an option for Lewis who wishes to analyze causality in terms of
worlds via an analysis of counterfactual dependence.^^
2.3 The Balance Sheet on MR
Finally, let us tot up the balance sheet on MR.
contains a primitive ontology of only two categories: concrete
particulars and classes (both pure and impure). Since philosophers are not
entitled to declare the most basic quantifications of either the ordinary person or
the mathematician unintelligible, MR's primitive quantifiers are indeed pre-
theoretically intelligible. And it contains an ideology that consists only of
membership, parthood, spatiotemporal connectedness and naturalness. With the
possible exception of naturalness, these too seem to be pre-theoretically
intelligible. So MR is not to be faulted on the intelligibility of its primitives.
Moreover, this is an extremely parsimonious ontology-cum-ideology. Indeed, it
is about as minimal an ontology-cum-ideology as any metaphysical theory could
hope for. MR's axioms include those of some standard impure set-theory and
some standard mereology. And it is not to be faulted on this score either.
Yet despite this paucity of materials, MR proposes a reductive analysis of
modality in the form of (Al) and the associated definitions, analyses and logical
constructions. This is the greatest advantage claimed by MR, something Lewis
argues that no rival theory can claim. It was agreed that (Al) does indeed impose
great systematization on the data of modality and it clearly involves no violations
of the negative data of modality. So if (Al) were adequate, MR would indeed be
an extremely attractive theory.
However, we also saw a number of difficulties.
First, MR contains implausible theorems. The analysis (Al) is adequate to
the positive data of modality only if there exists a plenitude of concrete worlds.
Some will have weird spatiotemporal structures, some talking donkeys and cities
of cheese among their parts, some instances of alien properties and relations and
so on. But many philosophers just find the claim that such things exist very
implausible.
Second, MR is importantly incomplete when it comes to explaining the
positive data of modality. The mere existence of a plenitude of its worlds does
not suffice for (Al) to count as an explanation of the data. For even if these
worlds exist, if MR itself is to have explained the data, it must say that they exist;
a fully explanatory theory should entail as much of the data as possible. But the
existence of a plurality of worlds sufficient to do justice to all our modal
intuitions does not follow from the axioms of MR; in particular, this does not
follow from Lewis's recombination principle. And it is hard to see how to
reformulate the recombination principle and secure its sufficiency without appeal
to modality.
Third, even if the modal realist could provide an acceptable reformulation
of the principle of recombination, it is unclear how we could have come to know
this principle. VIR renders the origin and a priori status of modal knowledge
mysterious.
Fourth, since the recombination principle is not reducible to any principles
to which we have an antecedent commitment, MR must still regard modality as
somehow concerned with an autonomous subject-matter.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, MR's definition of a world rules
out a priori the possibility of island universes. And this is unacceptable.
Nevertheless, Lewis argues that, all things considered,
...the price is right, high as it is. Modal realism ought to be accepted as
true. The theoretical benefits are worth it.
Provided, of course, that they cannot be had for less.^^
I he rest of this dissertation will be an examination of whether or not they
can indeed be had for less. I will attempt to make a start on showing how they
can.
The first step will be to develop an account of properties and relations that
requires neither the vast plurality of non-actual concrete particulars posited by
MR, nor any modal primitives. This is the project that will occupy us for the next
two chapters.
> D. K. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, ( Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), hereafter
Plurality. See also D. K. Lewis, Counterfactuals, ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1973), chapter 4 and a number of papers in his Collected Philosophical Papers, vols 1 and II
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, 1986).
^ As I mentioned in chapter one, 1 will assume throughout that it is propositions rather than
sentences that are the primary bearers of the various modal statuses; it is propositions that are
possible, necessary, that might be the case, and so on. It is because a sentence expresses a
proposition and so may be said to "inherit" its modal status that sentences too can be said to
have modal statuses; but sentences have modal statuses derivatively. I will also be assuming
that to explain modalization in general, it suffices to explain the modal statuses of
propositions.
I have no criterion to offer for when a given nofion qualifies as a modal notion. Instead, I
merely rely on intuitions.
'^This account of propositions is presented as a logical construction rather than a definition
because the notion of a proposition is supposed to be antecedently familiar from the
literature, and MR's propositions are supposed to be suitable entities to play the roles
traditionally assigned to propositions. Often, however, quite what roles they are supposed to
play is not spelled out as fully as one would like. And it is even unclear whether there really
is a unified role. For our purposes it is sufficient to point out that it is propositions that are the
bearers of the modal statuses; whether or not propositions thus constructed are also suited to
play the various other philosophical roles they are assigned, e.g. being that towards which ue
bear propositional attitudes, is left open. The literature on the nature and role of propositions
is vast. See Plurality, section 1.4 for discussion and (the beginning of a chain of) references.
^ I have tried to present the theory in such a way that there is a clear distinction between
definitions on the one hand — mere conventions concerning how a word is to be used - and
analyses and logical constructions on the other — philosophically significant statements. Note
in particular that I have taken 'world', despite its familiarity from the literature, to be defined
rather than analyzed or logically constructed. It must be shorn of all familiar connotations
and taken to mean just what it is defined to mean. Indeed definitional substitution could
simply eradicate all reference to worlds. The philosophically significant components of this
part of the theory are the logical constructions and analyses, (LCl), (LC2), (LC3) and (Al). It is
only these that explicitly connect up the theory with our modal thought and language. The
rest of 2.1.1 consists simply of stipulations about how words are to be used.
^ Lewis himself is agnostic about whether or not there are also universals in addition to
individuals and classes. See D.K. Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals", Australasum
journal of Philosophy, 61 (1983), pp. 343-77. In this version of MR however universals play no
role.
^The reason for the doubling up here is that it seems that any adequate account of properties
must distinguish what Lewis calls a "sparse" from an "abundant" sense of 'property' and
ation (see D K Lewis, New Work for a 1 heorv^ of L niversals", and Plimilih/
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section 1 S
rJZ ^ properties and relations in both senses have been constructedPhis distinction and the adequacy of the above constructions will be discussed in chapters
iree and four Note that these definitions implausibly disqualify propositions, properties
and relations from themselves instantiating properties and standing in relations. Removing
his restnction is very simple, but it in no way illuminates what follows and indeed makes the
exposition less easily graspable, or so it seems to me.
In order that complex individuals might be duplicates according to this definition, it mustbe allowed that they sometimes instantiate natural properties. So to alow this I will simply
assume that "structural" properties, properties that can be had only by objects that have
proper parts, can be perfectly natural.
This provides an illustration of the point of introducing the above definition of a possible
particular. For notice that the pnnciple of unrestricted mereological composition guarantees
the existence of sums of parts of distinct worlds, including sums of whole worlds. Such
entities exist only partially at any particular world; they do not exist wholly at any particular
world. In the above sense, they exist at a number of worlds, but they are not possible
individuals. Such sums are sometimes called "transworld" individuals and what we have
called a possible particular is sometimes called a "world-bound" individual.
These core axioms, common to all mereologies, are taken, with slight rewording, from D.
K. Lewis, Parts of Classes, (Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1991), p. 74. As Lewis points
out, in light of (2) and (3) we may legitimately "talk of 'the fusion of', and rely on it to be a
functor defined for any plural argument whatsoever." For a thorough discussion of
additional axioms and alternative mereologies see P. Simons, Parts: A Study in Ontology,
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), especially chapters one and two.
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1 See e.g. W. V. O. Quine, Set Theory and its Logic, Second Edition, (Cambridge, MA, London:
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1969), for a brief but clear discussion of these various
alternative set-theories. Whichever set-theoretic axioms are adopted, I will assume that they
entail that whenever some individuals exist, so does the set whose only members are those
individuals and that a set exists only if this is the case. So some sets exist contingently — those
with contingent members. And since properties and relations are classes of their instances,
according to MR these too will not in general exist necessarily.
Pliiraliti/, p. 88.
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Roughly, the reason for this is as follows. The recombination principle is supposed to be a
principle of plenitude; it aims to tells us what worlds there are. So — though this is very rough
— what we want it to tell us is that all possible patterns of perfectly natural intrinsic
properties are instantiated at some world or other. For it is Lewis's view that all else
supervenes on such arrangements of qualitites, including relations of "identity" across
worlds (see 1.3.2 above). TTius, the principle has to do primarily with what patterns of
intrinsic properties may be instantiated at various worlds. Hence, it would be inappropriate
to formulate the principle in terms of notions such as identity or Lewis's own counterpart
relation (see D. K. Lewis, "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic", fotirmlof
Philosophy, 65 (1968), pp. 113-26) that may depend on extrinsic features of the objects in
question.
Indeed, formulating the principle in terms of literal identities across worlds would be
inappropriate for a second reason. Lewis argues that literal transworld identities of
particulars ought not to be accepted by a modal realist (see Plurality, section 4.2 Against
Overlap). For, intuitively, some entities have properties which are both intrinsic to them and
non-essential. Suppose that x is a human hand and F is the property of having five-fingers.
Intuitively, whether or not x has this property does not depend on the state or existence of
anything but x - whether x has five fingers or not is a matter just of how x itself is. So F is
intrinsic. And clearly it is a contingent matter how many fingers a hand has - having five
fingers is not essential to x; x could have had four or six fingers without ceasing to exist. Thus
there is a world where x has five fingers and there is a world where it is not the case that x
has hve hngers. bo h x ,s hteralty one and the same m both these worlds, then x hterally both
aba "h
Lewis argues that ,t is preferable tondon the literal identity of x across worlds rather than the existence of genuinely intrinsicbut accidental properties. Although his argument is directed specifically at modal rLlists,here is some reason to think that rival theories would also do well to abandon genuine
transworld identities. ^
’^ Though quite how large a collection of particulars or how many duplicates of a givenindividual should be allowed is left open here. It would be most natural to allow any numberincluding any infinite cardinal number. But there is a glitch. Lewis points out that "Only alimited number of distinct things can exist in a spacetime continuum. It cannot exceed the
infinite cardinal number of points in a continuum. So if we have more than continuum many
our
possible individuals to be copied, or if we want more than continuum many copies of any
single individual, then a continuum will be too small to hold all the coexisting things that
principle requires." Plumlitxj, pp. 89-90. So he suggests that a fully adequate principle of
recombination be qualified by a 'size and shape permitting' proviso. 1 have ignored this
complication for ease of exposition. Nothing in what follows hangs on it.
For a discussion of possible spatiotemporal arrangements see below 2.2.4.4.
^ We need, for instance, to give some account of the notion of a spatiotemporal arrangement
and what it is for particulars to exist "according to a spatiotemporal arrangment". It may be
that if sufficient care is taken in how these notions are to be understood, the need for a 'size-
and-shape-permitting' proviso may be avoided.
Bricker argues, for instance, that this is not strong enough to express fully the intuition
behind the Humean denial of necessary connections among distinct existences. See P. Bricker,
Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality", forthcoming in Reality and Superz>enience:
Essays on the Philosophy ofDavid Leuns, S. Preyer and F. Siebelt (eds.).
Lewis himself actually takes the relation being the singleton of to be his set-theoretical
primitive in order to distinguish clearly between the mereological and the purely set-
theoretical component in traditional set-theory (see his Parts of Classes). This interesting
though unorthodox approach is not relevant to the questions concerning the metaphysics of
modality and so 1 take the more traditional approach and adopt the membership relation as
primitive in presenting MR.
Lewis takes classes to include proper classes - entities that have members but are not
themselves members - in addition to sets (see his Parts of Classes). Proper classes however
play no role in the subsequent discussion and so 'seP and 'class' may be treated as synonyms.
At least pifrc set-theory should be granted Moorean status. Impure set-theory results from
adding a single extra axiom to the axioms of pure set-theory to guarantee that for every
particular, there exists the set whose only member is that particular. This axiom cannot,
perhaps, claim the security of the axioms of pure set-theory or an ontology of concrete
particulars, but few who grant pure set-theory and an ontology of concrete particulars would
balk at subscribing to it or begin to doubt the intelligibility of the membership relation if it is
accepted.
There is a choice over the primitive of set-theory; the singleton relation, for instance, might
be chosen over membership. And it is no part of mathematics that any particular one should
be taken as primitive. However, set-theory requires at least one primitive notion and since
set-theory should not condemned as unintelligible, at least one choice must be intelligible. 1
have followed the traditional course and taken membership as the primitive. It seems hard to
object to this.
D. K. Lewis, Parts of Classes, p. 59. Note that the reply is not that set-theory provides the
foundation for mathematics and so quantification over sets cannot be rejected without
rejecting all of mathematics. For even if the project of reducing mathematics to set-theory
should turn out to be unacceptable for some reason or other, mathematics cannot be simply
rejected. TTen we would have to seek new foundations for it, or accept it without
foundations. Rather the reply is less ambitious. It is merely that philosophers should not
reject even parts of mathematics if they are sufficiently entrenched, regardless of whetherthese parts are thought to have some kind of privileged foundational status.
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7''!,^™“*’'® Worlds", in r/ir Possible and Ihe Actiuil, M. |. Lous(ed.), (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1979) pp. 274-316.
This charactenzation of an individual leaves it open whether or not every individual
ultimately decomposes into atoms or whether there is are individuals all of whose proper
^arts have proper parts ("gunk"). ^ ^
Strictly speaking I should say that its ideology includes the predicate 'is a part of' ratherthan the corresponding relation. However, I will ,n general use 'pnmitive' to refer
indiscriminately to the unanalyzed predicates of a theory and to the properties and relations
these predicates express. This use-mention confusion is harmless here.
But far from uncontroversial. In particular, the principle of unrestricted composition is
questionable on the grounds that it seems to guarantee ontological free lunches. Suppose
individuals a and b exist. Then this pnnciple guarantees the automatic existence of the fusion
of a and b. But this fusion is identical neither to a nor to b; it seems to be something extra.
However, in this context 'extra', 'distinct are clearly ambiguous, and Lewis replies that a
fusion not really "extra" in the objectionable sense of involving an additional ontological
commitment, any more than, say, the conjunction of two properties is an extra commitment
beyond the conjuncts. For a fusion is wholly distinct neither from a nor b and together a and
b overlap it entirely (Parts of Classes, section 3.6 Composition as Identity). This reply is not
completely convincing but to discuss the matter further would take us too far afield.
To be more precise, there being some spatiotemporal distance between x and y is sufficientbut not necessary for them to be spatiotemporally connected. Bricker argues that x and y
might be spatiotemporally connected but that the fabric of space might contain a "rip"
between them such that there is no way to get from one to the other. Then, on the conception
of distance as "the shortest path", distance is undefined (or infinite). See P. Bricker, 'The
Fabric of Space: Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Distance Relations", in MidWest Studies in Philosophy
XXI: The Philosophy of Science, Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling Jr. and Howard K.
Wettstein (eds.), (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 19%).
This primitive differs from that adopted by Lewis. Lewis assumes a class of primitive
spatiotemporal relations of "distance". These are relations among individuals which may or
may not also hold among sets or among sets and individuals. However, for ease of exposition
1 have assumed instead a single two-place relation of spatiotemporal connectedness. The idea is
that this relation summarizes" these spatiotemporal distance relations: x is spatiotemporally
connected to y if there is some relation of spatiotemporal distance between them. For this
relation to do its job it must be understood to involve some sort of metric. But again I ignore
this for simplicity.
^^That is, every individual is spatiotemporally connected to itself (reflexivify); if x is
spatiotemporally connected to y, then y is spatiotemporally connected to x (symmetry); and if
X is spatiotemporally connected to y and y to z, then x is spatiotemporally connected to z
(transihvity).
See below 5.3 for a brief discussion of this claim.
Indeed, naturalness and similarity are closely related; given either we could define the
other. Things are objectively similar in some respect iff there is a natural set (or a set which
has a very high degree of naturalness) to which they both belong. The definition of
naturalness in terms of similarity is more complicated but still possible (see D.K. Lewis, "New
Work for a Theory of Universals").
For much more on naturalness and for references see chapters three and four below.
See N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Fourth Edition, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1983); also "Seven Strictures on Similarity", in Experience and Theory, (L.
Foster, j. W. Swanson, eds.), (Amherst, MA; University of Massachusetts Press, 1970), pp. 19-
29.
^ See N. Goodman, "Seven Strictures on Similarity", p. 19.
These remarks do not of course settle the matter. And the debate about the legitimacy ofnaturalness js an ongoing one. For an interesting discussion concerning problenl about
reference and naturalness see e.g. Lewis's "New Work for a Theory of Universals"; and his
I utnam s Paradox
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Austrubsum Ion,ml of Philosophy, 62 (1984), pp. 221-36; H. Putnam
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the Moral Sciences, (New York; Routledge, 1978) • C.
.
•Si'^' ^^^nnaturalScience", /o/<;/aj/o/P///7osop//y, XCII,6, (1995), pp. 289-302;B. van
raasen, Elgin on Lewis's Putnam's Paradox", loiinml of Philosophy, XCIII 1 (1997)See e.g. Plurality, Chapter 1 ,4 Philosopher's Paradise for an extended discussion.
I assume that the ways in which numbers and all other mathematical objects can be
logically constructed from sets are by now- familiar.
In particular, set-theory, for reasons 1 will nof discuss, has resisfed all aftempts at
reduction to the application of mereological operations to individuals alone. See D K Lewis
Nominalistic Set Theory", Nous, 4 (1970), pp. 225-40.
For an argument to show why there couldn't be thing-like entities at which contradictions
were true see Plurality, p. 7, fn.3.
R. Stalnaker, "Possible Worlds" in Loux, The Possible and the Actual, pp. 225-234.
Coiinterfactmls, p. 84.
Plurality, p. 86.
« Indeed in chapter one I stipulated that the analysans of any adequate analysis must have a
more complex logical structure than the analysandum. The idea was as follows. An analysis
is only needed when the analysandum is pre-theoretically puzzling for some reason or other.
But it is only if the analysans has a more complex logical structure than the analysandum that
It can be said to decompose the analysandum concept into its parts and display how these
parts are connected. And it is only then that an analysans explains the analysandum concept.
Otherwise, the analysis would merely supply an unneeded synonym, a suggestion about
respelling.
'^Though 1 will continue to speak of "spatiotemporal" structures, it may even be that some
possible structures are spatial but not temporal or vice versa.
Or maybe Lewis's sense of reality is too robust!
Notice that it is not just because these axioms entail the existence of a v^ery rich and strange
collection of concrete individuals whose parts include purple cows, talking donkeys and
cities of cheese that they are implausible. For the existence of even just one more concrete
world than the actual world, even a very similar one, is already incredible.
Though there has been widespread misdiagnosis of exactly which part of the theory is
incredible. Presumably, it is not the idea that modal discourse is implicitly quantificational in
structure that provokes this reaction; that idea goes back at least to Leibniz and no doubt
many of the starers themselves subscribed to it. Nor, presumably, is it the idea that
quantification is the vehicle of ontological commitment that is responsible. Again, it is a fairly
safe guess that many of the starers themselves subscribe to this Quinean doctrine. And even if
the proposed quantificational analysis of modal discourse and the Quinean criterion of
ontological commitment are indeed incredible doctrines, they are at least familiar enough not
to reduce an audience to staring. Nor, finally, could the source of the incredible stares be the
fact that Lewis names the entities to which the quantificational analysis of modality commit
him, 'worlds'. TTie terminology again goes back to Leibniz; and, anyway, a mere
terminological {X)int is unlikely to strike philosophers dumb. Yet anyone who accepts the
quantificational analysis of modal discourse and the Quinean criterion of ontological
commitment and does not object to the terminology, believes in possible worlds. ITence, a
mere belief in possible worlds alone is not likely to be the source of the incredulous stares.
Sometimes the stares are taken to be an objection to the ontology of the theory on the
grounds that it is not parsimonious enough. But Lewis points out that there is no obvious
violation of the ontological parsimony dictated by Occam's razor:
Distinguish two kinds ot parsimony...: qualitative and quantitative. A doctrine isqualitatively parsimonious if it keeps down the number of fundamentally differentkmds of entity: if it posits sets alone rather than sets and reduced numbers or
particles alone rather than particles and fields... A doctrine is quantitatively
parsimonious if it keeps down the number of instances of the kinds it posits; if it
posits 10 electrons rather than 1q37 or spirits only for people rather than spirits for
all animals. 1 subscnbe to the general view that qualitative parsimony is good in a
philosophical or empirical hypothesis; but 1 recognize no presumption whatever infavour of quantitative parsimony. My realism about possible worlds is merely
quantitatively, not qualitatively, unparsimonious. You believe in our actual world
already. I ask you to believe in more things of thaf kind, not in things of some new
kind. Counterfactmis, p.87.
On the score of ontological parsimony modal realism is indeed admirably successful
recognizing only two kinds of thing. But what is incredible is not this ontology, but the
existential claims of fhe theory. And these, as 1 have construed the form a metaphysical
theory should take, are part of the set of axioms, rather than part of the ontology. It is of
course required that the axioms themselves be plausible regardless of what we think of
ontological parsimony. The problem that is in part responsible for the incredulous stares is
that modal realism contains unbelievable axioms.
Plurality, p. 133.
Lewis himself recognizes this point and tries to argue that this greatly enhances the degree
to which the theory satisfies the criteria of theoretical utility.
See 6.5 below for a brief discussion of haecceitism.
Plurality, p. 155.
The point here is not simply that according to MR modal reasoning concerns a separate
domain from reasoning about the concrete part of the actual world. Indeed, that may be an
advantage — modal reasoning is, after all, reasoning about alternatives to actuality. Rather the
point is this: we are (nearly) all — the modal realist included — already committed to a
domain other than the domain containing actual concrete particulars, viz. the abstract part of
actuality that contains mathematical enhties. And the mathematical ersatzer takes modal
reasoning to be about entities in this domain. MR however, requires an additional domain of
non-actual concrete entities for modal reasoning to be about. And that does seem to be a
disadvantage.
33 See David Hume, 4 Treatise ofHuimn Nature, P. H. Nidditch (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1978), Book 1 Part 3.
34 For a discussion of the obscurity of the abstract/ concrete distinction, see Plurality, 1.7 p. 81
33 Plurality, p. 133.
However, a similar objection applies to our knowledge of the axioms of set-theory. But, it
might be argued, any objection that applies equally to mathematics must be a bad one, for it
is not to be disputed that we have knowledge of the axioms of set-theory. Granted - it is not
to be disputed that we have it. However, quite how is still problematic. And Lewis cannot
claim the same Moorean status for the recombination principle that should be granted to
mathematical knowledge.
37 Not all rival theories to MR are as ambitious as mathematical ersatzism, but most agree
that the subjects of modal claims -- worlds - are abstract rather than concrete entities, where
this is taken to mean in part that they are, by their very nature, causally inaccessible. Of
course, quite how we know a priori about abstract entities is not unproblematic. But at least it
is nearly everyone's problem. (The only exception that springs to mind is N. Goodman’s
"Harvard nominalism" see, e.g., the system of The Structure ofAppearance, (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1951)). Nearly everyone agrees that we do have knowledge of at
least some abstract entities — sets or numbers, for instance. So there must be some explanation
ot how. And these rival theories can then perhaps appeal to this explanation, whatever it ,sto ‘Account for our knowledge of the entities over which we quantifv m our assignments of
'
modal statuses to propositions. Modal realism too is already committed to the existence andknowabihty of sets, so it too has to admit that there must be some explanation of how weknow about abstract entities. However, modal realism takes the subject-matter of its
recombination principle to be concrete entities, and concrete entities are not causally
inaccessible by nature. So modal realism's classification of worlds as concrete bars it from
appealing straightforwardly to this explanation to account for our modal knowledge.
Here of course, talk of "passing from one region to another" is to be understood simply as
meaning there being some spatial or temporal distance between them. If there is, and we
Ignore any constraint imposed by the laws of physics at the world in question then we can
pass from one to the other.
j. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, "Beyond the Blank Stare", Tlieoria, 53 (1987), p. 97-113.
^ See Plurality, pp. 206-9 for Lewis's endorsement of such worlds.
J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, "Beyond the Blank Stare", pp. 108-9.
See "A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance", in D. K. Lewis, Philosophical Papers vol 11
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp 83-132
Pluralitxj, p. 72-3.
In his Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality" Bricker argues for the possibility of
island universes from general Humean principles. Bricker's principles are not quite the same
as Lewis's recombination principle. However, we have already seen that the recombination
principle is very sketchy and Bricker's are more carefully stated, more general and more
plausible. Indeed, they seem to ones Lewis himself would be inclined to accept.
Here 1 follow closely the lead of Bricker in his "Plenitude of Structures".
Notice in passing that the argument suggests that certain types of modal reasoning, in this
case, reasoning to the possibility of island-universes, have a mathematical basis. This perhaps
gives indirect support to the idea that modal realism's adoption of specifically modal axioms,
rather than its reduction of them to mathematical axioms, is misguided. And in chapter six
below 1 will consider the suggestion that all our intuitions about the plenitude of logical space
have their source in the following sort of mathematical reasoning.
Bricker also draws this conclusion in his "Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality",
though on slightly different grounds (see above fn. 63).
Or even one alternative: if we could see the spatiotemporal structure of the world as an
instance of just one sort of geometry, a mathematical type that has many other sorts, where
would any of our ideas about alternative structures have their source?
Bricker ("Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality") argues that one might use
external connectedness instead of spatiotemporal connectedness, where x is externally
connected to y iff there is some external relation x bears to y. And this, he argues permits
island universes. However, he argues that ultimately this is stiU not acceptable and so
suggests even rejecting (Al).
D. K. Lewis, "Causation", in Philosophical Papers vol II, pp. 159-213.
Plurality, p. 133-5.
CHAPTER 3
STRUCTURAL NOMINALISM I: INTRINSIC PROPERTIES OF SIMPLE
PARTICULARS
3.1 Two Conceptions of Properrips
Pnma fade our ordinary unreflective talk carries ontological commitment
to properties: we seem to refer to them by name (e.g. 'red(ness) is a colour') and
we quantify over them (e.g. 'there is a property which both firetrucks and roses
have in common', 'the canvas contains every colour of the rainbow'). And most
people believe in such things as properties without thereby believing that thev
are dependent on particulars, states of mind, or anything else.^
This ontological commitment is not gratuitous. There are at least two
traditional theoretical roles that properties are called on to play and Lewis
distinguishes between what he calls a sparse and an abundant conception of
properties corresponding approximately to each of these roles.2 Properties in the
abundant sense of 'property' are required because we require entities suited to
play the role of semantic value for predicates. There must be such entities for
every possible predicate in every possible language, however gruesomely
gerrymandered that predicate may be, and however impossible that language
may be for us to master. Lewis adds that:
There is one of them [i.e. an abundant property] for any condition we
could write down, even if we could write at inBnite length and even if we
could name all those things that must remain nameless because they fall
outside our acquaintance. In fact the [abundant] properties are as
abundant as the sets themselves, because for any set whatever, there is the
property of belonging to that set.^
Properties in the sparse sense of 'property' are required to be that which
makes for genuine, objective, qualitative similarity among their instances. It is the
81
sparse properties that are said to "carve up realit\’ at the joints" and whose
interrelations natural science aims to codifyd
Lewis points out that if our ontology already includes all the properties in
the abundant sense, then there will be one for each property in the sparse sense,
so
we may as well say that the sparse properties are just some - a very small
minority - of the abundant properties. We need no other entities, just an
inegalitarian distinction among the ones we've already got.5
Members of the minority he calls "natural" properties. Whether or not some
property is natural is supposed to be a mind- and language-independent fact
about reality.^ He takes this distinction as primitive. However,
Probably it w'ould be best to say that the distinction between natural
properties and others admits of degree. Some few properties are perfectly
natural. Others, even though they may be somewhat disjunctive or
extrinsic are at least somewhat natural in a derivative way...The colours,
as we now know, are inferior in naturalness to such perfectly natural
properties as mass or charge; grue and bleen are inferior to the colours; yet
even grue does not plumb the real depths of gruesomeness.
^
One strategy then for developing a theory of properties that unites both
conceptions would be to characterize the abundant properties first and then
recover the sparse properties from them by appeal to naturalness. The idea is that
the properties whose relations science codifies would, ideally, all be perfectly
natural and the properties expressed by most of our predicates would all have
some degree of naturalness, though in many cases this will be less than a perfect
degree.
Intuitively, all the sparse properties are intrinsic (though not conversely).^
An intrinsic property of an object is any qualitative property' that, intuitively, the
object has per se, in and of itself, regardless of the state or existence of any other
distinct thing. And a proper^ is intrinsic simpliciter ivhenever it is an intrinsic
property of an object at this or some other world. Whether some object has this
shape or that, this colour or that; what its mass is, its charge, its length and so on,
are facts about it. Whether an object instantiates such properties or not depends
only on the nature of the object in question. So, shapes, colours, masses, lengths
are intrinsic properties.*^ The contrast is with properties that are “extrinsic".
Whether a particular x has an extrinsic property depends not just on its nature,
but on the state or existence of some other thing or things or x's relation to it or
them. Extrinsic properties are implicitly relational. Intuitively, they include being
five miles from Boston, being an uncle and being the bookies' favourite. Whether
or not you are five miles from Boston, for instance, depends not on your nature
or Boston's; it depends on the distance between you and Boston.
In this chapter I will develop and examine a metaphysical theory of
properties in both the abundant and the sparse senses. I will follow Lewis's usage
of these notions and I will follow the above strategy for developing a theory that
unites both conceptions. I call the theory "structural nominalism" (SN). However,
in this chapter there is not space to develop SN in full and so in what follows I
will restrict the scope of the theory to just certain properties. First, SN attempts to
characterize only intrinsic properties; it has nothing to say about the nature of
extrinsic properties (other than that they are not intrinsic). Second, it aims to
characterize only those properties that are basic in the sense that there are "just
enough of them to characterize things without redundancy This restriction is
supposed to exclude, for instance, disjunctive properties (e.g. being either round
or red) and conjunctive properties (e.g. being both round and red) from the scope
of the theory. Finally, SN aims to characterize only those properties that can be
had by simple objects whether or not they could also be had by complex
objects.! ^ Xo be six feet tall, it is necessary to be a complex object; but this is not so
tor charges and masses, or at least not obviously. So heights fall outside our
scope but charges and masses are probably included. Maybe only complex things
can be red or have a heart or be sentient, so these too should fall outside .12 But,
having stated these official restrictions on which properties SN aims to provide
an account of, I will usually play fast and loose with examples for the sake of
vividness. I will be careful about the restrictions only when it is necessary-. In
what follows I shall suppress reference to these restrictions; I will use 'property'
to mean 'intrinsic, basic property that could be instantiated by simple
particulars'.
In 3.2 I outline some of the motivating ideas behind Structural
Nominalism. In the longest section, 3.3, 1 develop the theory. The stategy there is
to start with a naive version of the theory and then modify it in stages in
response to certain difficulties. In 3.4 I briefly discuss some of its theoretical
advantages. Section 3.5 consists in a discussion of two further ways that SN
might be extended. Section 3.6 is taken up with a phenomenological objection to
the theory. In the final section, I give a formal statement of the theory.
3.2 Morivating Structural Nominalism
In 1921 W.E. Johnson introduced a distinction between what he called
determinable properties and determinate properties. \ assume that the
distinction is familiar: very roughly, properties can be grouped into families --
shapes, masses, charges, colours and so on; these families are the determinables
and their members — being roimd, being Ig, being red and so on -- are their
determinates.
Johnson points out that this division of properties is characterized by
various logical relationships. First, anything that instantiates some determinate
property must also fall under the corresponding determinable property: if
something is square, it must have a shape; if something is Ig, it must have a
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mass; if something is positively-charged, it must have a charge. Second, if
something falls under a determinable, then it must instantiate some determinate
of that determinable, though there is no particular determinate it must
instantiate: if something has a shape, it must be either square or triangular or
round or if something has a mass, it must be either Ig, or 2g, or...; if something
has a charge, then it must be either positively-charged or negatively-charged.
Third, no particular can instantiate more than one determinate of any
determinable (at the same time): nothing can be (simultaneously) both square
and circular; nothing can be (simultaneously) both Ig and 2g in mass; nothing
can be (simultaneously) both red all over and green all over. *4
Traditionally, theories of properties start by trying to provide entities to
play the role of determinate properties considered in isolation; determinates are
identified with classes of their instances or Forms or tropes or universals. Then, if
at all, determinables are dealt with as a kind of afterthought. But any theory of
properties that is really to capture the essence of what properties are must
capture any logical relations among them.^^ And the fact that properties
generally stand in various logical relations to one another having to do with their
classification into determinates and determinables suggests, I think, that an
adequate theory of properties ought to start with determinables-together-with-
their-determinates rather than with determinate properties considered in
isolation.^^ The traditional approaches signally fail to capture these relations.
This starting point is also suggested by the metaphor of sparse properties
"carving up reality at the joints". For notice that no sparse determinate really
does carve up reality at the joints. To divide things into Ig particulars and non-lg
particulars for instance is not to carve at the joints any more than a cake can be
satisfactorily divided by cutting a single slice. At most it is to carve at a single
joint; it divides reality into one group of things similar to each other and a
miscellaneous group consisting of everything else.^^ Rather it is determinables
that carve up reality. A sparse determinable like mass divides up ever> thing (to
which it applies) into various groups corresponding to the various determinate
masses such that each particular is similar to all and only the other members of
its group with respect to its mass. It is like a way of dividing the entire cake into
slices.
And this in turn suggests, I think, that Lewis's inegalitarian distinction
among the abundant properties that selects out the sparse minority is better
drawn at the level of determinables than determin/ifcs. It is ways of carving up
reality — determinables-together-with-their-determinates
— rather than the
individual determinates that result from these ways of carving which are the
primary bearers of naturalness. Notice also that if naturalness were to apply in
the first instance at the level of determinates rather than at the level of
determinables, we would be left with no ready explanation of why it is that
determinates drawn from the same determinable are, intuitively, all equally
natural.^^ Why, for instance, is it that although redness is less natural than the
property of being Ig and more natural than the property of being a foreigner,
intuitively it is exactly as natural as greenness?^^
Traditionally it has been held that certain determinate properties are, in
some irreducible way, "qualitative"; that each possesses its own unique
qualitative nature or "quiddity". The being of, say, redness, what distinguishes it
from all other properties, has been supposed to consist in a certain irreducible
qualitative ruddy essence; similarly, for blueness or squareness.
There may be phenomenological reasons for positing quiddities, but
surely one major motivation was to explain the various relations of entailment
and exclusion among properties: since these relations do not appear to have
anything to do with truth-functional or quantificational relations, they are
attributed to the metaphysical natures of the properties themselves. Why redness
«(>
excludes greenness is then seen as a matter of the peculiar irreducible qualitative
natures of redness and greenness, their quiddities.
A final motivation for approaching the project of characterizing properties
from the standpoint of determinables-together-with-their-determinates rather
than from the standpoint of determinate properties considered in isolation is that
it undermines this rationale for positing quiddities. For it holds out the prospect
of an alternative explanation of the relations among propierties -- they can be
explained in terms of the classification of properties into determinates and their
determinables. Thus, stripped of any logical justification, distinctive qualitative
natures or quiddities - indeed the very notion of qualitativeness itself - may be
rendered theoretically superfluous. And unless quiddities are accorded some
kind of Moorean status, this would surely be an advantage; quite what quiddities
are, how we know about them and how they account for the relations among
properties has never been clear.
3.3 Formulating Structural Nominalism (SN)
One way to cash out the metaphor of ''carving up reality" is to think of
dividing all the particulars up into groups such that every particular falls into
exactly one group. In set-theoretic terms this corresponds to a partition on the set
of particulars — some set of non-empty subsets such that every particular is
member of exactly one subset. It can be represented by a pair <P, S> where P is
the set of all particulars and S any equivalence relation whose field is P. It is
helpful to introduce some terminology: call each such partition of particulars <P,
S>, a total classification ofparticulars (or, for short, simply a classification), and call
each of the groups that results from a given classification, each equivalence class,
a cell of that classification.
Particulars can be partitioned in all sorts of ways and the axioms of set-
theory guarantee that for each such way there exists a classification. But since u e
kno;v that^7// such classifications actually exist, we kiunv that among them there
u iil be some that group together particulars in the same ceil precisely when they
are genuinely, objectively similar and similar in related ways. For instance, there
IS some classification which groups together particulars iff they are the same
colour; there is another classification which groups them together iff they have
the same mass; a third which groups them together iff they have the same charge,
and so on. Intuitively, these classifications are more natural than most of the
others in the sense that they correspond to some genuine objective similarity;
they carve up reality at the joints.
3.3.1 A Naive Version of Structural Nominalism (NSN)
As a first shot at formulating SN then we might simply identify
determinables with classifications and their cells with determinates. Call the
resulting theory, "NSN". Its ontology contains only actual particulars and set-
theoretical constructions from pure sets and actual particulars. To pick out the
small minority of classifications that are to be the sparse properties, NSN
assumes a primitive notion of naturalness that applies to classifications.^^^ The
idea is that whether a given classification is natural or not is an extra-mental,
extra-linguistic objective contingent fact about the world which it is the task of
the natural sciences to discover and codify. And although we can hope that we
have evolved so as to tend to classify particulars — mentally and linguistically —
in ways that correspond to the natural classifications, there is no a priori
guarantee that what seems natural to us really is so. NSN consists of the
following:
[Def. 1] X is a total classification ofparticulars (for short, a classification) =df. x
is a pair <P, S> where P is the set of all actual particulars and S is
any total equivalence relation (i.e. its field is P).
X is a cell on a classification <P, S> =df. for some y G P, x = (z: ySz}.[Def. 2]
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lAla] X is d deternmiahle properU' in the abundant sense of 'properb ' iff x
is a total classification of particulars.
[Als] X is a determinable properU' in the sparse sense of 'property' iff x is a
natural total classification of particulars.
[A2a] x is a determinate property in the abundant sense of 'property' iff x
is a cell on some total classification of particulars.
[A2s] X is a determinate property in the sparse sense of 'property'' iff x is a
cell on some natural total classification of particulars.
[A3a] X is a property in the abundant sense of 'property' iff either x is a
detemiinate property' in the abundant sense of 'property'' or x is a
determinable property in the abundant sense of 'property.
[A3s] x is a property in the sparse sense of 'property'' iff either x is a
determinate property in the sparse sense of 'property' or x is a
determinable property in the sparse sense of 'property''.2i
[A4] S is a similarity relation iff <P, S> is a determinable property in the
sparse sense of 'property'.
3.3.2 Modifying NSN I: The Problem of Accidentally Coextensive Determinates
NSN, however, yields an inadequate account of both determinables and
determinates.
First, the identification of determinates with cells incorrectly entails that
actually coextensive determinate properties are identical. A cell is simply a set of
particulars and so obeys the set-theoretic axiom of extensionality. If determinate
properties are identified with cells, then they must be identical whenever they
contain the same members. But since structural nominalism's ontology contains
only actual particulars, if every actual red particular happened also to be round
and vice versa, then SN would entail that redness and roundness are one and the
same property. And that cannot be right.
This, of course, is a traditional objection to any form of class nominalism
that identifies properties with sets of their actual instances. Lewis is a class
nominalist and his solution is to identify properties not with the sets of their
actual instances, but with sets of actual and merely possible instances alike.^^
Any properties which are, intuitively, only accidentally co-instantiated, will
X‘)
differ m which merely possible particulars they contain. I lence, Le^viss class
nominalism correctly entails that they are distinct.
There are, however, three drawbacks to this solution. First, and most
obviously. It requires the resources of an ontology that contains, in addition to
actual particulars, mere possibilia. So this is clearly not a solution for ever\^one.
Second, the solution is not general enough: as it stands it still entails the identih’
of necessarily coextensive properties, properties like triangularity and trilaterality
whose extensions coincide at all worlds. Yet, intuitively, these are distinct
properties. Lewis responds that in cases where we need to distinguish necessarily
coextensive properties (e.g. in guaranteeing that the predicates 'is triangular' and
'is trilateral' get assigned different meanings^^) properties should be seen as
"having some kind of quasi-syntactic structure". Trilaterality and triangularity^
are still to be identified with set-theoretic constructions from their instances
(together, perhaps, with various artificial devices) and these instances are, of
course, the ver}^ same. Where these properties differ is in how they are
constructed from these instances, i.e. with respect to their "quasi-syntactic
structure". But notice that this results in an uncomfortable duality in the criterion
of individuation of properties: all properties are sets, but the identity of
properties does not always consist in sameness of their (actual and possible)
instances; sometimes it requires, in addition, sameness of structure. It must count
against a theory' that it fails to give a unified account of the difference of
properties. Or at least it should count against the theor}" in the absence of some
independent argument that such a unified account ought not to be sought.^-^
Finally, there is an epistemological worry. A property is simply the set of
its actual and possible instances and each property' has some unique degree of
naturalness. Let the set of all actual and possible red things be the set R, and let
the set of all actual and possible round things be the set O. Now suppose once
again that redness and roundness happen to be actually coextensive; let the set of
actual red things (= the set of actual round things) be r. Here vve have three sets -
R, O and r. The latter, r, is a common subset of the other two. Each has a unique
degree of naturalness, and, presumably, r has a degree of naturalness less than
either of the other two.25 But we would know that redness and roundness are
distinct even if they actually ivere coextensive. How? Not by acquaintance with
particulars that are members of R but not O or vice versa, because, ex hypothesi,
these are all non-actual and so beyond our acquaintance. Not by some sort of
acquaintance with some degree of naturalness that distinguishes R and O,
because, ex hypothesi, we have acquaintance only at best with r which has a
unique degree of naturalness less than that of R and O. (Moreover, it should not
be ruled out a priori that R and O are equally natural.)
Perhaps, it might be suggested, we are directly acquainted with the
properties redness and roundness themselves not just their instances. In looking
at a red circle one just does experience both a colour and a shape, regardless of
whether redness and roundness are coextensive.
But this is just what the class nominalist must explain: if properties really
are classes and r is the actual extension of both properties, then the class
nominalist has failed to provide us with two entities to be experienced. Yet
Lewis's ontology contains notliing else that could serve to provide the distinction
betu^een R and
In short, then, Lewis's solution seems to rule out any possible basis for
recognition that r is a common subset of two accidentally coextensive properties,
rather than say the actual extension of a single natural property. This
epistemological worry, if cogent, is quite general. There is nothing in set-theory,
the notion of naturalness or any actual experience that could provide a basis for
our recognition that some properties are only accidentally coextensive while
others are necessarily so. It is similarly unclear what could provide the basis for
^)1
our recognition that some properties are merely accidentally disjoint while others
are necessarily so. Yet we clearly do knoiv the difference in many cases.
These three drawbacks with Lewis's solution point the way to a more
adequate class nominalist response to the problem of distinguishing distinct but
actually coextensive determinate properties. If we eschew an appeal to addihonal
entities - mere possibilia - to distinguish them, while retaining the idea that
determinate properties are set-theoretic constructions (having a unique degree of
naturalness) from ordinary particulars, we have no alternative but to appeal to
additional set-theoretic structure. The second difficulty shows that this move
may have to be made at some point in any case. The third difficulty suggests that
the difference between coextensive determinates should be one that is accessible
from the actual world.
So what exactly is wrong with identifying accidentally coextensive
determinates anyway? After all, it would seem to represent a considerable gain in
theoretical economy.
A naive explanation of why being 3g and redness (to change examples)
would not be the same property even if they were coextensive is that they are
simply different types of property — one is a mass property and the other a
colour. This shows up in the fact that redness and being 3g differ in their logical
relations. If something is 3g, then it follows that it has some mass, that it's not
lOg, perhaps that it is similar in mass to a penny and so on, none of which follow
from the fact that it’s red. On the other hand, if something is red, then it follow s
that it's coloured, not blue and perhaps that it is similar in colour to tomatoes,
none of which follow from the fact that it is 3g in mass. In short, something's
being red entails other colour facts about it but no mass facts (or charge facts,
or...); something's being 3g entails other mass facts about it but no colour facts (or
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charge facts, or...). So perhaps part of what's wrong ^vlth identifying a
determinate with its extension, a cell, is that doing so obliterates information
about which determinable it belongs to, i.e. what type of property^ it is.
So let us identify a determinate properU^ not just with a cell but with a pair
consisting of a determinable together with one of its cells. The idea is to build into
the nature of a determinate the information about its tc^pe required to guarantee
those inferences just noted. Now even if redness and being 3g were actually
coextensive, the account would not entail that they are identical. For although
they would then have the same second member, viz. the set of actual red
particulars (which happens also to be the set of actual 3g particulars), they would
differ in their first members. Redness has the colour determinable as its first
member and being 3g has the mass determinable as its first member. And these
determinables would in general be distinct. For the coextensiveness of redness
and being 3g does not guarantee that all the other colours and masses are also
coextensive; some blue particulars would still be 2g, but some 4g, others lOOg
etc.; some 2g particulars would still be green, but some purple, others yellow.
And notice that this difference is one that is accessible from the actual world.
j.3.3 Modifying NSN II: The Problem of Accidentally Coextensive Determin^f?/t?s.
the Problem of Internal Structure and the Problem of Missing Determinates
But perhaps this is only a partial solution. For if all the determinates of
certain determinables were to be coextensive, then NSN, even thus amended,
would still entail their identity and the identities of the corresponding
determinates. And this seems wrong. If the fact that all red things also happen to
be 3g and vice versa is not sufficient for identifying redness and being 3g, why
should it be sufficient if it also happens that aU and only blue things are 4g and
all and only green things are 5g, and so on through all the corresponding
determinates? The problem of coextensive determinates is avoided but u hat u-e
might call the "problem of coextensive determin/if^/cs" is not.
Before looking at a possible solution to this new problem let us fir^t notice
two further inadequacies in NSN. The first is that the identification of
determinables simply with partitions on the set of particulars would, in
Armstrong's words "seem to cast no light upon the internal ordering of the
shapes, the colours etc."27 .. the fact that, for instance, orangeness is more similar
to redness than it is to blueness; that being Ig is more similar to being 2g than it
IS to being lOOg etc. Tlie second inadequacy is what we might call "the problem
of missmg values". We often have occasion to refer to and quantify over
determinate properties that are not actually instantiated - Hume's missing shade
of blue, the infinitely many actually uninstantiated mass properties, and so on -
and we grasp predicates that express these properties. But if a determinate is
simply a pair of a classification and a non-empty cell which is the extension of the
determinate, tlien there are no uninstantiated properties. Tlius, the account fails
to provide for the referents of all our names, or the values of all our variables and
predicates.
In response let us amend NSN's account of determinables and identify
them not just with (unordered) partitions of particulars, but with partitions
having some kind of internal structure. Tlie idea is tliat it is this structure that at
once encodes the facts about the relative "closeness" of various determinates of a
determinable, provides for "gaps" to function as the missing values and allows
us to distinguish even between coextensive determinables, determinables that
classify all particulars alike. In set-theoretic terms: x is a classification =df. x is a
triple, <P, S, m>, where m is some metric on the equivalence classes induced by S
on P. This metric can be thought of as defining a "space" for the determinates of
that determinable. For instance, m might be a function from the set of real
numbers lo the set of cells <ind so can be thouglit of as assigning a real number to
each cell. The determinable would have the internal structure of the real line and
the number assigned to each cell would specify that cell's location in the
determinate space - roughly, where it lies on the real line. Call the new theory,
"SN".
(And let us also require, following the suggestion of section 3.2 (fn. 19),
that each determinate inherit the degree of naturalness of its determinable: if
determinable <P, S, m> has degree of naturalness n, then so does every
determinate of that determinable «P, S, m>, [x]s>. This has the immediate
consequence that every determinate of a given determinable has the same degree
of naturalness, but it places no constraints on the relative degrees of naturalness
of any determinates drawn from distinct determinables.)
A natural question that arises at this point is: Is there a single type of
structure common to all natural determinables? It would seem not. We talk of the
colour circle
,
so perhaps the metric on the colour determinable encodes some
sort of circular internal structure. But intuitively many of the so-called extensive
and intensive magnitudes - mass, length, temperature, density, volume and so
on - are drawn from determinables that have the same sort of internal structure
as the positive reals or as the real line. In such cases the metric is perhaps a total
function from the set of positive reals or all the real numbers to the partition and
will define a linear ordering on the partition. Still other determinables, for
instance those involving discrete quantities such as charge, valence, number of
sides etc., intuitively have (or could have, if sufficiently generalized) the same
sort of structure as the integers. In many such cases the metric will likely be a
function from the set of integers to the partition, and in some cases it will define a
well-ordering on it. And maybe in some cases the internal structure is more
complicated stiU — perhaps it is some kind of multi-dimensional space. In such
cases, the metric is best thought of as defining a "distance" relation of some kind.
^)5
Since structural nominalism aims to be a general theory of properties, it will
maintain only that there is some structure to each determinable and that this
should be encoded by some function from mathematical entities to the partition.
The nature of the structure should be a matter for empirical investigation; an a
priori theory like SN can and should be no more specific than this.^^
Now, of three determinates drawn from a single determinable, «P, S, m>,
A>, «P, S, m>, B> and «P, S, m>, C> we can say that the first is more “similar"
to the second than the third iff A is “closer" to B than it is to C in the determinate
space defined by m. Thus, the redefinition accommodates the internal ordering of
determinables.
And it may happen that m assigns a number to every cell but not every
number is assigned to some cell. One way (perhaps not the most elegant)29 to
exploit these unassigned numbers to furnish us with the missing values such as
Hume s missing shade of blue and the actually uninstantiated masses would be
to relax the definition of 'classification' to allow the empty set as a kind of
courtesy cell. And then we could allow that the empty set is assigned more than
one number. Each missing value of a determinable would be a pair whose first
member is the determinable and whose second member is the empty set indexed
by some number assigned by the metric. Uninstantiated determinates would
differ from each other by virtue of the number the empty set is assigned by that
determinable's metric i.e. by their position in the determinable's structure.
Suppose for instance that nothing is exactly 3g and that nothing is exactly 7g.
Then the determinate property being 3g would be «P, S, m>, (}3> and the
determinate property being 7g would be «P, S, m>, {}7>, where S is the is the
same mass as relation and the subscripts indicate the numbers assigned by m.^‘^ So
even uninstantiated determinates actually exist to be referred to, quantified over
and assigned as values to our predicates. What makes one the 3g determinate
and the other the 7g determinate despite not differing in their determinable or
their extension is, roughly, that the former comes halfway between the 2g and 4g
determinates, the latter halfway between the 6g and 8g determinates. Tliis seems
a fairly natural explanation.
And maybe some determinables differ only in their metrics, i.e. only in
how the cells induced by S on P are arranged within the determinable space.
Thus SN allows that there can be distinct determinables that do not differ at all in
which particulars they group together, but only in how these groups of
particulars, their cells, are arranged vis a vis one another. Thus, the redefinition
allows us to distinguish even coextensive determinables.^^
3.4 The Transworld '"Identiries" of Properties
3.4.1 SN and Isomorphic Determinables
SN however still entails the identity of any determinables (and so their
corresponding determinates) that partition particulars in the same way and
impose the same structure on this partition; that is, SN entails the identity of
determinables if they are isomorphic.
However, unlike the identification of coextensive determinates and
perhaps the identification of coextensive determinables, this latter identification
is not clearly objectionable at all.
Notice first that distinct but isomorphic determinables would be
epistemically indistinguishable to us. For suppose that d and d' are
corresponding determinates drawn from distinct but isomorphic determinabk*s
and consider some particular distinct from us.32 How could we ever detect that
this particular instantiates d rather d'? Not directly; for we detect directly onl\'
the extrinsic properties of particulars distinct from us - their effects on our
instruments and our senses. Nor could we directly detect anything from which
we could deductively infer the presence of d rather than d'; for, as Hume argued,
any effects are only contingently connected with the intrinsic properties
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responsible for them.M \or does it seem thdt tliere could be any other evidence
to distinguish them. For since isomorpltic determinables classify every particular,
past, present and future, in exactly the same way, notlung we could detect about
my particular could distinguish those effects due the presence of d from those
due to the presence of d'. And clearly if the corresponding determinates drawn
from distinct but isomorphic determinables are epistemically indistinguishable,
SO are the determinables themselves.
Indeed, if it were possible for there to be distinct but isomorphic
determinables, then, for all we know, the mass determinable may actually have a
shadow ''schmass" determinable, and each of its determinates a shadow schmass
determinate. For all we know there may actually be infinitely many such
shadows for all our intrinsic properties; only God could distinguish them. And
this is hard to swallow.
Notice also that although there are actually coextensive but distinct
determinates such as renate and cordate, there do not seem to be any actual
examples of isomorphic but distinct determinables. Nor does this seem to be just
a happy accident. For scientists sometimes announce the identity of types of
property or the reduction of one type of property to another (e.g. temperatures to
mean kinetic energies of molecules). Yet the only evidence they could have, even
in principle, for such claims is that the determinables from which they are dravvm
are isomorphic; for, as we have just seen, distinct but isomorphic determinables
would be epistemically indistinguishable. In short, scientists seem actually to
regard isomorphism among determinables as sufficient for their identity.
These observations are not conclusive without some fairly dubious
verificationist assumptions, but they do seem to me to constitute fairly strong
prima facie evidence for the identity of isomorphic determinables. And in that
case the onus is on the opponent of SN to produce some positive argument for
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recognizing the possibiliU’ of distinct but isomorphic (and so epistemically
indistinguishable) determinables.
But perhaps the opponent will reason as follows. Consider any t;vo
property determinables that have the same sort of structure - say, the mass and
the (absolute) temperature determinables which are both (positive) real-valued.
Since many of their determinates are not actually coextensive, it is agreed on all
sides that these are distinct determinables. Let us suppose however that some
mass and temperature determinates are in fact coextensive
- perhaps all and
only particulars that are 5g in mass have a temperature of 20K; all and only those
particulars that are lOg have a temperature of 40K; and so on. A very plausible
principle of recombination guarantees that the result of patching together any
collection of distinct particulars from any one world whatever their intrinsic
properties is also a world.^4 consider a world w obtained by patching together
only those distinct particulars from the actual world that instantiate those mass
and temperature determinates that are in fact coextensive. And let these
particulars be the only particulars that exist at w. Now, at w the extensions of all
the mass and temperature determinates coincide and the determinable structure
is the same, so the temperature and mass determinables are isomorphic there.
The problem is that we know from the actual world that masses and
temperatures are distinct properties. So, contrary to SN, it is possible for there to
be distinct but isomorphic deterrninables, their epistemic indistinguishabiUty
notwithstanding .^5
Notice, however, that this argument goes through only on the assumption
that if masses and temperatures are distinct at the actual world, then they must
also be distinct at w. More generally, this sort of argument requires the
assumption that properties, if distinct, are necessarily distinct. So before we can
see whether this argument wdll convince a structural nominalist we need to
examine SN's proposed criterion of transworld identity for properties.
M2 SN and the Transvvorld Identih- Conditions of PmpprHacJh
SN identifies each actual determinable property u ith a triple, <P, S, m>,
where P is some set of actual parHculars, S some equivalence relation on P and m
some metnc defined on the equivalence classes induced by S on P. And it
identifies determinate properties with pairs «P, S, m>, [x]k> consisting of a
determinable and one of the equivalence classes induced by S on P, indexed to
indicate its "position" in the "determinable space" defined by m.
SN also supposes that each actual determinable property has a certain
unique degree of naturalness and that this is inherited by each of its
determinates. The naturalness of any determinable <P, S, m> is to be thought of
as a measure, roughly, of how genuinely and objectively similar x is to y
whenever xSy.
In order to talk about determinables and their determinates at different
worlds it IS helpful to have some way of comparing their internal structures and
their degrees of naturalness. So let us make two assumptions. First let us assume
some way of encoding the type of internal structure imposed by the metric of any
classification on its partition of particulars at its world: let o(<P, S, m>, w) = the
type of internal structure m imposes on the partition <P, S> of particulars P at
world w. The idea is that o should assign, for instance, the mass and (absolute)
temperature determinables at the actual world the same value there, since they
are both have the internal structure of the positive reals; but, since the colour
determinable at the actual world intuitively has some sort of circular internal
structure, o should assign it a different value there. Second, let us also assume a
function that assigns to each classification at each world a value to measure its
degree of naturalness at that world: n(<P, S, m>, w) = the degree of naturalness
of classification <P, S, m> at world w. This degree of naturalness is also inherited
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by any pair of a classification and one of its cells: for an\’ x, the degree of
naturalness of «P, S, m>, [x]k> at world w = n{<P, S, m>, w).
It seems that something along the follmving lines is SN's best bet for the
transworld identity criteria of properties:
[1] Determinable <P, S, m> at world w and determinable <?', S', m’> at
a distinct world w are the scunc dct^nninable iff:
(1) n(<P, S, m>, w) = n(<P', S^, m^>, w^); and
(2) o(<P, S, m>, w) = o(<P, S', m'>, w').
[2] Determinate «P, S, m>, [x]p at world w and determinate «P', S', m'>,
[x ]|^> at a distinct world w' are the same determinate iff:
,
S
,
m'> are the same determinable; and
(2)i = k.37
To state the transworld identity conditions for some kind of entity is, in
effect, to state what one takes the essence of that kind of entity to be. Roughly, the
guiding idea behind SN is that the essence of a property, whether determinable
or determinate, consists in a certain dassificational role. In the case of a
determinable <P, S, m>, this role is defined by the type of structure its metric m
defines on its partition of particulars <P, S> and by how natural the resulting
structured partition is. Roughly, [1] says that a determinable D at world w is the
same determinable as determinable D' at world w' iff D and D' are equally natural
and they have the same type of internal structure at their worlds. In the case of a
determinate «P, S, m>, [x]k>, this role consists in occupying a certain location in
its deterrninable space. Roughly, [2] says that determinate d at world w is the
same determinate property as determinate d' at world w' iff they belong to the
same determinable and they occupy the same position in that determinable's
space as defined by its metric at their worlds.
A brief examination of some of the consequences of this account should
help to make the idea clearer.
lOl
First, and most obviously, this account entails that properties are to be
constructed in the same way at all worlds. At any world a determinable is,
roughly, an ordered partition of particulars, and a determinate is a pair of a
determinable and one of the equivalence class on this partition. Thus, SN entails
that the relations of exclusion and entailment among properHes are essential to
them. And this seems right. It does seem to be part of the essence of, e.g. redness
to entail being coloured and to exclude being blue.
Second, this account makes the degree of naturalness of any determinate
property essential to it. According to [1], if determinables at distinct worlds differ
at all in how natural they are at their respective worlds, then they are distinct;
and, by [2], the same is true of determinates also. Since the naturalness of a
determinate property is supposed to be a measure of the degree of genuine
objective similarity the property imposes on its instances, the account entails that
each determinate property imposes exactly the same degree of similarity on its
instances regardless of where these instances are in logical space. And this too
seems right. Although resemblance is a matter of degree
- greenness, e.g.,
confers a greater degree of resemblance on its instances that grueness -
intuitively, any given property makes for exactly the same degree ofsimilarity
among its instances. Surely, if x and y have a certain degree of similarity by
virtue of both being green, then this is the case regardless of what x and y are or
where in logical space they exist. And surely the fact that particulars are more
similar by virtue of being green than they are by virtue of being grue is
something that should be true at all worlds. In short, SN entails, correctly it
seems, that the degree of similarity conferred by any property on its instances is a
part of its essence.
Third, [1] entails that determinables at distinct worlds are the same
determinable only if they have the same type of internal structure. And [2] entails
that their determinates are the same only if they occupy corresponding positioas
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in this structure. Fhis proposal thereby makes the "distance" relations among
determinates of the same determinable essential to them; it entails that e.g.
redness is more similar to orangeness than it is to blueness at every ^vorld at
which these properries exist. This too seems to match intuitions; intuitively, it is
of the nature of redness to be more similar to orangeness than to blueness.
But according to SN these features exhaust the essences of properties.
Notice in particular that SN's transworld identity criteria involve no constraints
having to do with the extensions of the properties at various worlds. The account
thereby allows: (a) worlds whose domains of particulars differ, and which may
even contain none of the same classifications, but which nevertheless contain
instances of all and only the very same properties; (b) worlds containing the very
same particulars but which differ in which properties are instantiated there; and
(c) worlds containing the very same particulars and at which the very same
properties are instantiated, but which have those properties differently
distributed among its particulars.
This also matches our intuitions: intuitively, the extension of a property,
the collection of its instances, is not essential to it; intuitively, the instances of a
property can vary from world to world. At the actual world, for instance,
tomatoes, firetrucks and roses are red, while the sky, the sea and violets are blue.
But, intuitively, violets might have red and roses might not have been.
However, intuitively, the members of a set are essential to it. So by
adopting these transworld identity criteria SN effectively severs any link between
the identity of a given set across worlds and the identity of a given property
across worlds. In effect, SN identifies properties with certain "roles" that may be
filled by different sets at different worlds. It is the role rather than the particular
set that plays this role at a given world that constitutes the essence of a given
property. And although SN entails that a property has its degree of naturalness
essentiaUy, it can allow that the very same classification may differ in naturalness
from rvorld to world; it can alknv that a given classification (and so a pair of a
classification and one of its cells) has its degree of naturalness only contingently.
Although, for instance, colour has its degree of naturalness essentially, SN may
allow that the particular set that plays the role of being colour at the actual world
may have a different degree of naturalness at some other world, even at a world
that contains the very same particulars as the actual world.
So SN can allow that, for instance, redness may be one set at one world,
but a different set at others; much as the inventor of bifocals may be one person
at one world, but a different person at another. And it can allow that the very
same set may play different properties roles at different worlds; much as the very
same person may be the Prime Minister at one world but the Leader of the
Opposition at another.
One important consequence of all this is that SN allows for what we might
loosely call "the contingent identity" of properties, though only for certain
properties. It seems to be possible for determinables to differ in how they
partition particulars without differing at all in their internal structures or in their
degrees of naturalness. Consider, for instance, the mass determinable and the
temperature determinable at the actual world. These seem to have the same type
of internal structure — that of the positive reals. And they are both candidates for
being perfectly (and so equally) natural determinables. If so, then these are
distinct determinables which differ only in how they divide up the particulars of
the actual world ~ some actual particulars having the same mass have different
temperatures and some actual particulars having the same temperature have
different masses. But according SN, any determinable at any other world that is
both perfectly natural and has the internal structure of the real line just is the
temperature determinable. And it is the mass determinable too! Thus, although
temperatures and masses are distinct at the actual world, SN entails that they are
one and the same at other worlds. Similarly, it may be that at some other world
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that is richer than the actual world, there are determinables - say the "bass"
and "schmass" determinables - that are distinct there (because they partition
iv*'s particulars differently) but which are both the same determinable as our
actual mass determinable (because they are both perfectly natural and both have
the internal structure of the real line). Again SN entails that although bass and
schmass are distinct determinables at w*, they are one and the same at the actual
world.^*^
SN even allows that there are very impoverished worlds, say ones at
which there exists a just a single particular, at which for any given degree of
naturalness and any given internal structure, there is at most determinable
having that degree of naturalness and that type of structure. This particular may
have a certain temperature and a certain mass and so on, but at this world, these
temperatures and masses will be (contingently) the very same properties.
It is because SN allows that properties may be distinct at one world but
identical at another that the structural nominalist can block the anti-SN argument
with which we finished section 3.4.1. SN can also reject the possibility of distinct
but in principle epistemically indistinguishable properties, properties that only
God could distinguish. And she can endorse the actual scientific practice of
identifying actually isomorphic determinables.^o Moreover, the fact that
properties may be contingently identical may provide grounds for dismissing
any lingering mysteries about how the ''identity" of properties, e.g. temperatures
and mean kinetic energies of constituent molecules, is discovered in the course of
scientific investigation. The advocate of SN can maintain that what is discovered
is that classification of particulars by instruments to detect temperature and
classification of them by instruments to detect mean kinetic energy result in the
same classification. Since a determinable will in general involve classifying vast
numbers of particulars, if you start with those particulars and I start with these, it
lOS
is unsurpnsmg that ^ve should fail to realize that our classifications are one and
the same.
This position is far from problem-free however. Consider a world of
comparable nchness to our own. And suppose that at this world there are several
distinct (because non-isomorphic) perfectly natural determinables having the
internal structure of the real line. According to SN, all of them have an equal
claim to be the temperature and the mass determinable there. And this may be
thought objectionable; though this is not obviously so. Unfortunately there is not
space to pursue the issue fully here. I will merely point out that SN permits the
the contingent identity of a fairly narrowly circumscribed collection of
determinate properties. Determinate properties can be the same property at some
worlds and distinct at others only ifthey are drawn from equally natural,
structurally isomorphic determinables and they occupy the same positions on
these determinables. Thus, SN entails that being positively-charged and being 3g
are necessarily distinct (because drawn from determinables with different
structures); it entails that being red and being 3g are necessarily distinct (because
drawn from determinables that are not equally natural); and it entails that being
red and being green are necessarily distinct (because they occupy different
positions in their determinable).
3.5 Evaluaring SN
In section 3.6 I wdll consider two of the remaining difficulties with SN.
These require some minor extensions of the account. But let us first make a start
on evaluating the theory. (I have stated SN in full, including these modifications,
in the Appendix.)
The first and most obvious advantage of SN is its theoretical economy. Its
ontology is safe and sane: it includes just two fundamental categories of entity -
particulars and sets. And it is a fully actualist theory: no appeal is made to any
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merely possible mdiv,duals. Its ideology is also very parsimonious: apart from
the fundamental notions of set-theory, its only conceptual primitive is the notion
of naturalness which applies to certain sets and comes in degrees.
.All other
noHons are defined, analyzed or logically constructed. These include the
following: determinate property, determinable property (in both senses of
property'), similarity (and, in the Appendix, intrinsic nature and duplication). It
is also noteworthy that no modal notions appear among the primitives of SN.‘*'
Indeed, SN is at least as attractive on grounds of theoretical economy as any
other extant theory of properties.
Second, SN entails, without appeal to any special additional axioms'^^, a
number of important theorems thereby explaining how it is that they are known
a priori. First, it entails that every determinate belongs to a unique determinable,
thereby accounting for the fact that we know a priori that e.g. red is a colour
property, Ig is a mass property, and so on. Second, it entails that if a particular
instantiates a determinate F, them (a) It falls under the determinable to which F
belongs; (b) It instantiates some determinate of that determinable (though there is
no particular determinate it must instantiate); and (c) It instantiates no other
determinate of that determinable.'*^ This is SN's explanation of Johnson’s three
features of the logical relations among properties outlined in 3.2. In particular, in
virtue of (c) SN explains why it is, and how we know a priori, that e.g. nothing
can be both red (all over) and green (all over), nothing can be both Ig and 3g in
mass, and so on.'*'* In short, it solves the famous problem of incompatibilities
among properties, a problem which no other extant theory solves satisfactonlv
Third, SN has a number of epistemological advantages. One has already
been mentioned — it enables us to distinguish accidentally coextensive properties
without appeal to mere possibiha, thereby avoiding the commitment to mere
possibilia responsible for so many incredulous stares. I'll mention just one more
here: it seems to throw some light on the role of paradigms in grasping
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properties such as colours. Simply pointing at some blue particular is clearly not
sufficient for a grasp of blueness - how could poindng at any particular suffice to
direct someone's attention to its colour rather than any other of its properties?
Nor is there any special super-paradigmahcally blue particular which we must
grasp to grasp blueness; almost any blue particular will do as paradigm.
According to SN, blueness is a pair consisting of the colour determinable and
some equivalence class determined by the similarity relation in this determinable.
To grasp blueness requires that we grasp both the determinable and the relevant
equivalence class. Any blue particular will do as paradigm because any
determines the same equivalence class under the colour similarity relation. But
none is sufficient, for it could not determine the colour determinable as a whole.
To its advantage SN avoids the hopeless project of finding some super-
paradigmatically blue thing to which all blue things are more similar overall than
each is to anything else or with being saddled with a vast number of primitive
similarity-relations which bedeviled traditional forms of resemblance
nominalism.4^ In reality, it seems that we grasp blueness by being told that
something is blue iff it is the same colour as that, pointing to some paradigm,
perhaps to the sky or the cover of some book. Or perhaps we are told that
something is blue iff it has a colour that is halfway betw^een that of grass and
iodine. So it seems that we actually do grasp it by grasping both some
paradigm(s) and the (ordered) colour determinable in general as SN suggests.
3.6 Two Further Difficulties with SN: Some Extensions
The first difficulty is what we might call "the problem of relative
determinables". Armstrong points out that some properties seem not to be
determinates or determinables simpliciter, but determinables relative to some
properties and determinates relative to others.^^ Redness for instance is a
determinate relative to colour, but a determinable relative to scarlet. Moreover,
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fcnlet Itself seems to be a determinable relative to various completely spedtic
shades (for which we lack predicates). This raises hvo difficulties for any theory
like SN which aims to encode Johnson's logical relations among properties into
the structure of those sets with which they are to be identified. First, such cases
show that Johnson's third claim - that determinates of a determinable exclude
each other - is false, or at least true only if the determinates are "at the same
level".« Although, redness and blueness exclude each other and scarlet and
aquamarine exclude each other, scarlet and redness do not, nor do blueness and
aquamarine. Second, such cases seem to show that there are further logical
relations among properties than the ones Johnson points out. For something can
be scarlet only if it is red, something can be aquamarine only if it is blue, and so
on. So even if SN succeeds in incorporahng Johnson's three features into its
account of the nature of properHes, it would still fail to give a full account of their
nature.
To deal with this problem we must extend SN in a natural way. We know
from the axioms of set-theory that there will sometimes be two classifications that
are related in the following two ways: first, any particulars classified alike by the
first are also classified alike by the second (though not vice versa); and second,
the metrical structure of the first is preserved on mapping it into the metrical
structure of the second. When these conditions obtain let us say that the second
classification is a pvecisificcition of the first. Roughly, one classification is a
precisification of another when it provides a more fine-grained partition of
particulars while still preserving the structure of this partition. When this
situation occurs a single cell of the former will contain all the members of several
cells of its precisifications. Let us say that such a cell is a subdeterminable relative
to those cells of its predsification.'*^
Quite often predsifications are more natural than that which they
predsify; they are, after all, more spedfic. But this is not so in general. It is an
10')
easy matter to dream up very unnatural predsifications of prettv’ natural
determinables. Indeed, if a precisification were always more natural than that
which it predsifies, then every unit property would be perfectly natural, and this
seems vwong. So, in general, there need be no straightforward relation between
the degree of naturalness of a determinable and the degree of naturalness of any
of its predsifications.
This terminology allows us to explain Armstrong's observation without
abandoning Johnson's third claim. Johnson is right that no particular instantiates
more than one determinate of any determinable. However, some determinables
are preasifications of others and possess similar degrees of naturalness. In such
cases we often give these (strictly distinct) determinables the same name.
Moreover, in such cases some determinates of one classification will qualify as
subdeterminables relative to determinates from its predsifications. Colours
provide a case in point — strictly speaking, the seven-colour determinable, the
intermediate determinable that includes scarlet, aquamarine and so on, and the
infinitely-many, completely spedfic hue determinable are all distinct
determinables despite all being called "colour". However, they do constitute a
chain of predsifications and one deterrninable (e.g. the seven-colour
determinable) contains determinates (e.g. redness) that qualify as
subdeterminables relative to the determinates (e.g. scarlet, crimson, some
absolutely spedfic reddish hue) of the other two determinables. Furthermore,
when one determinable is a predsification of another, then, by the definition of
'predsification', any particular that instantiates a determinate of the former must
also instantiate the corresponding determinate of the latter. Thus, being scarlet
entails rather than excludes being red. But the names should not mislead:
subdeterminables are not genuine determinables at all according to SN and
(proper) predsifications are distinct determinables from that which they predsify
despite often being given the same name (e.g. 'colouT). In short, Johnson's claim
IS compatible ivith Armstrong's observation, and, thus extended, SN entails the
logical relations that, intuitively, hold among deterrmnables and their
precisifications.
r he second difficulty is generated by the fact that, by definition, a
classification assigns every particular to some cell or other. Hence SN entails that
every particular instantiates some determinate from every determinable. But this
is not quite nght. Although it seems pretty plausible for the macroscopic
particulars of everyday life, it is clearly not the case for all the particulars posited
by saence and philosophy. Although chairs, cars and buildings all have some
mass, colour and shape, electrons, spacetime points and force fields do not have
any colour, and propositions, ideas and Cartesian egos don't have any mass or
shape. 1 hese sorts of particulars are such that some determinables just do not
apply to them. Indeed, there may even be no determinable under which every
particular falls, that is to say, there is perhaps no respect of similarity according
to which we may classify absolutely every particular.
1 will briefly mention three strategies for amending SN in the light of this
objection.
I he first is simply to drop the assumption that every determinable
partitions the entire set of particulars. Instead a determinable could be identified
with any partition of any subset of P. Ihen only some particulars will fall under
most determinables. It could be urged that the colour determinable, for instance,
partitions only some not all particulars. And electrons, propositions, spirits and
so on are not among those it partitions. I hus, colour just does not apply to these
particulars.
One drawback to this approach is that it would deprive us of an
explanation of certain relations among determinables themselves which 1 have
not mentioned up till now. Intuitively, some determinables are such that any
parhcular falling under one must also fall under the other and vice versa. For
instance, it is impossible for any particular to be red but lack a shape, or an area.
Indeed these mter-determinable relations may be what is behind those traditional
though vague metaphysical slogans to the effect that a bare particular is
impossible or that reality must be fully determinate. Although, it is unclear what
these slogans really mean, it does seem natural to take the former as saying that
every particular must instantiate at least one property. However, if this is what it
means, then it understates the case. For it seems just as impossible for a particular
to instantiate just one property - say, being red - as that it should instantiate
none. Nor does it seem possible for a particular to instantiate just two properties,
or just three; even a "semi-clothed" particular is impossible. For if a particular is,
say, red, then surely it must have some shape or other, some area or other, some
mass or other, and so on. One way to take the second slogan — reality must be
fully determinate - is as asserting that for every particular x and every properN
P, either Px or not Px. But this too seems not to be the whole story. For consider
all the mass determinates; being Og, being Ig, being 2g, being 257.9g, and so on.
Now the above condition would be satished if of some physical particular it were
not the case that that it instantiates each such property. Yet this does not seem
possible — it must have some mass, even if it is zero mass. Perhaps we might more
accurately express the intuitions underlying these slogans by means of the
slogan, "every particular must instantiate a full complement of properties". Of
course, the problem is then to explain what counts as a "full complement" of
properties. And notice that SN as originally stated explains this. For it entails that
every particular instantiates some determinate from every determinable and that
may be just the sort of thing we mean when we say that a particular must be fulK-
clothed or fully determinate. Intuitively, what was wrong with SN was that it
exaggerated the extent of these logical relations among determinables. The
partial classification response, by contrast, entails no such relations among
defermmables; it thus fails to accommodate all the pre-theoretical data
concerning properties. The truth seems to lie somewhere m the middle - some
but not all determinables are logically connected in this way .so
The second strategy consists in subjecting the set of all actual particulars to
an initial partition into fundamental categories
- perhaps into concrete
particulars and abstract particulars, or into physical substances and mental
substances, or perhaps in some other way - and then relativizing the structure
proposed by SN to these categories. The idea is that each category has its own
determinables and that SN as originally stated is true of each category: within a
category every particular instantiates some determinate of every one of that
category s determinables. Particulars in, say, the abstract category such as
propositions would then be such that the concrete determinables - mass, colour,
charge etc. - don't apply to them.
One obvious drawback here is that it is unclear what the categories should
be. Electrons, for instance, are physical objects but they do not have a colour even
though physical objects are generally coloured. So a fundamental category of
physical objects seems to be ruled out. Of course, colour is not a serious
candidate for being a sparse property. Nevertheless, there seems to be no a priori
guarantee that this problem will not arise with more serious candidates.
The third approach would be to introduce a "null" determinate into every
determinable. Then, although every particular would have to instantiate some
determinate from every determinable, in some cases this will merely be the null
determinate. This account would entail that every particular instantiates some
colour or other, though in the case of electrons, propositions and the rest, the
colour would be this null colour.^i
One problem with this approach is that it is unclear how non-arbitrarily to
decide on the null determinate's position in the metrical structure. Indeed
uithout further development this approach would seem to differ only nominally
trom the partial classification approach. ,\or does this approach e.xplain ivIn- a
coloured particular must have a non-null mass.
The pnnapal criticism of the partial classification approach uas that it
may fail to capture all the relations among properhes. However, it is not obvious
that these really are lof;ical relations at all, the tradihonal metaphysical slogans
notwithstanding. It is therefore unclear whether a theory of properties should
even try to incorporate them into its logical constructions. But at worst this
approach seems to say less than the whole truth rather than something clearly
false. So although at present I am unsure of which approach to amending SN is
best, or whether some hybrid approach is preferable, I have adopted the partial
classification response in the formal statement of SN in the Appendix.
3.7 The Phenomenological Objection to SN
The opponent of SN might argue as follows. VVe know what it is like to
experience certain determinate properties and this phenomenal access reveals
their distinctive essence - their "qualitative nature" or "quiddity". In experience,
we are acquainted, for instance, with the ruddiness of red and it is this ruddiness
that is at least partly constitutive of the essence of redness. But according to SN
the essence of a determinate consists only in the classificational structure
imposed on particulars by its determinable, e.g. colour, how natural this
classification is, and where redness is located in the colour-space as defined by
the colour metric. In particular, SN makes no room for the quiddities of
properties, such as the ruddiness of red, and so fails fully to capture their
essence.52 Indeed, the entire approach may seem to get the cart before the horse:
being classified in a certain way does not constitute some particular's redness;
rather, red particulars are classified alike because they are all red.^^
The objection may be put a little more precisely. Suppose that SN's
account of properties really does leave something out, their quiddities or
essences. Then it mil conflate distinct possibilities that differ only xvith respect to
facts about these quiddities. For if it doesn't, and any particular at any ^vorld
instantiates SN's candidate for redness iff it instanhates the putative genuine
article, quiddity and all, then theoretical economy dictates the identification of
SN s candidate with the real thing. To make her case then the opponent of SN
needs to describe two ivorlds that are exactly alike in all dassificational respects -
- that IS, in which particulars and classifications exist there and in which degrees
of naturalness are assigned to which classifications - but which nevertheless
differ in which particulars instantiate which properties. Since such worlds do not
differ at all in their classificatory structure, SN will entail that they are the same
world. So if intuitively they are distinct, SN is refuted.
Perhaps the fantasy of inverted spectra provides an example.54 Imagine a
world exactly like the actual world in all dassificational respects. In particular,
imagine that at this world, there is a classification of particulars that groups
together tomatoes with firetrucks, grass with leaves, sea with sky etc. in a way
that matches exactly our colour classifications. And imagine further that at this
world the partitions of particulars are ordered in the same way. In particular, on
the above classification the group containing grass and leaves is closer according
to the metric to that containing the sea and sky than it is to that containing
tomatoes and firetrucks to just the same extent that greenness is actually more
similar to blueness than it is to redness. Finally, suppose that this classification
has exactly the same degree of naturalness there as the colour determinable has
at the actual world. According to SN, this classification just is colour and the
world is identical with the actual world. Yet it seems possible that this is a world
of inverted spectra: what the inhabitants of this world experience as red we
would experience as violet and vice versa, what they experience as orange, we
would experience as blue and vice versa, and so on through all the colours.
Intuitively our world and the inverted spectrum world are distinct worlds.
despite the tact that they differ neither in which particulars exist nor hou- they
are naturally classified, nor even in the h pe of structure imposed on these
classifications. So SN fails.
This argument, however, is not compelling.
First, because it is not clear that the inverted spectrum example is even
coherent. If the distinctness of the inverted spectrum world from the actual world
is to show that SN's account of properties is inadequate, it must differ only with
respect to which particulars instantiate which properties. In particular, its laws
are supposed to be the same as the laws of the actual world, so the wavelengths
of light reflected by the particulars at the inverted spectrum world do not differ
from those reflected by the corresponding actual particulars, the microscopic
structures of their surfaces are the same, and so on. Note that the laws that
govern human reactions to colour must also be the same: perceptions of stop
signs, tomatoes and firetrucks are associated with the same human reactions at
each world whatever they are (perhaps increased adrenalin levels, avoidance
behaviour etc.). But could there really be a world of inverted spectra without any
other of these differences at aU? Could it be that the classification that groups
together stop signs with tomatoes and firetrucks etc. would still not be redness
even if associated with the same human reactions as redness actually is?
Second, since it is stipulated that the spectrum at the world under
consideration is inverted, it is unclear whether SN really does entail that the
putative inverted spectrum classification is the same as the colour classification at
the actual world. For the metric on the colour classification is inverted relative to
the metric on the inverted spectrum classification. And so SN may entail that
these are distinct classifications after all, thereby avoiding the putative
objectionable identification of the worlds.
There ,s a problem rvith this second repl.v lun^ ever. Although SX entails
that there are dist.nct classifications that differ only by virtue of the fact that their
metrics are inverted relative to one another, SN entails that both exist at («fl,
worlds. So to distinguish the tivo worlds, SN ivill still require some reason for
saying that only one is instantiated at the actual world and only the other is
instantiated at the inverted spectrum world. A response might exploit the idea
discussed in section 3.4 that SN permit that the naturalness of a given set may
vary from world to world. For then the structural nominaUst can say that at the
actual world the colour classification is more natural than the "inverted"
classification, while at the inverted spectrum world, it is the other way round.
(Though a final verdict on this type of response will depend on how SN resolves
the question of filtering out merely conventional structural differences among
determinables (see fn. 28)).
Third, although I have played fast and loose with examples throughout
this chapter, officially SN is a theory only of intrinsic properties that could be
instantiated by simples. And it is far from clear that colours are really examples
of these. Indeed, it is far from clear that we ever directly perceive an\/ of these. So
perhaps properties that have a phenomenology may just fall outside the scope of
SN in which case the objection can be ignored.
Fourth and connectedly, the objection requires us to be able to find actual
properties whose phenomenology shows them to be essentially different in
nature, even if they were to be drawn from determinables whose naturalness and
structure are the same. So the objection would show at best that SN fails only
with respect to properties that we seem to experience directly. But, as was
pointed out above, we do not directly perceive the intrinsic properties of any
particulars distinct from us, merely their effects on us or our instruments, i.e.
their extrinsic properties. Nor, if the recombination principle is true, can anything
about the intrinsic properties of particulars distinct from us be deductively
mferred from the effects they have on us. So the objection shotvs at best that SN'
fails with respect to intrinsic properties of particulars that are not distinct from us
- perhaps, the intrinsic properties of ideas or sense-data.
And even if there were these differences in intrinsic properties of our ideas
or sense-data between the actual world and the inverted spectrum world, «
hypothes! they would show up neither in how we classify particulars nor in how
we behave. .Mor would they induce any hirther logical relations among
properties over and above Johnson's three features incorporated by SN.
Furthermore, such quidditistic differences would presumably be private and
subjective and so would not show up in anything that we say - indeed, it seems
that they would be incommunicable. Finally, if we accept some kind of
functionalist account of mind according to which sense data and other qualia are
identified with intrinsic properties of brains or something similar, then sense-
data, the last refuge of non-classificational quiddities, drop entirely out of the
picture. I have something along the following lines in mind: x is directly aware of
a red sense-datum iff x is directly aware that x has the intrinsic property bein<;^-
appeared-to-redly, where this intrinsic property is a physical state of x's brain. And
such intrinsic properties of brains are given the same treatment as other intrinsic
properties of particulars. Indeed this functionalist account provides the only
plausible justification for our unreflective assumption that our colour experiences
are very much alike: we experience alike because are brains are constructed alike.
In short, the phenomenological objection to SN is far from clear and,
insofar as sense can be made of it, it seems that the structural nominalist has a
number of lines of reply.
In the next chapter I will extend SN to cover intrinsic properties that are
capable of instantiation only by complex particulars and to cover relations
whether between simple or complex particulars. I will also discuss how SN
provides for the existence of so-called alien properties and relations. In the last
chapter SX in its general form u-,11 be exploited in order to provide a reductive
analysis of modality'.
3.8 Appendix: Structural Nominalism (SN>55
3.8.1 Ontolog\- and Ideology
The ontology of SN consists only of pure sets, actual particulars and
impure sets constructed from actual particulars in the usual way. Its ideology -
its set of conceptual primitives - contains only those fundamental notions of set-
theory and mereology needed to guarantee the existence of the appropriate sets
plus the property of naturalness which applies to certain sets and comes in
degrees. It also assumes the usual set-theoretical axioms and those of some
standard mereology. The only additional axioms are the analyses and logical
constructions.
3.8.2 Definitions, Analyses, Logical Constructions
[Dl] X IS a partial classification of particulars =df. x is triple <P, S, m> such that;
(1) P is some subset of the set of all actual particulars.
(2) S is any equivalence relation that is total on P.
(3) m is any metric defined on the partition induced by S on P
together with the empty set.
[D2] [x]s is a cell of some partial classification of particulars <P, S, m> =df. [x|s
is the set containing all and only those particulars y such that ySx for some
particular x (or the empty set).
[D3] Db =df. the set of partial classifications of particulars.
[D4] Dt =df. the set of pairs «P, S, m>, [x]s> such that <P, S, m> is a member
of Db and [x]s is a cell of <P, S, m> or the empty set.
[D5] If x is a particular and f is a function that takes each member of Db into
one of its cells, then f is the intrinsic nature ofx =df.
(1) for all determinables <P, S, m> (in the sparse sense) in the range
of f, X G f(<P, S, m>) (i.e. «P, S, m>, [x]s> G f) ; and
(2) f is maximal, i.e. any other function f satisfying (1) is a subset ot
[D6] f is an intrinsic nature =df. f is the intrinsic nature of x, for some particular
X. (In effect, an intrinsic nature is a maximal collection of (non-empty)
determinates
— pairs of a determinable and one of its (non-empty) cells).
1D7|
[D8]
[D9]
A determinable <l’, S
,
m'> is a piva^ificnlum of another <1>, S, m> =df.
particulars x and y, xSy whenever xS'v; and
rT r m "" like c2 thanc3, then the corresponding cells on <1>, S', m'> c'l, c'2 and c'3
respectively are such that it is not the case that c'l is more like c'3than c 2. Where a cell c' corresponds to a cell c whenever every
member of c' is a member of c; and the relation of beitw more like
than... IS determined by the metrics m and m’
X is ajubdetermirmble =df. there are distinct determinables <P, S, m> and
<P, S
,
m > such that the latter is a precisification of the former and x is adeterminate of the former but not the latter.
X is a taxonomy =df. x is a sequence of classifications such that each is a
precisification of its predecessor in the sequence.
[LCla]
[LCls]
[LC2a]
[LC2s]
[LC3a]
[LC3s]
F is a determinable property in the abimdant sense of 'property' iff
F is a member of Db. ^
F is a determinable property in the sparse sense of 'property' iff F is
a member of Db and F is natural.
F is a determinate property in the abundant sense of 'property' iff F
is a member of Dt.
F is a determinate property in the sparse sense of 'property' iff F is a
member of Dt and F's first member is a determinable in the sparse
sense of 'property'.
x is a property in the abundant sense of 'property' iff either x is a
determinate property in the abundant sense of 'property' or x is
a determinable property in the abundant sense of 'property.
X is a property in the sparse sense of 'property' iff either x is a
determinate property in the sparse sense of 'property' or x is a
determinable property in the sparse sense of 'property'.
[A1 ] A determinate property F belongs to a determinable property D iff D is
the first member of F.
[A2] A particular x instantiates a determinate property F iff F is determinate
property «P, S, m>, [u]s> and fx(<P, S, m>) = [u]s where fx is x's
intrinsic nature and u is any member of [u]s.
[A3] A particular x falls under a determinable property <P, S, m> iff x
instantiates some determinate whose first member is <P, S, m>.
[A4] S is a similarity relation iff <P, S, m> is a determinable property in the
sparse sense of 'property'
[A5] For any particulars x and y, where fx is the nature of x and fy is the
nature of y,
(i) X is intrinsically similar to y iff there is some determinable
property in the sparse sense of 'property' <P, S, m> such that
fx(<P, S, m>) = fy(<P, S, m>);
(ii) X is a duplicate of y iff for all determinable properties in the
sparse sense of 'property' <P, S, m>, fx(<P, S, m>) = fy(<P, S,
m>).
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[A6j Li is a pnrmii^m of some determinate F iff F = «P S1 / ‘d’, m>,
3.8.3 Transworld IdenHtv-
[ 1 ] Determinable <P, S, m> at world w and determinable <P' S' m'> at
a dishnct world w are the satne determinable iff:
0) n(<p, s, m>, w) = n(<P', S', m'>, w'); and
S, m>, w) = o(<P', S', m'>, w'), where n is a function thatassigns a positive real number to each classification at each world as a measure of
1 s na^ralness at that world. ,And o is some function to encode for each
[2] Determinate «P, S, m>, [x]j> at world w and determinate «P', S',
^ [x ]k^ at a distinct world w' are the same determinate iff:
(1) <P, S, m> and <P
,
S
,
m'> are the same determinable; and
(2) j = k.59
3.8.4 A Sample Proof
Although proofs of the various claims concerning the consequences of SN
made in thiis chapter are straightforward, for purposes of illustration, one
example may be helpful. So here is a proof that if a particular instantiates a
determinate, then instantiates no other determinate of that determinable:
A particular x instantiates a determinate «P, S, m>, [u]s> iff fx(<P, S,
m>) = [u]s where fx is x's intrinsic nature and u is a paradigm of this
determinate. Since an intrinsic nature is afunction from determinables to
equivalence classes, it assigns a unique equivalence class to each determinable for
which it is defined. And since each particular has a unique intrinsic nature, for
every particular x there is a function fx such that for every determinable <P, S,
m> for which fx is defined, there is a unique determinate «P, S, m>, [u]> in fx,
i.e. there is a unique determinate of that determinable which x instantiates.
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must be distinguished from uses of 'naturar to mean
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not man-made' and so on. Some property is natural in the intendedsense when it makes for genuine resemblance among its instances
Plural, h,, p. 61. However, in what follows I will often talk, for the sake of simpliatv as if
rZeir degrees of naturalness ExplicitlyThis eases exposition and no point of substance hangs on it P y
.ht:e"!re tottrab' "8 - '•’““S''
‘^Though even these are not all clearly properties of something regardless of the state or
existence of any distinrt thing. Colours, for instance, depend, in one sense at least, on the statehe observer. And shapes and lengths may depend on the nature of the spatiotemporal
structure within which the particular is located. But I will ignore these doubts and asVume
these are intnnsic properties.
Plurality, p. 60. This restriction may be redundant; Lewis claims that it is already built into
our sparse conception of properties.
That IS not to say that SN does not cover at least some properties instantiated by complex
particulars. For some properties can be had by both simple and complex particulars SN fails
to cover only those properties the instantiation of which by a particular entails that the
particular is complex. So SN will not cover idl the properties instantiated at a world with
some complex particulars and a fortiori it will not cover all the properties instantiated at a
world at which every particular is complex (if there are such worlds). But it will cover some
properties at both such worlds.
The reason for these restrictions is that, intuitively, the excluded properties supiervene in
one way or another on those included, together with relations: extrinsic properties are
implicitly relational and so supervene on relations among particulars; "disjunctive"
properties, conjunctive properties and so on supervene on their disjuncts, conjuncts and so
on, the intrinsic properties of complex particulars supervene on the intrinsic properties of and
relations among their parts. These excluded properties cannot, therefore, be characterized
independently of the properties on which they supervene, though the converse is not the
case. So the strategy should be to develop a theory of those properties included first, and then
extend it to cover the excluded properties and relations in a way that incorporates the
relations of supervenience. I carry out this extension in chapter four. Again intuitions vary
concerning exactly which properties are excluded by this restriction.
W. E. Johnson, Logic, Part /, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921).
Armstrong objects that this third claim is "...not quite accurate. Determinates under a
common determinable do not exclude each other in this way unless they are "at the same
level". is a determinate to colour, but a determinable to scarlet. Scarlet is also a
determinate of colour. But redness and scarlet do not exclude each other." D. M. Armstrong, A
Theory of Universals, Volume II: Universals and Scientific Realism, p. 1 12. 1 will ignore this
objection for now, but 1 return to deal with it below (see section 3.6).
The connections between sentences like 'a is red' and 'a is not blue' or 'a is coloured' are
not usually called "logical", and the corresponding arguments are usually said not to be valid
122
r.rrs2?. s r™ ;
evealed by translation into this language. Surely it is better to reject attempted^
regimentations as inadequate on the grounds that they fail to capture these relations amonpproperties than having to posit some kind of extra-logical
"metaphysical" necessity to explL
One could perhaps start with determinates, and then introduce determinables as exclusivedisjunctions of determinates. That approach too might get the logical relations right
It seems to me that this approach would still fail to provideady explanations for certain other facts about properties, e.g. why determinates of^he samedeterminable are all, intuitively, equally natural. The structural nominalist approach howeverdoes explain these (see below). n ev
Perhaps naturalness as a whole carves at every joint.
That is not to say of course that there is no explanation available to account for this fact ifwe take determinates rather than determinables to be the primary bearers of degrees of
naturalness. Lewis, for instance, suggests (very briefly) that the degree of naturalness has todo with the degree of disjunctiveness of the properties concerned (see Plurality, pp. 60-1) TheIdea IS that perfectly natural properties constitute some sort of "base" and disjunctiveness is
o be defined in terms of it. One problem with this approach is that on the face of it
disjunctiveness is a property of linguistic items rather than extra-linguistic items like
properties. Perhaps the idea is that naturalness has to with the definitions of the various
properties m some language. But which language? Moreover, since any definition can be
made arbitrarily disjunctive by well-known logical tricks, this approach tilts unnervingly
close to extreme Platonism about "correcf' definitions.
I menhon the above observation by means of motivation only. In view of the
problems with Lewis s approach it at least seems worth exploring whether the distinction is
better drawn in the first instance at the determinable level.
As will emerge below, SN entails that every determinate belongs to a unique determinable.
So if naturalness applies in the first instance to determinables, then every determinate can
also be said to have some degree of naturalness in a derivative way: it has that degree of
naturalness which its determinable has; it "inherits" the degree of naturalness from its
determinable. This provides a very straightforward explanation of the above phenomenon.
Here for ease of exposition I simplify once again by assuming that naturalness is an all-or-
nothing matter rather than something that comes in degrees. To restore the idea that
naturalness is a matter of degree read "perfectly natural" for "natural" in what follows.
Notice that NSN treats determinable properties and determinate properties quite
differently. In particular, NSN identifies determinables with classifications. Most other
theories treat them in essentially the same way. Lewis, for instance, regards both
determinables and determinates as simply non-empty classes of particulars. One consequence
of this is that what Lewis would call determinables, turn out to be determinates (in the
abundant sense) according to NSN.
See e.g. his "New Work for a Theory of Universals".
Lewis is doubtful whether the theoretical roles assigned to "properties" are unified enough
to talk of what they are really like once and for all, and this is why he distinguishes an
abundant from a sparse sense of 'property'. But insofar as properties are to play the role of
being the semantic values of predicates, then he admits that we may need to distinguish
triangularity from trilaterality in order to account for the difference in cognitive value
between the trivial 'Triangularity is coextensive with triangularity' and the informative
Trilaterality is coextensive with triangularity'. However, he is reticent about admitting that
there really are necessarily co-extensive but distinct properties in the sense of 'property'
required to explain relations of resemblance among particulars, the sparse sense of 'property'
(see Plurality, pp. 55-63).
2-^ Bncker argues that both ordinar>^ language and philosophical theon,’ require a distinctionbetween a s^uctural and a non-structural conception of properties. See P. Bricker
Properties in The Ena/clopedm of Philosophy, (Supplement), (London: MacMillan 1996)
It follows from the recombination principle that no perfectly natural property can have all
its instances drawn from a single world, so r cannot be perfectly natural.
Nor is it clear how positing quiddities will help. Even if r is somehow associated with two
distinct quiddities, how would we recognize this? We have phenomenal access only to the
effects of these quiddities but quiddities, being intrinsic, are only contingently connected with
any effects they have on us. What grounds would there then be for attributing any such
effects to two qualitative natures rather than just one?
27 D^M. Armstrong, /\ Theoiy of Universals, Volume //; Universals and Scientific Realism, p. 1 13.There are three prima facie problems with this approach of incorporating a metric into the
nature of a determinable. The first is that is that it would seem to rule out a priori the
existence of unstructured determinables. But it shouldn't; perhaps, some determinables could
be unstructured. One way to accommodate this idea would be to allow that in such cases the
metric defines a structure on the relevant partition according to which every cell is exactly the
same "distance" from every other. The second is that it seems to make certain numbers
essential to the nature of properties to which they are assigned. But this is not quite right, for
there are clearly elements of convention in which numbers are taken to encode the structure
of certain determinables, especially those whose structure is that of the real line. So perhaps
determinables which differ not at all in their partitions or in the type of structure encoded by
their metrics but only conventionally should be identified. There is not space here fora full
discussion of how merely conventional differences should be filtered out. 1 will assume
however that this can be done. The third problem is that sometimes a metric might provide
too much structure, as may well be the case if the determinable in question is ordered but not
quantitative. This is related to the second problem and again there is not space here for a full
discussion of this. But it does not seem to be an insurmountable problem. One approach
might be to identify determinables with certain classes of classifications.
2^ Phillip Bricker points out that a more general and elegant approach might follow the lead
of measurement theory and consider homeomorphisms between so-called empirical
structures and numerical structures.
Because the construction being discussed is, though simple and straightforward, not very
elegant, 1 am being a little non-committal about the details. In particular. I've left open exactly
how the subscript notation works. One way to think of the subscript notation is as an
abbreviation for the ordered pair whose first member is the empty set and whose second
member is the number specified in the subscript. Thus, (}3 is <{}, 3>, {j/ is <{}, 7> etc.
And notice that since naturalness applies to entire classifications, it may be that one metric
results in a more natural classification than a distinct metric on the very same partition. Thus,
determinables <P, S, m> and <P, S, m'> may differ in naturalness despite not differing in how
they divide particulars up into groups. Speaking loosely, we may say that some ways of
ordering are more natural than others.
^2 For similar arguments concerning particulars not distinct from us, see below section 3.7.
23 David Hume, A Treatise ofHuman Nature, P. H. Nidditch (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1978), 1.1.6.
2'^ See Plurality, p. 86ff. and 1.3.1, 2.1.2 and 2.2.4 above for a discussion of versions of this
principle.
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Ifi however, the elements of conventionality in which metric is taken to encode the
structure of a determinable are not filtered out (see above fn. 28), then SN may be able to
distinguish these determinables. But intuitively this is not the place to look for a solution.
2^ Part of the project in this dissertation is to demonstrate, contra Lewis, the possibility of
analyzing modality without appeal to mere possibilia. So strictly speaking discussions of
transworld identities should come only when some account has already been given of the
what other worlds and their parts are. However, the plausibility of the account of worlds and
their parts discussed below rests in part on the plausibility of SN; so SN should be
independently plausible. Indeed, it should be perfectly compatible with modal realism
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( minus the account of properties) and it should be possible to substitute SN for Leu ,s'saccount of properties in modal realism without loss of plausibility I he aim is to show n Ithat the worlds of n.odal realism are not needed to analyze modahty not thanh^e^ ^o
^
such worlds^So, for simplicity, assume that Lewis's vast plurality of concrete possibilia existand that modal, ,s to analyzed, a la (A I), ,n terms of quant.fication over Ihem SUM SNseems to me preferable to Lewis's class nominalism.
Condition (2) is not quite accurate, again due to the problem of "filtering out" (see fn 28)But the idea IS clear. To be the same determinates, «P,S,m>,[x],-> and «P' S' m'> |x'|y>must have the same determinable as their first member. And this means that m and m'ncode the same type of structure on the partitions <P, S> and <P, S'> respectively e g thatof the rea line. To say then that k = j is to say that [x), and [,x' |k occupy the Lme positL inthis structure. Lhough it may be that until we haye filtered out conventional differences kmay not be the same as j. But they must at least "correspond" to the same location on thedeterminable space.
According to SN, each determinate property will in general be identified with a class
cons ructed from many particulars other than those instantiating that determinate property,
or It entails that each has that determinate's determinable as its first member. Moreover the
above account entails that the essence of a determinate property consists in its playing a
certain classificational role. And this may arouse the suspicion that SN's determinates are not
really intrinsic properties at all; for whether or not a particular instantiates one of themdepends on factors - degrees of naturalness, classificational roles, metrical structures etc -
that are other than the particular itself. Perhaps then SN is best seen as an attempt to analyze
mtrinsicahty in terms of extrinsicality. This objection, however, is not convincing. The
account does entail that which set plays which property role at which worlds is extrinsic to it.
But this does not show that a property is extrinsic to the particulars that instantiate it. And the
account does not entail that for a particular to instantiate a property, any other particulars
must have any particular properties or even that there must exist any other particulars at all.
For it entails that the extensions of determinables and determinates are contingent. So it
seems to me to capture the intuitive notion of intrinsicality.
Though these "contingent identities" no more violate the principle of the necessity of
identity than does the fact that at some worlds the inventor of bifocals and the first
postmaster general are the same person and at others different people. In effect, the above
proposal amounts to (a sketch of) a counterpart theory for properties (cf. Lewis's counterpart
theory for individuals in his "Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic", journal of
Pliilosoplnj, 65 (1968), pp. 113-26).
Notice that if we assume that naturalness is a function from classifications to the positive
reals, isomorphic determinables and their corresponding determinates are bound to be
equally natural.
The significance of this is that it provides a possible to reply to one strand of Lewis's
charge, to be considered in chapter six, that the popular attempt to construct possible worlds
out of sets of sentences is doomed to yield a circular analysis of modality. The argument very
roughly is this. TTie propiosed analysis is that for something to be possible is for a sentence
meaning just that to be true at some world. A world is identified with a maximal consistent
set of sentences of some appropriate language and truth-at is identified with membership.
But prima facie consistency is a modal notion — a set of sentences is consistent iff it is possible
for them all to be true together. Drop the consistency requirement and the worlds are not
possible worlds — some will be impossible — and the analysis gets the facts of modality
wrong. Include it and the analysis is circular because it involves a modal primitive. One
response is to adopt one of the surrogate notions of consistency familiar from the study of
logical languages. These can be defined in purely syntactic or model-theoretic terms without
appeal to any modal notions. But, Lewis argues, none is sufficient to exclude all inconsistent
sets from qualifying as worlds; it is hard to see how a set such as |'x is red all over’, 'x is blue
all oveT} can be filtered out by such means, for it is not syntactically inconsistent on
translation into the predicate calculus. However, SN entails that nothing can be red all over
and blue all over and so if correct could be built into the defining condition of a world in such
n way as to exclude si|^ch troublesome sets. .And since SN reltes on no modal pnm, lives tinsapproach w|ould avoid reducing the proposed analysis to circularitv. See D. K. l ewis
Pluralitx/, Chapter Three for Lewis's argument and references; and see 6.6 below for adevelopment of a version of linguistic ersatzism that incorporates this solution to the
problem.
« For instance, meaning postulates of the kind discussed by Carnap |R. Carnap, M«„„i,„ „„J
^
222 ff i
* (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1958)
Proofs of these claims are straightforward, so I have omitted them here. However for
^rposes of illustration I have included a proof of (c) in the appendix.
Indeed, given the definitions of 'determinate' and 'determinable' these claims are analytic
Most authors do not even attempt to provide a solution to this problem. One who does
however, is Armstrong in his A Combinatorial Theori/ of Possihilitij pp. 78-84. According to
'
Armstrong natural properties are to be identified with universal - sui generis entities that
are constituents (in some sense) of the particulars that instantiate them. He holds that
universals are not all distinct. In particular, determinates of the same determinable overlap
and this overlap explains their incompatibility with one another. So he is committed to the
view that the apparent simplicity of properties like being 5g, being Ig, being red and being
blue IS illusory: since they are incompatible, they - or at least one of each pair - must really
be complex entities. ^
This attempt to accommodate incompatibilities among properties is objectionable for
three reasons. First, it requires positing hidden structure where common sense or even
science may not yet have discovered any. Properties like blueness, redness etc. do seem to
common sense to be simple. Indeed some philosophers have regarded them as
paradigmatically simple properties (See e.g. G. E. Moore, Pnncipia Ethica, (Buffalo, NY:
Prometheus Books, 1988) p. 7ff.) And although we now have scientific analyses of colour
properties that reveals their complexity, science presently regards certain other properties,
e.g. mass properties, as simple. It would be extraordinary that we know a priori that the
properties treated as simple by both common sense and science are really complex! Surely,
whether or not a certain determinate property is complex should be an empirical claim. So
this solution is at fault since it seems wrong for a metaphysical theory to dictate that there
must be structure where neither common sense nor science yet suspects there is any.
Second, even if we grant the contention that of any pair of incompatible properties at
least one cannot be simple, it is unclear how this really explains the incompatibility.
Armstrong suggests the following solution (taking the properties being 5kg and being 1kg as
his paradigms). To be five kilograms is to be divisible into five non-overlapping one kilogram
parts. And "Given this, it becomes clear why the very same thing cannot be both five and one
kilogram in mass. To attempt to combine the two properties in the one thing would involve
the thing's being identical with its proper part." But this is confusing; even if we suppose he
is right that a 5kg thing has five non-overlapping parts each of which is 1kg, how does that
disqualify the whole from also being 1kg? Armstrong says that it would "involve the thing's
being identical with its proper part". But why? A thing may consist of five non-overlapping
red parts and itself be red without it being identical to any of its parts (Lewis also makes this
point. See his review of Armstrong's A Combinatorial Theoiy of Possibility in the Australasian
Journal of Philosophy 70, (1992)).
Third, it is hard to see exactly how this solution can be applied generally. What could
be the common part of the properties being positively-charged and being negatively-
charged? The most likely candidate is the property of having a charge. But how does this
work its exclusionary magic?
^ For examples of attempts to formulate resemblance nominalism that fail to avoid both
these evils see H. H. Price, Thinking and Experience, (London: Hutchinson, 1953) and R.
Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, (Trans. R. A. George), Routledge, 1%7), sections 67-
93 and 108-20. For a full account of how they fall prey to the problem see D. M. Armstrong,
Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism, Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), Chapter 5.
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^ these primitive similanh' relations with structures
- partitionsogether ^ 'th some metric - that have no bound on their complexity. And it might bequestioned whether this really represents any epistemological gam. 1 think it does These can
mn/e oT"""
^et-theory using only the verv limited ideology ot SN Ag f primitiye similarity relations is a range of conceptual primitives; the more^there areme worse the ideological parsimony of the theory.
See D. M. Armstrong, A Theoiy of Universats: Universals and Scientific Realism, Volume ll, p.
See fn. 14 aboye.
These notions are defined formally in the Appendix, though with one slight variation I
require there, for re.lsons of technical simplicity, only that a precisification provide at least as
me-grained a classification as that which it precisifies, rather than a more fine-grained one
I hus, eyery determinable qualifies as a precisification of itself.
It may also useful to introduce the notion of a "taxonomy". Consider the seyen-
colour determinable, the intermediate determinable and the infinitely-many specific hue
determinable. Roughly, these can be thought of as forming a three-membered series of
c assi ications of increasing precision. But clearly the idea generalizes: there could be series of
classifications containing any number of members such that each is a precisification of its
predecessor. A taxonomy is the entire chain from the most precise classification whose
determinates are maximally specific to the least precise classification whose determinates are
highly disjunctiye. More precisely, x is a taxonomy =df. x is a sequence of classifications such
that each is a precisification of its predecessor in the sequence.
Phillip Bricker has suggested that perhaps logical relations among determinables really
only arise with respect to complex particulars. In which case the partial classification
response would seem to be the best approach here.
Though the null determinate will have to be distinguished from a zeroth determinate (e.g.
being Og in mass) when there is one.
52 The structural nominalist may be tempted to reply as follows. According to SN, each
determinate does have its unique location in the determinate-space defined by its
determinable s metric
— just why is this location ineligible to be its quiddity, its unique
essence? After all, it is far from clear exactly what it is for something to "constitute" a
particular s redness. In particular, it is unclear that we are well enough acquainted with set-
theoretical relations to know that these "locations" couldn't play this "constitutional" role.
5^ In Nominalism and Realism, (pp. 36-7) D. M. Armstrong raises essentially this objection to
any theory of properties that identifies them with sets of some kind.
5'! Although colours are not good candidates for being physically fundamental (i.e. perfectly
natural properties), they are among the best candidates for properties for which we can claim
phenomenological access. If the phenomenological objection cannot be made to stick by
considering colours, it seems unlikely to succeed with respect to any other properties. We
cannot plausibly claim phenomenological access to the essences of the perfectly natural or
physically fundamental properties such as charge, mass and so on. For these properties, the
structural nominalist would may rely on the arguments of section 3.4 to show that there is no
need to posit quiddities.
55 In stating SN I quantify over worlds, but these can, I believe, be logically constructed (see
below chapt. six).
56 When a determinable is quantitative perhaps a precisification should preserve more than
simply the structure of the metric of that which it precisifies. Perhaps it should also preserve
various quantificational features. Quite how this should be done depends on the solution to
the problem of filtering out conventional differences (see fn. 28).
52 Here again I simplify by assuming a hard-and-fast division of partial classifications of
particulars into the natural and the non-natural. I assume that the theory could be easily
refined (and complicated) to allow naturalness to be a property that comes in degrees.
5^ (A6j simply identifies a paradigm with an instance, and so, in a sense, provides a trivial
stand-in for what we usually think of as a full-blooded paradigm. The point of including it is
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merely to show how SN can dispense with the need for identiK ing "super pind.Pm^t "mstances (see section 3.5). - ” aradig a ic
Cond.t.on (2) is not quite accurate, again due to the problem ol "filtering out" (see fn. 37).
CHAPTER 4
STRUCTURAL NOMINALISM II: ALIENS, RELATIONS AND NON-BASIC
PROPERTIES
In chapter six I will discuss how SN may be exploited in developing a
metaphysical theory that attempts to analyze modality in wholly actualist terms.
The principal aim of this chapter is to discuss certain aspects of SN that are
relevant to this project. In section 4.1 1 will briefly explore what SN has to say
about so-called 'alien" properties. In 4.2, 1 discuss how it might be extended to
cover basic relations as well as basic intrinsic properties. In section 4.3 I discuss
how SN might be extended to cover non-basic properties and relations. In the
final section, 4.4, 1 briefly summarize SN and indicate its relevance to the analysis
of modalitv.
4.1 Alien Properties
In 1.3.1 1 argued that any adequate metaphysical theory of modality
should accommodate the intuition that there might have been more instantiated
properties than there actually are, that the properties that are actually
instantiated are only some of all the possible properties. Bricker asks us to
suppose, for instance, that among the properties that are not actually instantiated
are
...two kinds of uniformly dense matter, and suppose that the two kinds of
matter have all of their quahtative properties in common. However, they
are distinguished relative to one another by the fact that matter of
different kinds mutually attracts, matter of the same kind mutually repels.
Call one of the kinds of matter p-matter and the other kind ^-matter.
Consider the possibility that there exists nothing but a single cube of p-
matter, and the possibility that there exists nothing but a single cube of n -
matter. I claim that these are distinct possibilities... to deny it would be to
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hold...that u-e cannot specify other ^vorlds by stipulating xvhat kinds they
contain. [And this] is strongly at variance ^vith modal intuitions.'
^
This sort of example poses a problem for actualist theories of modality:
hou' is the actualist to construct different worlds to represent the possibility of
there being just the single cube of ii-matter and the possibility of there being just
the single cube of p-matter. For the two possibilities differ only in whether the
cube is made of n-matter or p-matter and both of these properties are alien to the
actual world. Yet actuaUst theories are theories whose ontological resources
include only those properties that actually exist. So it seems that the actualist
must somehow “construct" these two properties, or at least construct something
to represent them.^ I will discuss some alternative ways to respond to this
problem in 6.53, ^^t in this section I will briefly examine the resources available
to the actualist who subscribes to SN. Does SN provide the actualist with the
resources to construct the property of being n-matter and the property of being p-
matter in actualist terms?
4.1.1 Three Wavs for a Property to be Alien
Let us call properties that are not, but might have been, instantiated
“alien" properties.4 And, more generally, let us say that a property is alien to a
world iff it is not instantiated at that world. It is helpful also to distinguish three
ways in which a property might be alien to a world.
Intuitively, some properties are, in some sense, “compounds" of others.
And one way for a property to be alien to a world is for it to be a compoimd
property that is not instantiated there even though the properties from which it is
compounded are instantiated there. The property of being both gold and having
a mass of lO^O kg, for instance, is, intuitively, a compound of the property of
being gold and the property of having a mass of lO^^ the actual world
some things are gold and some things have a mass of lO^O kg but there is nothing
that instantiates botli properties; there is ,ust not that much gold in the universe.
So the compound propertv- of being both gold and having a mass of 1050 kg
exemplifies the hrst way in which a property may be alien to the actual ivorld.
Intuitively, there are worlds that contain instances of some but not all
determinates of certain determinables. These "missing determinates" are then
alien to those worlds. And this is a second way for a property to be alien to a
world. Again, it seems that some properties are alien to the actual world in this
way. Many determinate colours are actually instantiated, for instance, although
perhaps Hume's missing shade of blue is not. And clearly many physical
magnitude determinates ~ masses, lengths, durations etc. -- will remain forever
uninstantiated.
There is no guarantee that these missing determinates can be assimilated
to the hrst sort of alien property, the alien compounds. For intuitively, the
missing determinates might be simple properties, properties not compounded of
other properties.^ After all, there are many properties that science and common
sense presently treat as simple. And it would be high-handed for the
metaphysician to declare a priori that both the scientist and the ordinary person
are wrong about this. And if it is possible for there to be simple properties at all,
then it seems that some of them might be alien to the actual world. The simplicity
of a property does not seem to entail its necessary instantiation and to hold that
the actual world is special in the relevant way would be to subscribe to an
unacceptable sort of parochialism. Maybe the missing masses, for instance, are
simple properties that are alien to the actual world.
Finally, perhaps at some worlds there are also uninstantiated (simple)
determinates belonging to a determinable none of whose determinates are
instantiated there. It seems that some particulars do not fall under certain
determinables — electrons have no colour, for instance, and Cartesian egos have
no mass. And surely there might have been nothing but electrons, or nothing but
Cartesian egos. To deny this ivould be to reject, unacceptably, the recombination
principle.'- At such electron-only worlds and Cartesian ego-only worlds no
determinate colours and no determinate masses respectively are instantiated. The
entire colour or mass determinable is missing at such worlds. And once again, if
it IS possible for there to be such "missing determinaWcs" at some worlds, we
must accept that some determinables are missing at the actual world on pain of
parochialism/
4.1.2 Actualism and Properties that are Alien in the First Way
Properties that alien to the actual world in the first way — actually
umnstantiated compound properties that are composed from actuaUy
instantiated properties - raise no real obstacle to actualist theories of modality,
regardless of whether such theories incorporate SN. For if these properties are
composed from actually existing properties, they can be constructed by any
theory that has the resources to construct properties by composition from others.
Indeed, Bricker's examples of p-matter and n-matter are not to be thought of as
alien to the actual world in this way. For p-matter and ^-matter are stipulated to
be qualitatively indiscernible. So if they are both compounds of actually existing
properties, they would presumably be the same compound.
4.1.3 Actualism and Properties that are Alien in the Second Wav
But why should some alien properties, e.g. w-matter and p-matter, not be
sunple properties? If they are, then actualist theories of modality face a more
difficult problem: because they are alien properties, the actualist must somehow
construct them from actual materials; but if they are simple, it is not obvious how
can they be constructed at aU. As we will see in chapter six, actualist theories that
accept traditional accounts of properties (as Forms, universals or tropes, and so
on, each of which is supposed to possess its own unique nature or quiddity) have
great difficult)’ here. And this is ivhere S.\ can offer the actualist some real help.
For according to SN, the resources of the property of naturalness and set-theory
alone, resources both available at the actual ivorld, are suffiaent to construct any
actually alien property, even those that are simple.
To recap briefly, SN identifies a determinable with a triple <P, S, m>
where P is some subset of the set of particulars, S is some equivalence relation on
P, and m defines some metric on the equivalence classes induced by S on P
(together with the empty set). And it identifies determinate properties with pairs,
«P, S, m>, [u]x> where the first member is a determinable and the second
member, [u]x, is one of the equivalence classes or the empty set, indexed to
indicate its position in the space defined by the metric. According to SN the
essence of a determinable consists in tw^o things: the sort of classificational
structure (as encoded by m) that it imposes on the particulars of its world, and
how natural this classification is. Thus determinable D at world w is the same
determinable as determinable ET at world v/ iff \y has the same degree of
naturalness and the same metrical structure as D. And the essence of a
determinate also consists in two things: the identity of the determinable to which
it belongs, and a particular location on the "determinable space" as defined by
the determinable's metric. In particular, the essence of a determinate does not
consist in its extension or in any unique qualitative nature. Thus, determinate d
at world w is the same determinate as determinate d' at w' iff there are pairs <D,
[u]x> <\y
,
[v]y> such that d = <D, [u]x>, d' = <D', [v]y>, D is the same
determinable as D' and x = y.
Bricker does not intend n-matter and p-matter to be missing determinates
of some "matter-determinable" at least one of whose determinates is actually
instantiated. So he does not intend M-matter and p-matter to be thought of as
alien in the second sense. For "matter" is not really a scientifically discoverable
determinable at all. Rather it is just an ordmarv- concept intended to apply to
whatever physical objects are actually composed of. And it is probably to distort,
or at least to go beyond, our ordinary thinking to suppose that there actually is
such a matter-determinable.
However, SN is intended to cover ordinary properties as well as scientific
or fundamental properties. And it entails that roery property' must be either a
determinable or a determinate that falls under some determinable. In particular,
SN entails that matter must be either a determinable or a determinate, even if
ordinary language leaves unsettled which is the case. So even if this contrary to
Bricker's intentions, it is instructive to see what SN has to say about ii-matter and
p-matter supposing them to be aliens in the second way: determinates of some
hypothetical matter-determinable one of whose deterrninates is actually
instantiated (by the physical objects of the actual world). After all, this is a fairly
natural way to give content to the idea that w-matter and p-matter are "kinds of
matter".
As we saw in the previous chapter, SN entails the actual existence of a//
actually missing determinates. They are identified with the "empty locations" on
the determinable space, pairs of the form «P, S, m>, { }x> whose first member is
a determinable some of whose determinates are actually instantiated and whose
second member is the empty set indexed to indicate its location in the
determinable space defined by m. And it distinguishes among missing
determinates by their different locations in the determinable space. Moreover, S\
contains nothing to rule out the possibility that such missing determinates are
simple properties.
So according to SN, the putative matter determinable would be a triple <P,
M, m>, where M is the matter-similarity relation (is the same kind of matter as)
and m defines the matter-determinable space. Perhaps, the actual kind of matter
is «P, M, m>, {}i>, ^-matter is «P, M, m>, {}i7>, and p-matter is «P, M, m>.
1.-S4
Il29>. Thus, S\ provides the .actualist tvith the resources to construct d.stmct ,,-
matter and p-matter cube-avorlds even if ,,-matter and ,,
-matter are alien simple
properties, as long as they are really "types of matter", actually missing
determinates of the matter determinable.
j.1.4 Actualism and Properties that are Alien in the Third VVay
But suppose finally that the property of being n-matter and the property of
being p-matter are alien to the actual world in the most radical way: they are
determinates belonging to determinables none of whose determinates is actually
instantiated. Can SN provide the resources to construct them in this case?
The axioms of pure set-theory alone entail the existence of all triples of the
form, <{}, S, m>. These triples therefore all necessarily, and so actually, exist.
And, according to SN, these triples qualify as sparse determinables. However,
they constitute a kind of limiting case; for the subset of particulars that
constitutes the first element in such a determinable is the empty set (and S is
redundant). Such determinables are, in effect, mere geometrical structures (that
take the empty set for each of their points).^
These bare structures" seem to be the obvious candidates for the missing
determinables. But there is a problem with this suggestion. SN tells us that the
essence of a determinable consists the sort of classificational structure (as
encoded by its metric) that it imposes on the particulars of its world and how
natural this classification is. But these bare structures do not classify any
particulars at all and there is no obvious sense in which any is more or less
natural than any other.
^
However, although these missing determinables (and their determinates)
do not actually exist, if SN is true, then the actualist does have the materials from
which they can be constructed. For all the possible bare structures <{}, S, m>
actually exist, and, since some actually existing determinables are natural, the
propert>^ of naturalness actually exists too. But according to SX the essence of
such a determinable consists only in a certain structure and the propert>' of
naturalness. So if the actualist has the resources to combine naturalness with any
possible structure, she can construct any possible sparse determinable (and so of
course its determinates).
In short, the actualist who subscnbes to SN has all the materials necessary
to construct any determinable, even those that do not actually exist, and all their
determinates.
There are, however, several possible ways of interpreting the claim that n-
matter and p-matter might belong to missing determinables. And to see whether
SN provides the actuahst with sufficient resources to do justice to the the sort of
intuitions Bricker appeals to these need to be considered separately.
First, consider the possibility that ^-matter and p-matter are distinct
determinates of the same missing determinable. Then they have to occupy distinct
positions in their determinable-space as defined by the metric. Since SN can
construct this missing determinable and it can distinguish the various positions
on it, it can provide for the difference between these two properties. And an
actualist theory that incorporates SN can provide the requisite distinct cube
worlds.
Notice however that SN constructs the relevant missing determinable
entirely from mathematical materials - the bare structures <{}, S, m>. And it
distinguishes the n-matter and p-matter determinates in entirely mathematical
terms ~ they are identified with pairs «{}, S, m>, (}n> and «{}, S, m>, (}p>
where the subscripts n and p indicate the (different) locations of n-matter and p-
matter respectively on the missing determinable <{}, S, m>. In effect, the two
types of matter are distinguished only by the numbers assigned as subscripts.
And although this provides for enough different sets to be the alien properties, it
may be argued that it provides only an "irrelevant multiplicih'" of such sets. On
the one hand, we have the alien properties that need to be distinguished; on the
other, we have different pure sets to play the role of being these alien properties.
But what makes «{}, S, m>, {}„> ^-matter and «{), S, m>, (}p> p-matter rather
than the other way round? Clearly, the problem generalizes: SN uill need to
provide for infinitely-many properties that are alien to the actual world (in the
third way) and it will be able to provide infinitely-many pure sets, differing only
in the numerical indices assigned to their second members. But the many sets are
not tied-up unambiguously with the many alien properties that need to be
distinguished. Rather, each of the many sets is ambiguous with respect to the
many properties that need to be recognized. Indeed, it may seem that SN may as
well identify the alien properties with ordinal numbers! And this cannot be right.
SN provides enough differences but these are not relevant differences.!!
However, this objection will not worry the structural nominalist. For one
thing, the indices are not there merely to provide for the required multiplicity of
properties. They do some real work. For collectively they encode the internal
structure of the relevant determinable; they provide for the relations of similarity
among the various determinates of the missing determinable - they tell us, for
instance, whether w-matter is more similar to p-matter than it is to, say, s-matte.
And these relations among determinates of the same determinable really are
partly constitutive of their essences (or so I argued in the previous chapter). SN
does not provide for a mere multiplicity. For another thing, the objection ignores
the fact that each determinable and its determinates must also be assigned some
degree of naturalness. And, as I also ai^ued in chapter three, the essence of a
determinable is exhausted by its internal structure and its degree of naturalness;
and the essence of a determinate is exhausted by the determinable it belongs to
and the position it occupies in its determinable's space. What makes «{}, S, m>,
{}n> n-matter and «{}, S, m>, {}p> p-matter rather than the other way round is
that the former occupies a certain location on the determinable space defined by
m and the latter occupies a different location. So it is unclear that the ordinal
numbers if assigned a degree of naturalness, really would be ineligible to be the
properties! The structural nominalist will maintain, in short, that the differences
SN provides are relevant and that there are no hirther relevant differences it fails
to provide. '2
Next, consider the possibility that ^-matter and p-matter are determinates
drawn from distinct missing determinables.t3 in this case it would be wrong to
think of them as incompatible, and probably misleading to call them types of
matter. But again nothing in our modal intuitions seems to rule out the
possibility of cube-worlds of this kind.
Now, different determinables may differ in their structure or their degree
of naturalness, and if the determinables to which p-matter and ^-matter belong
differ in either way, then SN can provide distinct constructions for them. Hence,
the actualist who adopts SN can construct distinct worlds to represent the
possibility that there be just a single ^-matter cube and the possibility that there
be just a single p-matter cube.t4
But perhaps w-matter and p-matter are simple properties that belong to
empty though distinct determinables which do not differ at all in either their
structure or their degree of naturalness. Now, finally, and in just this one case, it
seems that SN will not enable the actualist to distinguish the n-matter cube-world
from the p-matter cube-world. And even the actualist who subscribes to SN will
be able to provide only a single world to represent both possibilities.
However, in this case it is unclear whether these possibilities really should
be distinguished. In the previous chapter I argued that the structural nominalist
will hold that properties may be identical at some worlds but distinct at others.
And I suggested that this is indeed a plausible position. So she will allow that at
some worlds the property of being composed of «-matter and the properU- of
being composed of p-matter are one and the same property, even though at
others they are distinct. Whether or not this is so is a matter of the (contingent)
laws of the worlds in question. And at the veiy simple single cube-world(s)
described by Bricker, this seems extremely likely to be the case. The structural
nominalist can bite the bullet here.
Does this violate Bricker's intuition that we be able to “specify other
worlds by stipulating what kinds they contain"? SN does not deny that we can
stipulate that there is a world containing nothing but a single cube of uniformly
dense iz-matter. And it does not deny that we can stipulate that there is a world
containing nothing but a single cube of uniformly dense p-matter. The only
relevant constraint SN places on what we can stipulate is that it denies that we
can stipulate the distinctness of these worlds. For according to SN whether or not
these properties are the same at a given world is a matter of the laws of that
world. And throughout we have been assuming that the laws of a world
supervene on its distribution of local qualitative matters of fact. This means that
we cannot stipulate the laws of the world and its distribution of local qualitative
matters of fact independently of each other on pain of incoherence. We cannot
stipulate the non-identity of an n-matter cube-world and a p-matter cube world
that are otherwise identical any more than we can stipulate the existence of a
world that is qualitatively identical to the actual world but at which heat and
molecular motion are distinct.
We can of course consider more complicated worlds that contain an n-
matter cube or a p-matter cube. But to show that there are distinct possibilities
here, these worlds must be described in such a way that the lawful identification
of M-matter and p-matter is ruled out and yet which are still indistinguishable by
the actualist. And it is far from clear how this could be done.^^
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I conclude then that SN does indeed provide the actualist with sufficient
resources to construct the alien properties required for her to do justice to our
intuitions about the various possibilities involving them.
4.2 Basic Relarions
The version of SN outlined in the previous chapter is a theory of intrinsic
properties. However, a fully adequate of modality must also take into account
relations among particulars. It is the task of this section to extend SN so that it also
characterizes relations among particulars.
In extending SN to cover relations I will adopt the same general
methodology as before. First, identify the role that relations play in our thought
and language. This involves characterizing the logical relations among them.
Then, using only elements drawn from the official ontology and ideology,
construct entities suited to play this role.
I will also adopt parallel restrictions to those adopted in chapter three.
First, I attempt to extend SN to characterize only intrinsic relations; it has nothing
to say about the nature of extrinsic relations (other than that they are not
intrinsic).^^ Second, it aims to characterize only those properties that are basic in
the sense that there are "just enough of them to characterize things without
redundancy". This restriction is supposed to exclude, for instance, disjunctive
relations (e.g. being either four feet from or the same colour as) and conjunctive
relations (e.g. being both four feet from and the same colour as) from the scope of
the theory. Finally, SN aims to characterize only those relations that can be had
by simple objects whether or not they could also be had by complex objects. This
excludes, for instance, the relations of having the same area as (except in the
vacuous case) and the relation of being the same height as. In what follows I shall
again suppress reference to these restrictions; I will use 'relation' to mean
'intrinsic, basic relation that could be instantiated by simple particulars'.
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4.2.1 The Conceptual Role of Relations
The conceptual role of relations parallels that of intrinsic properhes.
We say e.g. that there is some relahon that Jakob and Daniel share with
Leopold and Wolfgang, or that an individual at each epoch in a world of hvo-
way eternal recurrence shares all its relations with its counterparts at every other
- apparent quantiHcahons over relations. So in the absence of some existentially
innocent paraphrases of such expressions, an adequate theory of relations ought
to provide enhties to name and quantify over. Relations are also required to be
that which explains what certain pairs (and triples, quadruples etc.) have in
common when they are said to be similar in some respect. When we say e.g. that
the pairs <Jakob, Damel> and <Leopold, Wolfgang> are similar, we mean they
are similar in virtue o/instantiating the fatherhood relation.
Relations also stand in various logical relations. First, any particulars that
instantiate some determinate relation must also fall under the corresponding
relation determinable. Though in the case of relations, it is perhaps not so clear
what the relevant determinables are as it was in the case of properties. But if, for
instance, x and y are two feet apart, it seems at least that they are fall imder the
being-some-distance-in-feet-apart determinable. Second, if something falls under
a relation determinable, then it must instantiate some determinate of that
determinable, though there is no particular determinate they must instantiate: if x
and y are spatially connected, for instance, then they must be one foot apart, or
two feet apart, or ... Third, no particulars can instantiate more than one
determinate relation from any relation determinable (at the same time): nothing
can be (simultaneously) both three feet apart and two feet apart, for instance.
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4.2.2 Constructing Relations
The guiding Idea is very straightforward. Relations among particulars are
Identified with intrinsic properties of 'tuples of particulars. A two-place relation,
for instance, is treated as an intrinsic property of a pair of particulars, a three-
place relation as an intrinsic property of a triple, and so on. And instead of
saying, as is usual, that e.g. x stands in relation R to y, 1 will simply say that <x,
y> instantiates R to emphasize this. Indeed, if we allow that a property is a one-
place relation and that for any particular x, the one-tuple <x> = x itself, this
account subsumes the previous account as the special case where n = 1. In
essence then SN's account of relations is simply a generalization of the account of
properties of the previous chapter. So here I wiU merely outline the key steps.
SN identifies a determinable property with what I called a "partial
classification of particulars. This is a triple, <P, S, m>, where P is some subset of
the set of particulars, S is some equivalence relation on P, and m defines some
metric on the equivalence classes induced by S on P together with the empty set.
The key step in generalizing SN to cover relations is to generalize the notion of a
partial classification of particulars to a partial classification of 'tuples of
particulars. But relations come in many polyadicities and so we first define for
each n, the notion of a partial ^-classification of particulars, corresponding to
each possible relational polyadicity, n:^^
[Dl] For each n, a triple <PA S, m> is a partial n-classification ofparticulars
=df.
(1) P*^ is a subset of the set of all n-tuples of particulars.
(2) S is an equivalence relation that is total on P” (its field is P").
(3) m is some metrical structure on the partition induced by S on
P^ together with the empty set.i^
And we collect these together:
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|D2] For each n, Db" =df. the smallest set that includes all natural partial n-
classifications of n-tuples of particulars.
[D3] Db =df. the union of Db" for all n.
Next, just as the original partial classifications were identified with the
abundant intrinsic properties, so the partial n-classifications of particulars are
identified with the abundant n-place relations:
[LCla] R is a determinable relation in the abundant sense of 'relation'
iff R is a member of Db.
And just as intrinsic property determinates are identified with pairs of a
determinable and one of the cells on the partition induced by S on pn so too with
the relation determinates:
[D4] For each n, Dt" =df. the set of pairs «pn, S, m>, [x]s> such that <P«, S,
m> is a member of Db>^ and [x]s is the set containing all and only those
n-tuples of particulars y such that ySx.
[D5] Dt =df. the union of for all n.
[LC2a] R is a determinate relation in the abundant sense of 'relation' iff
R is a member of Dt.
Having defined the abundant relation determinables and determinates, we
define the sparse relation determinables and determinates by simply selecting
out that small minority that are natural:^^
[LCls] R is a determinable relation in the sparse sense of 'relation' iff R
is a member of Db and R is natural?-^
[LC2s] R is a determinate relation in the sparse sense of 'relation' iff R is
a member of Dt and R's first member is a determinable in the
sparse sense of 'relation'.
The rest of the theorr- simply repeats the corresponding parts of the theory
of intrinsic properties of chapter three with the appropriate substitutions
('relation' for 'property', etc.).
The above account of relations clearly utilizes the same actualist ontology
and (non-modal ideology) as the account of intrinsic properties. And it too
presupposes only the axioms of impure set-theory. It also entails that the logical
relations among relations exactly parallel those among intrinsic properties. It
entails that every determinate relation belongs to some relation determinable,
that every n-tuple of particulars instantiates exactly one determinate relation of
every n-determinable under which it falls and that relations are incompatible iff
they are determinates draum from the same determinable .22
4.3 Intrinsic Properties of Complex Particulars
SN identifies the determinate properties of simple particulars with pairs
S, m>, [u]x> consisting of a determinable <P, S, m> together with one of the
equivalence classes, [u]x, induced by S on P, indexed to indicate its position in the
space defined by the metric. In this construction P is some subset of the set of
sunple particulars. So the account covers only the intrinsic properties of simple
particulars. But obviously complex entities, those having proper parts, also have
intrinsic properties and stand in various relations. In this section I will attempt to
show how to extend SN to cover the intrinsic properties of complex particulars.^^
4.3.1 Supervenience and the Properties of Complex Particulars
Intuitively, the intrinsic properties of complex particulars should receive
the same treatment as the intrinsic properties of simple particulars. It would be
very surprising if intrinsic properties were of tu^o fundamentally different sorts
depending on whether they are intrinsic properties of atoms or intrinsic
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properties of complexes. So the most natural ivaj- to extend SX to cover the
intrinsic properties of complex particulars is to expand the previous account of
classifications, determinables and determinates to cover complex particulars too.
First, let us introduce the notion of a parhal n-classification of c-particuian
(for "complex") and one of its cells as follows:
[Die] X is a partial classification ofc-particulars =df. x is triple <P, S, m> such
that:
(1) P is some subset of the set of all actual complex particulars.
(2) S is any equivalence relation that is total on P.
(3) m is any metric defined on the partition induced by S on P
together with the empty set.
[^2c] [xjs is a cell of some partial classification of c-particulars <P, S, m> =df.
[x]s is the set containing all and only those complex particulars y such
that ySx for some complex particular x (or the empty set).
The rest of the definitions - intrinsic nature, duplication, similarity etc. -
would follow the same pattern as before, so that they too can be applied to
complex particulars. A sparse c-determinable, for instance, would be identified
with a natural partial classification of c-particulars, and a sparse determinate with
a sparse determinate together with one of its cells.
However, there is a complication with this approach. Intuitively, if
something is the fusion of certain parts, then its intrinsic properties supervene on
the intrinsic properties of its parts and the relations in which they stand.^4^5 pet
us call this the Principle of the Supervenience of Composition [PSCj. My
computer, for instance, has the shape it does because of the way its parts are
arranged; given their arrangement it has to have this shape rather than any other.
And it has the colour it does because of the colours of its parts; given their
colours, it couldn't but be grey. And this seems to be true quite generally.
Intuitively, the intrinsic properties otany complex particular supervene on the
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intrinsic properties of its parts and hmv these parts are arranged (or, more
generally, how they are externally related). So any adequate theory of properties
should guarantee these relations of supervenience. In particular, S\ should
guarantee these relations.
Notice however that supervenience is a modal notion: x supervenes on y iff
it is impossible for there to be a change in x without a change in y. So if [PSC] were
simply added to SN as an axiom, SN could not be incorporated into any
metaphysical theory that aims to analyze modality on pain of circularity.
4.3.2 A Non-Modal Characterization of Supervenience
Fortunately the content of the principle can be expressed in terms of
duplication if we assume that all particulars can be decomposed into atomic
parts.26 The idea is that the intrinsic properties of a complex entity supervene on
the intrinsic properties of its parts and the relations in which they stand in the
sense that if any two complex entities are duplicates at the atomic level, then they
must also be duplicates at the macroscopic level. For instance, it seems that what
is meant by saying that the intrinsic properties of my computer supervene on the
properties of its parts is that if I were to duplicate each of the parts from which
my computer is composed and to arrange these duplicates in a way that
duplicates the arrangement of my computer's parts, then the result would
instantiate all and only those intrinsic properties instantiated by my computer.^^
The first step is to define 'part-duplication':
[DIO] Particulars o and o' are part-duplicates =df. there is a 1:1 function f from
any of the atomic parts of o to any of the atomic parts of o' such that:
(i) for any x, if x is an atomic part of o, then f(x) is a
duplicate of x; and
(ii) for any relation and any n-tuple of the atomic parts of o,
<xi,...,Xn>, if R"(xi,...,Xn), then R'Xf(xi),...,f(x,0) also.
Thus t;vo complex particulars qualify as part-duplicates iff their corresponding
atomic parts are duplicates and these atomic parts are related to each other in the
same way
With this in hand we can express the supervenience of composition as:
[PSC] If any hvo complex particulars are part-duplicates, then they are
classified alike by all intrinsic property c-determinables, i.e. they are
intrinsic duplicates.
Since SN analyzes all the terms involved in [PSC'] - 'part-duplicate',
property c-determinable etc. — in wholly non-modal terms, it can be added as
an axiom to SN without introducing any modal elements into the theory. Naa^ we
can introduce the new classifications for complex particulars. Thus, SN is
straightforu'ardly extended to cover the intrinsic properties of complex
particulars with the guarantee that their properties supervene on the intrinsic
properties of and relations among their parts.
4.3.3 The Principle of Supervenience and Mereology
But why should [PSC'j be added as an axiom? In the previous chapter, SN
was developed in such a way that its axioms include only the axioms of impure
set-theory. And thaP s why it can claim to have explained the logical relations
among properties: given the constructions, these relations are simply logical
consequences of axioms to which we have an antecedent commitment. But to
cover the intrinsic properties of complex particulars, SN now needs an additional
axiom, [PSC'j, and this is not reducible to impure set-theory. So it seems that S\
has failed to explain the properties of complex particulars as adequately as it
explained those of simple particulars.
It is true that [PSC'] has a different status from the rest of the theor\'. But it
seems to me that this is because it has to do with mereology quite as much as it
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has to do with the nature of properties and relations.
.And mereological truths
like set-theoretical truths are being presupposed by the theory. S\ does not
attempt to explain them any more than it attempts to explain the truths of set-
theory. In fact, [PSC’I presumably articulates part of the intuition behind the
traditional, though obscure, slogan that a fusion is "nothing over and above" its
parts.^t It tells us that part of what it means to say that a fusion "just is" its parts
IS that the properties of a fusion do not vary independently of the properties of
its parts, that once the intrinsic properties of the parts of a particular are fixed, so
are its intrinsic properties.
Of course, the idea that a fusion is nothing over and above its parts is not
just obscure but highly controversial. And some will want to rqect it and maybe
even [PSC]. If they are right, then [PSC] can simply be dropped from SN. I have
included [PSC'] only to show how SN can be developed in such a way that it
expresses the disputed intuition. So SN is not to be criticized for including [PSC'j
as an axiom and thereby failing to explain it.^^ Whether or not it should be
included is a controversy for mereology.
4.4 SN and the Analysis of Modality
Before moving on to a consideration of further attempts to analyze
modality a brief summary of the account proposed in the last two chapters,
structural nominalism, may be helpful.
The ideology consists only of the basic notions of set-theory, mereology
and logic and the single conceptual primitive, naturalness, which applies to some
but not all sets. Every other notion is defined.
The ontology consists only of actual particulars and atoms, fusions of such
atoms and set-theoretical constructions from these atoms and their fusions.
This is a very parsimonious ontology. In particular, it does not include
properties and relations as basic sui generis entities of any kind. The principal
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task of chapter three \vas to argue for a view of intnnsic properties of the
mereological atoms as set-theoretic constructions of a certain kind from these
atoms. In this chapter the account was extended to cover relations among these
atoms and intrinsic properties of and relations among complex entities in such a
way that makes it clear how we can avoid violations of the principle of the
supervenience of composition.
The relevance of this account to the analysis of modality will fully emerge
only in what follows, but a brief preview is helpful here.
Lewis has argued that the metaphysician who attempts to analyze
modality on a purely actualist basis cannot succeed. For any proposed analysis of
modality when worked out in detail will be seen to involve, either implicitly or
implicitly, some modal notions. And then the proposal is unacceptably circular. If
Lewis is right, we seem to be faced with a choice beUv'een primitive modality and
Lewis's own modal realism.
But in chapter six I will try to show that an appeal to some primitive
modal notions is inevitable only if properties and relations are left unanalyzed or
incompletely analyzed. And Lewis's arguments seem compelling only because
previous attempts to analyze modality fail to provide non-modal analyses of
properties and relations in terms of actual entities. In chapters three and four I
have attempted to provide an analysis of properties and relations that makes no
appeal, either implicit or explicit, to non-actual particulars or to any primitive
modal notions. How such an actualist program for analyzing modality might be
pursued is sketched in 6.6.
^ P. Bricker, "Reducing Possible Worlds to Language", Philosophical Studies 52 (1987), pp. 331-
355. The quote is from p. 351.
2 Talk of "constructing" properties may seem to involve a metaphysical confusion. Surely
properties either just exist or they do not. And whether they do or not is quite independent of
the way we speak or think, at least in general. It is not for us to "construct" them. What could
that really mean anyway?
However, even if this sort of worry is genuine, it is misplaced here for two reasons.
First, the methodology for explaining certain philosophically troubling entities being
presupposed throughout this dissertation has been as follows. First, characterize the
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heoretical role that the entities in question piny
. Then, define using only terms (definable merms of the theoretical primitives) some (expression guaranteed to uniquely pick out) entitiesrmitted by the official ontology that are suited to play exactly that role. fhLe are the
lXai~s;r.,o: .he „.„er
Second, m chapter six we will see that what the actualist aims to construct need notbe construed as the properties themselves. Rather, the actualist aims to construct
rqrresentatives of these properties. As we will see there, there must be exactly one such
representative for each property if actualism is to do justice to our modal intuitions. In viewof this onerone correspondence, conflating talk of constructing properties with talk of
constructing their representatives is harmless.
3 Among these alternative solutions are those that distinguish the actual existence of aproperty from its being actually instantiated. As we will soon see, in effect, SN endorses a
version of this approach, though, I believe a clearer version than that usually advocated. Untilthen, however, 1 will usually talk of a property "being instantiated at a world" and it
existing at a world" indiscriminately.
^ Lewis uses 'alien' somewhat differently. He defines an alien property "as one that is not
instantiated by any part of this world, and that is not definable as a conjunctive or structural
property built up from constituents that are all instantiated by parts of this world " In a
footnote he remarks that maybe he "should have added a third clause: '...and that is not
obtainable by interpolation or extrapolation from a spectrum of properties that are
instantiated by parts of this world" {Plurality, p. 91). As I will use 'alien' the properties
excluded by Lewis's second (and third) clause - the structural properties and those
obtainable by interpolation and extrapolation - do count as alien. My use proves more
convenient for the subsequent discussion.
5 D. M. Armstrong discusses these missing determinates in his A Theory of Unwersals:
Umversals & Scientific Realism, Volume //, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978),
Chapter 22 p.l 16 ff. The solution he advocates there turns essentially on the idea that
properties overlap. In effect, he tries to assimilate missing determinates to missing
compounds. So he has to declare a priori that there is structure where neither science nor
common-sense yet suspect any. Moreover, he is left with no resources to deal with the
properties that are even more radically alien to be discussed in the next paragraph.
^ See 1.3.1, 2.2 and 5.5 for discussions of this principle.
Indeed, it might be argued that SN in particular ought to acknowledge alien properties that
belong to determinables none of whose determinates are actually instantiated. For SN allows
that it is possible for each determinate of any determinable to be missing. And it allows for
any number of them to be missing. But if this is possible, should it not also be possible for all
of them to be missing? Although, of course, this type of argument is to be treated with
suspicion, it is, 1 think, sufficient to shift the burden of proof: if not, why not?
® It will be recalled that the empty set but only the empty set may appear more than once in
the metric space defined by m on the partition induced by S on P.
^ Moreover, even if we allow each such bare structure to have some, perhaps arbitrary,
degree of naturalness, SN would still not entail that all empty determinables actually exist.
For determinables may be distinct even if they have the same structure by virtue of differing
in their degrees of naturalness. The (absolute) tempierature and the mass determinables, for
instance, have the same structure — that of the real line — but perhaps mass is more more
natural than temperature. And SN entails that such determinables, like determinables that
differ in structure, are necessarily distinct; a determinable's degree of naturalness is part of its
essence. So, for instance, the mass and temperature determinables would be distinct even at
worlds where the classification of particulars fails to decide between them (perhaps, because
the world in question has no particulars with any mass or temp>erature at all, or perhaps
because at such worlds any particular has mass n iff it has temperature n). But if it is possible
for tiiv such determinables to be empty at the actual world, SN will be unable to provide
distinct constructions. For it can provide only one entity — a bare structure — having a unique
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degree of na ura ness. In short, S\ cannot distinguish empK' determinables having the same
structure but differing in their degree of naturalness. And if the structural nominalist holdsthat a 1 determinables empty or not actually exist, she would be committed, wrongly to the
vnew that any having the same structure are the same determinable.
Here I have again been simplifying by assuming that naturalness is an all-or-nothing
matter. But officially it is a property that comes in degrees. And this complicates matters For
although certain depees of naturalness are actually instantiated at the actual world, perhaps
not all are. And perhaps at the actual world only certain degrees of naturalness are available
tor the actualist to construct various properties. Thus the actualist still comes up short.
IS so depends on quite w hat naturalness is, an issue I have not
ooked at m much detail. But it seems that the actualist can at least construct representations of
naturalness, perhaps by means of a mathematical function from sparse determinables to the
positive reals. (Perhaps she identifies the representations of a sparse determinables with pairs
of an abundant determinable and some positive real number that measures its degree of
naturalness). And that may be sufficient.
This objection is an adaptation of an objection Lewis raises in another context (see Plnmlitu
n. 157-8). '
2 Once again I have assumed that the problem of "filtering ouL' can be solved (see chapter
three fn. 28). ^
f:
1
n
There are other options here. Perhaps we think of p-matter as itself a determinable that
may have many determinates. Or perhaps we think of it as a kind of limiting case of a
determinable that has a unique determinate. It does not really matter as the same sort of
solution can be fashioned whichever way we look at it. Exactly parallel remarks apply, of
course, to u-matter.
There is one difficulty here: what about worlds the cardinality of whose stock of
particulars exceeds that of the actual world? Here one strategy would be to identify
particulars with mathematical points thereby affording SN an endless supply of them. See
1.3.1, 6.5 and 6.6 for a brief discussion of this. This approach has its problems, though I do not
discuss them in any detail because they arise principally in attempting to accommodate de re
possibilities and so fall outside the official scope of this dissertation. For further discussion
see e.g. Lewis's discussion of the Napoleon-worlds Plurality, p. 157-8, and A. McMichael, "A
Problem for Actualism about Possible Worlds", Tlie Philosophical Revmo, XCII No. 1 (1983),
pp. 49-66.
The reader is referred to the fantasy of inverted spectra in 3.6 for further discussion here.
A relation is intrinsic, roughly, whenever its obtaining depends only on the (qualitative)
natures of the relata themselves and their fusion, regardless of the state or existence of any
other thing. Just as an intrinsic property is a property that is intrinsic to any individual that
instantiates it, an intrinsic relation is a relation that is intrinsic to the fusion of any relata that
instantiate it; it can be thought of as an intrinsic property of the relata "taken together".
Intuitively, intrinsic relations include being four feet from, preceding, being taller than, being
the same shape as, and being oppositely charged from.
As noted in the previous chapter this restriction may be redundant (see Pluralih/ p. 60.
where Lewis claims that such a restriction is already built into our notion of "sparseness").
Perhaps relations among infinitely many particulars should also be permitted. To modify
SN to accommodate such relations, we should also allow infinite sequences of particulars
where SN allows only n-tuples of particulars.
Again SN should stay neutral on the question of exactly which type of structure m defines
on the partition.
I ignore here the possibility that applying the notion of naturalness to relations may raise
additional difficulties not raised by applying it to properties for lack of space.
Here again 1 simplify by assuming a hard-and-fast division of partial n-classifications of
particulars into the natural and the non-natural. I assume that the theory could be easily
refined (and complicated) to allow naturalness to be a property that comes in degrees.
For the theorv' to be fully adequate, these entailments must exluwst the logical relationsamong relations. But maybe there are extra logical relations among relation! that have noparallel m the logical relations among intrinsic properties. For lack of space I will notinvestigate this question here.
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I will not discuss explicitly how to extend the account so that it also covers relationsamong complex particulars. But the procedure outlined above in section 4.2 seems to be
straightforwardly general izable.
24 Quite how this is expressed depends on what the parts are taken to be. If the complex
particular is composed of mereological atoms, then its intrinsic properties supervene on the
intrinsic properties of the atoms and how these atoms are arranged vis a vis one another. But
1 we consider all the particular's parts, then reference to how they are arranged vis a vis one
another IS redundant. For the arrangement of x and y will determine the intrinsic properties
o their fusion, and if x and y are parts of z, then their fusion is a part of z. So there is no need
to mention the arrangement of x and y ; it is already covered by the intrinsic properties of the
fusion X + y. ^
25 Note that we don't need to require in addition that the internal relations among parts also
be duplicated. Since internal relations supervene on intrinsic properties of the relata, if we
duplicate the parts we automatically duplicate the internal relations among them.
The account to be developed will apply only to complex entities composed of atomic parts.
But it is probably preferable for a metaphysical theory of properties to stay neutral on the
question of whether there are any mereological atoms. Perhaps, everything has proper parts;
perhaps there is structure all the way down". 1 have omitted a discussion of this possibility
as It would take us too far afield into mereology.
22 Since this account applies only to complex entities composed of atomic parts, it does not
apply to "gunk" - complex particulars all of whose parts have proper parts. To extend SN to
apply to gunk, some way will have to be found to express in non-modal terms the more
general claim that if complex particulars have duplicate parts, whether or not these parts are
atoms, and these parts are arranged in duplicate ways, then they must themselves be
duplicates.
Clearly this analysis of duplication subsumes the previous relation of duplication among
the atoms themselves as a special case. And notice that the definition of 'part-duplication'
involves only notions that have previously been defined in non-modal terms: intrinsic
natures, functions, relations etc.
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Though this is at best only part of what what is behind the slogan. Lewis explains another
part of what is behind it as follows:
Mereology is ontologicaUy innocent..given a priori commitment to cats, say, a
commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment. The fusion is nothing over
and above the cats that compose it. It just is them. They just are it. Take them together
or take them separately, the cats are the same portion of Reality either way...(D. K.
Lewis, Parts of Classes, p. 81).
But this is both controversial and obscure. For one thing, the sentences 'It just is them.' and
'They just ore it/ are barely grammatical. For another, since the fusion of x and y is not in
general identical either to x or to y, it remains obscure quite why it is not something "over
and above x and y".
The actualist theory to be developed in 6.6 perhaps throws some additional light on
the sense in which a fusion is nothing over and above its parts. For it entails a version of the
recombination principle. This principle is supposed to express, at least in part, the intuition
that logical space comprehends a plenitude of possibilities or possible worlds. In part what il
says is, roughly, that the result of recombining anything with anything else regardless of their
intrinsic natures is itself a possibility, a possible world. (This is very rough and various
constraints are needed. See 1 .3.1, 2.2.1 and 5.5 for brief discussions of some of these
constraints.) But the version of the recombination principle entailed by the theory of 6.6
entails that recombining the fusions generates no “extra" worlds over and above thosegenerated by recombining their parts. To illustrate the idea, consider for simplicity a worldthat contains just three qualitatively different atomic particulars, a, b and c. By the^
recombinatorial principle, from this world we can generate 6 new worlds - one for each
subset of {a, b, c minus the whole set and the empty set. But the version of the principle
mvolved in the theory of 6.6, entails that there are still only 6 recombinatonal worldsgeneratable from the set that contains a, b, ca,td all their fusions - a.b, b+c and a+c. For it
entails that a fusion exists at a world iff its parts do. It entails that fusions are
recombinatorially redundant" and that is perhaps one sense in which a fusion is "nothing
are^it"
compose it; one sense in which “it just is them and they just
actualist theory of modality that incorporates SN. In particular, quitehow |PSC
I
IS to be guaranteed is left largely open. If it is true, then presumably it is
necessarily true, true at every world. One way to guarantee this would be to develop the
theory m two stages. In stage one, we take the set of atoms and form all the n-classifications,
n-determinables, n-determinates, intrinsic natures etc. This should define all the facts about'
the properties of and relations among the atoms. In stage two we repeat the process for both
simple and complex entities under the additional constraint [PSC].
It might be objected that this will entail only that there is no world containing part-
duplicates that are not themselves duplicates. That is, it guarantees only the supervenience
among coexistent complex particulars. But this does not seem to be the whole story. For the
intuition behind [PSC] seems to be that part-duplicates are always themselves duplicates
regardless of where they are in logical space; in particular, part-duplicates are duplicates,
whether or not they coexist. Yet this approach does not rule out the possibility that at some
worlds part-duplicates of my actual computer are all grey, at others they are all some blue, at
others all green etc. All that it guarantees is that part-duplicates within a world share their
'
intrinsic properties, it does not fix what these intrinsic properties are. So it may seem that
these intrinsic properties may vary across worlds. And that is counterintuitive.
However, the appearance is deceptive. For the if the theory guarantees an adequate
version of the recombination principle, then this principle together with the truth of [PSCj at
every world rules out the existence of any part-duplicates that fail to be duplicates existing
anywhere in logical space. For suppose that there are; perhaps, there is a part-duplicate of my
computer that is not a duplicate of my computer - maybe it is red rather than grey. Then by
the recombination principle duplicates of these two complex particulars coexist at some
world. Since the intrinsic properties of their parts and how these parts are arranged are
among their intrinsic properties, these will be preserved under duplication and the duplicates
will still be part-duplicates at this new world. And as the colours of things are also intrinsic
properties they too will be preserved at the new world. So this new world will contain part-
duplicates that fail to be duplicates. And this violates 1F*SC']. In short, any metaphysical
theory of modality that guarantees both the recombination principle and guarantees that
[PSC'I is true at each world, automatically guarantees that no part-duplicates anywhere in
logical space can fail to be duplicates.
CHAPTER 5
MAGICAL ERSATZISM
5.1 The Ersatz Proiert
All the metaphysical theories of modality discussed in this dissertation
hold that a proposition is possible iff there is some world at which it is true. For
such quantificational accounts to get the facts of modality right, coUectively their
worlds must constitute a plenitude: it must be that for every way that things
could be, there is some world at which it is true that they are that way.
To play the role of worlds, the modal realist posits a vast plurality of non-
actual concrete particulars over and above all the actual concrete particulars.
Enough in fact to guarantee a plenitude: the modal realist holds that for every
way that something could be, there is some such concrete particular, actual or
otherwise, that is that way.i
Many other philosophers also treat modal discourse as, in essence,
quantificational.^ So they too must guarantee a sufficient number of entities
quantified over ~ worlds - to constitute a plenitude. But most of them are far less
sanguine than Lewis about accepting the existence of a vast plurality of non-
actual concrete particulars. Most think that there just are no blue swans, talking
donkeys, cities of cheese, or particulars having weird spatiotemporal structures.
The most popular alternative is to posit instead
abstract entities capable, somehow, of representing. ..the entire concrete
world in complete detail, as it is or as it might have been.^
Lewis calls such an approach, "ersatzism"; and he calls the abstract
representational entities quantified over, "ersatz worlds". Ersatzism holds, for
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instance, that it is possible that there be blue swans iff there are certain abstract
entities that represent that the actual world is such that there are blue swans. But
for this to be the case, they argue, there need not really be any blue swans, only
abstract entities - ersatz worlds - that represent that the actual ivorld is such that
there are.
Lewis argues that the entire ersatz project is doomed. Indeed, this
constitutes his principal reason for thinking that modality must be understood in
terms of quantification over a vast plurality of concrete particulars. A defining
feature of any form ersatzism is that its worlds represent various things. And
ersatz theories may be classified according to their accounts of how their worlds
represent what they do. Magical” ersatzism denies that worlds represent by
virtue of any structure they might have. "Pictorial" ersatzism attributes the
representational powers of its worlds in part to their having a certain
mereological structure. "Linguistic" or "mathematical" ersatzism's explanation of
how its worlds represent exploits their set-theoretical structure of its worlds.
I consider Lewis's arguments against magical ersatzism in this chapter and
his arguments against linguistic or mathematical ersatzism in the next. Since his
arguments against pictorial ersatzism seem to me quite compelling, I will not
discuss them.'^
5.2 A Version of Magical Ersatzism. ME
Lewis's arguments against magical ersatzism are directed at a highly
generic version of the theory which I will call "ME".
ME posits certain sui generis "elements". These are abstract entities, that is,
they are causally inert. And they are simple, they lack any mereological or set-
theoretical structure. Some but not all of them are "selected" by the actual world;
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^vhlch ones are selected depends on ^^•hat goes on in the actual ^vorld. One axiom
of the theory entails that collectively these elements constitute a plenitude: for
everv- distinct properU' F that the actual world might instantiate, there is some
element e such that the actual world selects e iff it is F. And some of these
elements imply others:
[Dl] For any elements p and q, p implies q =df. necessarily, if @ selects p
then it also selects q.
"
Taken under this relation of implication, the elements collectively constitute a
complete, atomic Boolean algebra. The maximal elements, or atoms, of this
algebra are ME's candidates for the role of its ersatz worlds:
[D2] X is a wovld =df. x is a maximal element of the algebra of elements.
The representational properties of these worlds are explained in terms of
selection and some modal primitive:
[D3] For any property F and element e, e represents that the actual world
instantiates F =df. Necessarily, if the actual world selects e, then it
instantiates F.^
So to say, for instance, that some element e represents that the actual world has
blue swans among its parts is to say that it could not be that the actual world
selects e unless the actual world has blue swans among its parts.
Before considering Lewis's objection to ME, a few points about the theory
should be noted.
T he first is terminological. Clearly, ME's elements play the role
traditionally played by “propositions" or “states of affairs". And the selected
propositions (states of affairs) are simply those that are actually true (actually
obtain), those made-true by the way the world actually is. We could, indeed,
simply introduce these more familiar terms by definition:
[D4] X is a proposition or state ofaffairs =df. x is an element.
[D5] X makes-true y =df. x selects y.
[D6] X is actually true =df. x is selected by the actual world.
Similarly, given our modal primitive either of representation and selects is
definable in terms of the other.^ But Lewis prefers to present ME in terms of
elements
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and selection rather than the more usual “propositions" or “states-
of-affairs", "makes-true" and "represents". This is because these latter terms are
replete with philosophical connotations and often pretty obscure ones at that. So
using them runs the risk of obscuring the generic nature of ME and the scope of
his objection. Lie thinks that the sensible policy is to avoid them. I vvhll, however,
generally use the notions interchangeably.
Second, ME is not an ambitious theory. Its elements are not constructed,
but taken to constitute a primitive ontological category. It takes 'selection' - its
surrogate for the traditional notion of representation - and certain modal
expressions as primitive; no attempt is made to analyze them. And it simply
assumes the axioms required to guarantee that the elements constitute a
plenitude and that taken under implication they constitute a complete atomic
Boolean algebra. No attempt is made to reduce them to the axioms of mereologv,
set-theory or anything else. Indeed, Lewis imagines saying to the magical
ersatzer that really
..this is no theory. This is a theory-schema, which any number of diffeamt
theories could fit. Even my own: maybe the elements are the sets of
\\ orlds the concrete world - or any concrete world - selects just those
e ements that have it as a member, and it is the case according to an
element that a donkey talks iff each world in that element has a talking
onkey as a part. Equally, any sort of linguistic or pictorial ersatzism
could fit your schema.
Says he: not so. You have paid attention to the positive side of mv
theory' and overlooked the details. I denv that the elements are concrete Ideny that they have structure. I deny that they have parts or members
1 hat rules out the interpretations you mentioned. (Fair enough. But had
the denials been left out my point would have been well take.)^
The point of making ME so schematic is to bring out quite how wide the
scope of Lewis's objection is. If it refutes ME, it thereby refutes any theory that is
an instance of the schema.
Finally, notice that there is an important difference between modal realism
and iVIE in the role assigned to the actual world. According to modal realism
modality involves implicit quantification over certain concrete entities among
wliich is the actual world. But according to \LE modality involves quantifying
only over abstract entities - elements - and the actual world, being concrete, is
not among them. The ersatzer also uses the term 'world' for what is quantified
over
,
and this may prove confusing. For in the ersatzer's sense of 'world', the
actual world is not a world.^ Nevertheless it still plays an important role in ME: it
is the one concrete actual world that selects various propositions. To forestall
confusion on this matter it is helpful to introduce some terminology:
[D7] @ =df. the fusion of every concrete particular.*^
[D8] p* =df. the maximal element or world selected by @.
So is the name of the actual world, or, more precisely its concrete part.
According to ME, it is @ that bears the selection relation to various propositions.
But @ is not among the entities eligible for being selected; it is not a proposition
and so, according to ME, not a ^vorld. ME calls the ,vorld or maximal proposition
selected by 'p*'.
5.3 Selection and the Classification of Relations
Clearly the linchpin of ME is the relation of selection. But Lewis argues
that it is an illusion, a bit of magic. For although ME takes the predicate 'selects'
to be one of its primitives - a grasp of it is simply presupposed by ME - Lewis
argues that there is just no way that that anyone could have grasped a predicate
for the selection relation. And if 'selects' really is ungraspable, then ME itself is
literally an unintelligible theory.
Actually, Lewis concentrates on showing that 'selects' would be
ungraspable only if selection belongs to a category of relations he calls "internal".
But this is not much of a restriction; for if selection is not internal, it would have
to be external". And according to Lewis this only makes matters worse. For he
argues that the very notion of an external selection relation is itself unintelligible.
In short, if the concrete world selects elements by an internal relation,. ..it is
only by magic that 'selects' could be our word for any such relation. If, on
the other hand, the concrete world selects elements by an external relation,
it is the relation itself that is magical...Either way, ersatzism that relies on
such a relation is justly called 'magical'; and is to be rqected.^*^
Before this argument can be evaluated Lewis's classification of relations
must be clarified.
First, relations are divided into the intrinsic and the extrinsic.^^ A relation is
intrinsic, roughly, whenever its obtaining depends only on the (qualitative)
natures of the relata themselves and their fusion, regardless of the state or
existence of any other thing. Just as an intrinsic property is a property that is
intrinsic to any individual that instantiates it, an intrinsic relation is a relation
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that is intrinsic to the fusion of any relata that instantiate it; it can be thought of
as an intrinsic propert}' of the relata "taken together" (in the right order). '2
Intuitively, intrinsic relations include being four feet from, preceding, being taller
than, being the same shape as, being oppositely charged from. For whether x is
four feet from y or precedes it or is taller than than it etc., does not depend on
anything but x and y and how they are vis a vis one another. The state or
existence of anything but x and y has no bearing on whether or not they
instantiate such relations.
Relations that do depend, even in part, on the state or nature of something
other than their relata are extrinsic. Intuitively, they include being co-owned and
being more popular than. For whether x and y stand in either of these relations
depends in part at least on whether there is someone who owns both x and y and
who likes whom.
The intrinsic relations themselves are then subdivided into internal and
external relations. Internal relations are determined entirely by the intrinsic
properties of their relata "considered separately". External relations depend, at
least in part, on something other than just the several intrinsic natures of their
relata, though without depending on any third thing. Roughly, external relations
depend in part on how their relata are "arranged" vis-a-vis one another.
Intuitively, being taller than, being the same shape as and (probably) being
oppositely charged from are internal relations. Once the intrinsic natures of x and
y have been fixed, their heights, shapes and probably charges have been fixed
since these are intrinsic properties. ^3 gyt then it is also fixed whether x is taller
than y or the same shape as y or differently charged from y. Intuitively,
preceding, being four feet from, being a member of and being a part of are
external relations. Intuitively, whether x and y stand in any of these relations
does not depend in any way on things other than the fusion of x and y. So these
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are intrinsic relations. And yet such relations still do not supervene on just the
intnnsic nature of x and the intrinsic nature of y alone. Even if x and y stand in
these relations, individuals having exactly the same intrinsic natures as x and y
could fail to do so. One electron may be four feet from a particular proton, or a
member of some particular set, or a part of some particular atom and yet an
exactly similar electron not bear any of these relations to these same entities.
Lewis expresses this division of (binary) relations into extrinsic, internal
and external in terms of the notion of duplication. Intuitively, x and y are
duplicates iff they are exactly alike, flawless copies or perfect simulacra of each
other. In chapter hvo w'e defined a notion of duplication in terms of (perfectly
natural) intrinsic properties that matches this intuitive notion:
(D9) X is a duplicate of y =df. for any perfectly natural intrinsic property P,
PxiffPy.i4
There may or may not actually be any perfect duplicates, but if there are the
fundamental particles of physics seem to be the best candidates.
This allows us to formulate the three-w^ay classification more precisely:
(DIO) A (binary) relation R is intrinsic =df. if xRy, then for any x' and y' such
that: (a) the fusion of x' and y' is a duplicate of the fusion of x and y;
and (b) x' is duplicate of x and y' is a duplicate of y'; then
x'Ry' also.^5 Otherwise, R is extrinsic.
(Dll) A (binary) intrinsic relation R is internal =df. if xRy, then for any x' and
y' such that x' is a duplicate of x and y' is a duplicate of y', then x'Ry'
also. Otherwise, R is external.
Where the quantifiers range over all actual and possible particulars.
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First then, Lewis asks the magical ersatzer whether selection is extnnsic,
internal or external. ME of course takes selection as one of its primitives, and
Lewis concedes that
It would be unfair asking the ersatzer to deftne his primitive. But Iam not demanding definition, only classification. Compare my own case. I
might well take predicates of distance as primitive; but primitive or no, I
would say that distance relations are external relations par excellence I
'
might weU take some sort of similarity relation as primitive; but primitive
or no, any sort of similarity is an internal relation. I can fairly ask the
ersatzer to classify his primitive in the same way.^^
One option can be eliminated immediately: intuitively, selection could not be
extrinsic — how could whether or not @ selects a given proposition p depend on
anything other than the fusion of @ and p? Selection then must be either internal
or external. In the next section I will explain and evaluate Lewis's objection to
classifying selection as internal and I will consider his objection to classifying it as
external in 5.5.
5.4 The Argument against Classifying Selection as Internal
Lewis objects that no-one could grasp any predicate for an internal
selection relation. So if ME classifies selection as internal, the theory is literally
unintelligible.
One way to grasp the denotation of a predicate is by ostension. But the
range of the selection relation consists of propositions and propositions are
abstract; they are beyond the possibility of causal acquaintance. Hence, no-one
can have had causal acquaintance with any instance of the selection relation to
which she might have pointed to fix the denotation of 'selects' ostensively.
Another way to grasp the denotation of predicate is by listing its instanci's.
But this is possible only if the number of instances is short enough for us to list.
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And clearly the instances of selection would be too numerous for us to list -
there are infinitely many true propositions. Indeed, there are probably unlistably
many of them.
The only other way to grasp the denotation of a predicate is to grasp it
intensionally: by grasping some defining condition on its relata. Such a condition
will involve certain properties or relations instantiation of which by various
individuals is necessary and sufHcient for them to stand in the relation. So if the
ersatzer did not come to understand 'selects' by acquaintance with its instances,
or by listing its instances, she must have done so by grasping some condition of
the form:
[S] X selects y =df. (P^x & Qiy) or (P2X & Q2y) or....etc.
where the P's express properties that @ does or might have instantiated - ways it
might be - and the O' s express properties by virtue of instantiating which
propositions represent that @ is this way or that.
It is here that the supposition that selection is internal enters the picture.
For then the representational properties of the propositions, the Q-properties,
must be intrinsic. But, Lewis notes, if ME is to get the facts of modality right,
these Q-properties must be extremely numerous. Collectively they
..must be rich enough to permit enormous variation. For there must be
enough [propositions], all with different distinctive natures [i.e. differing
among themselves with respect to which intrinsic Q-properties they
instantiate], to provide a sufficient plenitude of possibilities.
So, Lewis argues, to grasp an instance of [S] we would have to grasp an
enormous number of Q-properties. But we could not have grasped any of these
Q-properties by causal acquaintance with their propositional instances because the
propositions are abstract and so beyond the possibiliU' of causal acquaintance.
But nor could we have grasped a sufficient number of them by causal
acquaintance with any (non-propositional) concrete instances they might have.
This is because the propositions are abstract simples. So the only properties even
eligible to be the Q-properties are intrinsic properties that could be instantiated by
abstract simples. And Lewis points out that, as a matter of fact, we have causal
acquaintance with instances of very few such properties, far too few to make all
the required differences:
There are not very many candidates [for Q-properties whose instances we
are actually acquainted with], since they must be properties capable of
being instantiated by simples. Properties of charge, mass, quark colour
and flavour, and the like might perhaps do (if they could somehow be
shared by abstract simples. But I don't see why they couldn't be.) But there
are not nearly enough of those properties to make all the differences we
need.i^
In short, the ersatzer could not have grasped any instance of [S] which
uniquely determines an internal selection relation because to grasp such an
instance she would have to grasp vast numbers of intrinsic properties capable of
instantiation by abstract simples. And she just could not have grasped enough of
them.
This completes the case against classifying selection as an internal relation:
such a relation could not have been grasped by ostension, listing its members, or
by grasping an instance of [Sj. But then it could not have been grasped at all. And
so, if the magical ersatzer has understood her primitive predicate 'selects' where
this is taken to express an internal relation, she must have done so by magic.
This argument is very difficult and abstract. However, or so I will argue, it
is ultimately unsuccessful. I will consider three lines of reply. The first is due to
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jubien and seems to me not to get to the heart of the matter. The other two do I
think show that Lewis has failed to establish that 'selects' would be ungraspable.
Jubien interprets Lewis as arguing that the ersatzer could not have
grasped the selection relation (except by magic) because
the causal isolation of propositions seems to make their individual natures
inaccessible to usT‘^
And, according to Jubien,
crucial in this argument.. .is the supposition that we have to know about
the relevant intrinsic features of the relota in order to "grasp" an internal
relation.20
But he thinks that this supposition is not plausible:
I think we can and do grasp internal relations without grasping their inner
workings...for example, there is a certain internal relation that holds
between my fingers and chunks of molten lava and burning charcoal, the
surfaces of certain furnaces and stoves, and so forth. It is this relation that
accounts for the fact that if 1 have the misfortune to find my fingers too
close to such things, 1 will suffer pain and perhaps serious injury as well.
VVe may call this the propensity to be burned by relation. With the world the
way it is, we need to grasp this relation and fortunately most of us do.
This, of course, is not to deny that a "complete"
(
or "scientific")
understanding of the relation would require understanding a certain
amount of the molecular theory of heat. The point is only that what it
seems reasonable to require for the grasping of this relation falls far short
of this analytical level of understanding.^^
Jubien seems to me to misinterpret Lewis's argument here.
Clearly we can and do grasp the properties of many substances — brass,
water, salt — without a grasp of their "inner workings", the chemical structures
on which these properties supervene. And the graspability of Jubien's propensity
to be burned by relation shows that we can also grasp certain internal relations
without a grasp of the intrinsic features of their relata.
But these are special cases. We can grasp them because ive have causal
acquaintance with their effects, or, as Jubien puts it elsewhere, their "outward
manifestations". This is how we seem to grasp, for instance, the properties of
brass, water and salt. And, as Jubien himself acknowledges, we grasp his
propensity to be burned by relation by causal acquaintance with its outward
manifestations — heat, for instance.
The range of an internal selection relation, however, consists entirely of
propositions. Propositions are abstract and so causally inert; they can have no
outward manifestations. And this disanalogy between selection and Jubien's
propensity to be burned by relation is crucial. Because we are acquainted with the
outward manifestations of Jubien's relation, in a sense, we can name it
ostensively (or at least we can name it by some combination of description and
ostension). And thaPs how we grasp it without a grasp of an instance of some
[S]-like schema. But the denotation of 'selects' cannot be named ostensively by
causal acquaintance with its instances or their effects. So, since its instances
cannot be listed, the selection relation must be grasped intensionally i.e. by
grasping some instance of [S]; there is just no other alternative.
In summary, Jubien's propensity to be burned by relation is a
counterexample to the claim that all internal relations must be grasped by
grasping the intrinsic properties of their relata. But Lewis argues only that an
internal relation must be grasped by grasping the intrinsic properties of its relata,
if it cannot be grasped ostensively or by listing its instances. And Jubien's relation
is not a counterexample to this claim. For we can grasp Jubien's relation
ostensively by causal acquaintance with its effects. Thus, Lewis need not be
worried by Jubien’s purported counterexample.22
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A second line of reply to l.ewis would be to reject his argument that the
number of properties we grasp that are eligible to be Q-properties - intrinsic
properties capable of instantiation by abstract simples - is too small to encode all
the required differences.
Lewis admits that we grasp mass properties and that these may be eligible
candidates for the Q-properties referred to in the specification of the denotation
of selects . Yet there are non-denumerably many mass properties. So it is far
from clear that there are not nearly enough... [eligible Q-properties] to make all
the differences we need." Just how many do we need?
Unfortunately, more than this. For there are only continuum-many mass
properties and yet, even at a conservative estimate, there must be at least 2-to-
the-continuum-many worlds.23 So even if we grant a grasp of all the mass
properties this is still not enough to make all the differences we need. And
perhaps it is unlikely that there will be some set of properties eligible to be the Q-
properties that we can claim to have a grasp of whose cardinality exceeds that of
the masses.34
This reply does, however, suggest a more promising line. For notice that
many of the mass properties are not actually instantiated, yet we grasp them and
the predicates that express them anyway. So it just does not seem to be true in
general that we grasp a property, and so understand a predicate that expresses it,
only if we have causal acquaintance with some of its instances. Indeed, even an
arch empiricist like Hume admits that someone could "raise up to himself the
idea of that particular shade [of blue], tho' it never be conveyed to him by his
senses.. .".35 And the same goes for many other "missing" physical values.
Moreover, the account of properties in chapters three and four suggests an
explanation of quite hou- li e manage to grasp actually uninstantiated properties.
Roughly the idea is this: u e grasp the determinable to which they belong; a
certain metric space is partially constitutive of each determinable; and by
exploiting this metric we can "triangulate" onto the missing values. So to grasp
Hume s missing shade of blue or the infinitely-many actual instantiated physical
values even without causal acquaintance with their instances, perhaps it suffices
to grasp the colour and mass determinables.
In short, even if we have causal acquaintance with instances of very few
properties capable of instantiation by abstract simples, it does not follow that we
grasp very few such properties. A grasp of the relevant kind may suffice to grasp
all the properties of that kind. In particular, a grasp of the Q-property kind -- the
determinable together with its metric - may suffice for a grasp of all the
determinate Q-properties themselves. So we may after all grasp enough Q-
properties "to make all the differences we need" as long as we grasp the kind
intrinsic representational properties capable of instantiation by abstract simplest
Lewis's argument against supposing that an internal selection relation
could be grasped by grasping an instance of [S] seems to presuppose that any
uniquely determining instance of [S] will have to involve a vast number of
predicates for the Q-properties. For if this is not the case, then the fact that we
grasp very few properties eligible for Q-hood, does not tend to show that we
could not grasp such an instance. The final and most promising tack for the
magical ersatzer is to reject this assumption.
Consider the duplication relation. This is an internal relation par excellence
and clearly we grasp it. But we probably did not grasp it by causal acquaintance
with its actual instances or by means of a list. For it may well be that there are no
actual pairs of duplicates. And even if there are — perhaps some fundamental
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particles are duplicates - and duplication were grasped ostensively by reference
to them. It need not be. Surely we would still grasp the duplication relation in a
world where there are no duplicates. We must have grasped it then, by grasping
some finite defining condition formulated in terms that involve only properties
of or relations among its relata. Presumably, this condition was along the lines of
(D5):
(D5) X is a duplicate of y -df. for any perfectly natural intrinsic propertv P
PxiffPy. t' f y
^
But notice that this condition involves no predicates at all, only predicate-
variables. Indeed, it clearly could not have been the case that duplication was
grasped on the basis of a grasp of a condition involving such predicates, i.e. a
condition of the form,
[D] X is a duplicate ofy =df. (P^x & Qiy) or (P2X & Q2y) or.. ..etc.
where the Ps and O's are predicates for (perfectly natural) intrinsic properties, or
perhaps complete intrinsic natures. For any such uniquely determining instance
of [D] would have to involve an infinitely long disjunction of combinations of
intrinsic properties. And so grasping it would be beyond our powers.
So even if "...at least the great majority of the 'representational properties'
[i.e. the Q-properties] must lie entirely outside our acquaintance" it does not
follow that "how anyone could have understood the predicate ['selects'] which is
supposed to express an internal relation that involves these properties [the Q-
propertiesj" is a mystery. For, as the case of duplication shows, a grasp of an
internal relation R by means of some uniquely defining condition on its instances
does not in general presuppose a grasp of the denotation of predicates for a
sutficient number of intrinsic properties to distinguish R from all other eligible
candidates. Indeed, such a condition may involve no predicates at all, only
propert\^ variables. For the condition may "involve" these properties by
quantifying over them rather than by containing predicates that express them.
Since a grasp of the defining condition for 'selects' need not presuppose a grasp
of any Q-predicate at all, a grasp of it does not presuppose the grasp of any Q-
property. And so the paucity of our grasp of Q-properties does not tend to show
that we could not grasp 'selects'. Since Lewis does not explicitly consider this
possibility, his case against the ersatzer classifying selection as internal is
incomplete.
Perhaps, how^ever, Lewis's case against classifying selection as internal
could be completed. For perhaps even such a quantificational condition could not
have been grasped. To see w^hether this is so, let us briefly consider w^hat such a
quantificational defining condition for 'selects' w^ould have to be like.
The ersatzer supposes that there are tw'o collections of intrinsic properties.
The first, the P s, contains all and only those intrinsic properties that the actual
world could instantiate. They will include the property of having certain laws,
the property’ of having donkeys among its parts, the property’ of having a certain
spatiotemporal framew'ork, and so on. Some of them could only be instantiated
by complex entities, and perhaps some could only be instantiated by concrete
entities. The second, the O' s, contains all and only those intrinsic properties in
virtue of instantiation of w’hich something represents the actual w’orld as being a
certain way. They v\dll include the property of representing that the actual w^orld
has certain laws, the property of representing that the actual world has donkeys
among its parts, or a certain spatiotemporal framework, and so on. All them
must be capable of instantiation by abstract simples.
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There are also ver>' many u'ays of correlating these hvo collections; one-one
functions from the P's to the Q's. And among them will be one function - call it
“f" - that correlates the P-property of having certain laws with the Q-propert>' of
representing that the actual world has these laws, the P-propert>^ of having
donkeys among its parts with the Q-property of representing that the actual
world has donkeys among its parts, and so on. That is, there is a one-one function
or correlation between the Ps and O' s, f, such that for all P-properties, P, f(P) =
the Q-property of representing that the actual world is P.
Now, if the ersatzer can grasp f, she can grasp 'selects'. For 'selects' can be
straightforwardly defined in terms of it:
[Q] X selects y =df. for every intrinsic property P, Px iff f(P)y.
(Notice that [Q] parallels the definition of 'duplication', [D5], Indeed, to
transform [Q] into [D5] just let f be the identity function and let P be the
collection of all intrinsic properties.)
So is there any reason to think that the ersatzer could not even have
grasped f? If there is, then perhaps Lewis is right after all to argue that the
ersatzer could not grasp an internal selection relation (except by magic).
Notice first that a grasp of f requires a grasp of the range of properties in
terms of which it is defined; in particular, it requires a grasp of the kind intrinsic
representational property (that could be instantiated by abstract simples). Yet Lewis
strongly suggests that the ersatzer could not or at least do not grasp such a kind:
Not a thing has been said about what sort of a property [an intrinsic
representational property] might be...We have not the slightest idea of
what "representational properties" are; except that they are properties
whereby a vast flock of abstract simples differ one from another.
Do ue grasp even a single instance of a single intrinsic representational
property? A representational property that is intrirmc would indeed be a weird
property. Just how would it, "reach out" to that which it represents?
But the magical ersatzer need not be moved by this. For one thing, to
suppose that selection is internal just is to suppose that there are indeed intrinsic
representational properties. So to object that we do not grasp the kind intrinsic
representational property is to object to the supposition that selection is internal on
grounds of unintelligibility right off the bat. This would equaUy be an objection
to any theory that assumes a primitive grasp of such a kind. The objection has
nothing specifically to do with selection. Indeed, a parallel objection would apply
to any theory that posits some form of intrinsic intentionality.
For another, to appeal to the intuitive "weirdness" of classifying
representational properties as intrinsic is implicitly to appeal to intuitions about
what sorts of properties intrinsic properties are. But much of the burden of
chapter three was to argue that appeals to our intuitions about the "nature" of
intrinsic properties are misguided.
A second reason to doubt that the ersatzer could have grasped f is as
follows. The collection of P's and the collection of Q's are both infinite. So there
are infinitely many possibilities for correlating them in a one-one manner; there
are infinitely many one-one functions from the P's to the Q's. Yet to have grasped
'selects' the ersatzer would have had to been able to pick out a specific one from
among this infinity of eligible candidates. And since we grasp so few of the Q's,
there is just no basis for doing so; there are just too many eligible candidates
indistinguishable to us from which to choose.
But this objection is inconclusive.
Ke^lv: A parallel situation obtains in the case of many other internal
relations. Although perhaps a little confusing, we can also think of duplication or
the same colour as relation as defined on the basis of a one-one correlation
function between infinite sets of intrinsic properties: x is a duplicate of y iff for all
intnnsic properties P, Px iff f(P)y; x is the same colour as y iff there is some colour
property C such that Cx and f(C)y. In each case there are an infinite number of
correlations, an infinite number of possible values for f. Yet we do manage to
pick out just one from among all the infinite correlations that exist if they do; we
do grasp these relations.
Objection: The reason that we grasp the duplication relation or the is the
same colour as relation is that the relevant function is simply the identity function.
And we already possess the means for referring to this. However, in the case of
selection, the correlation must be more complicated. For some of the P-properties
can be instantiated only by entities having proper parts e.g. the property of
having donkeys among its parts. But, as we already know, all the Q-properties
must be intrinsic properties capable of instantiation by abstract simples. So the
correlation cannot be identity. And nothing else springs to mind.
Reply : The problem of how we pick out a single correlation from among
all the eligible candidates, how 'selects' succeeds in referring, is really an instance
of a much more general epistemological problem. The vast majority of our
predicates, whether they are predicates expressing intrinsic properties, extrinsic
properties, internal relations, external relations or whatever raise parallel
epistemological worries. In different ways Wittgenstein, Goodman, Quine,
Kripke, Putnam^^ and others have pointed out that the information available to
us — whether information about verbal behaviour, dispositions, naturalistic facts,
mental facts — underdetermines the reference of our predicates. Indeed, this
underdetermination afflicts 'identity' quite as much as 'selects'. So the ersatzer
may concede that she lacks sufficient information to enable to pick out any one
correlation between the P's and Q's, f, from among the infinity of available
candidates that would exist if f does. But this is everybody's problem; it should
not be urged against in particular. And since we really do genuinely refer to
various properties and relations, this problem must have a solution. Whatever
this solution may be, the ersatzer can appeal to it to explain how f is picked out
and so how 'selects' is defined in a way that is graspable.
In fact, Lewis himself suggests that the only solution to these problems of
semantic underdetermination may be to assume that nature itself takes up the
slack: to refer just is to refer to the most natural of the candidates not eliminated
by all the information we do have, where which is the most natural candidate is a
mind- and language-independent fact about reality.
Perhaps then the best way for the magical ersatzer to reply to Lewis would
be to reject the idea that any way of correlating the intrinsic properties of the
actual world with the non-structure-entailing intrinsic representational
properties of the propositions is as good as any other. She might hold that one
way of correlating them is more natural than any other. Then a specification of
the denotation of 'selects' might run:
X selects y iff for every intrinsic property P, Px iff f(P)x, where f is the
most natural total one-one function from the set of intrinsic P-
properties to the set of non-structure-, (non-concreteness-)entailing
intrinsic Q-properties.
This appeal to naturalness to single out one from among a range of eligible
candidates for being the denotation of 'selection' is highly controversial, but at
the very least Lewis himself is in no position to reject it.
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I conclude that the case against ME classifying selection as internal has not
be established. Selection is a relation whose range consists entirely of causal
inaccessible propositions. The actual world bears this relation to an infinity of
propositions but fails to bear it to very many more. We could not have grasped a
predicate to express it, 'selects', by ostension or by listing its instances. But Lewis
has failed to establish that we could not have grasped it intensionally. For
'selects' may be specified intensionally as long as it is legitimate to claim to grasp
the kind intrinsic property capable of instantiation by abstract simples and it is
legitimate to appeal to the notion of the most natural correlation betw^een such
properties and intrinsic properties that the actual world might instantiate. In
particular, such a intensional condition could be framed in terms that do not
presuppose a grasp of a vast number of predicates for intrinsic representational
properties capable of instantiation by abstract simples. Indeed, such a condition
may merely involve quantityting over such properties, and so it need not
presuppose a grasp of any such predicates.
5.5 The Argument against Classifying Selection as External
There is no doubt however that it is very awkward for the magical ersatzer
to have to claim a grasp of the kind intrinsic representational properties capable of
instantiation by abstract simples, a grasp of the notion of intrinsic intentionality. So
let us turn next to consider the putative difficulty with supposing that selection is
external.
Lewis argues that classifying selection as an external relation would
introduce a new and "especially repugnant" type of primitive modality into the
theory. Indeed, he argues that such a relation w^ould simply be unintelligible or
magical and should be rejected.
This conclusion is supposed to be the consequence of two facts.
The first concerns the nature of the selection relation itself. .According to
ME, each proposition represents @ as having certain properties. Irrespective of
how representation is to be understood, to say that proposiHons represent @ as
being a certain way is to say at least that @ cmiMi, 'f have certain properties unless
It selects certain propositions and fails to select certain others; if @ has donkeys
among its parts, then it must select or make true certain propositions, if it has no
blue swans among its parts then it must fail to select or make false certain others,
and so on.
Notice in particular that some of these properties, e.g. the property of
having donkeys among its parts, are intrinsic. So to say that propositions are
representational is to say in part that if @ has certain intrinsic properties, it must
select or make true certain propositions, and if it lacks certain intrinsic properties,
then it must fail to select or makes false certain others. To deny this, would, van
Inwagen argues, amount to the supposition that @
...might have been just as it is and yet have borne selects to any set of
propositions whatsoever. But this is clearly absurd,...whether it holds
betw'een...[@]...and p is determined partly by the intrinsic features
of...[@].3t>
This feature of selection can be characterized most perspicuously in terms
of duplicates. Selection satisfies the following schema: for all y,
[M] If xRy, then for any possible duplicate of x, x*, x*Ry also.^^
Van Inwagen calls relations that satisfy [M] "range-internal" .^2 Jq express the
fact that selection satisfies [M], Lewis sometimes calls it a "modal" relation and
sometimes says that it "corresponds rigidly" to the intrinsic properties of its first
relatum.
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The second fact concerns the nature of external relations generally. Lewis
argues that it is of the nature of external relations quite generally to "var>'
independently of the intrinsic natures of their relata". This principle is, he says,
akin to our Humean principle of recombination which requires that
anything can coexist with anything, and which thereby prohibits a
necessary connection betu^een the intrinsic character of a thing and the
^ritrinsic characters of distinct things with which it coexists.
Later he adds that he
understand [s] these principles of independent variation in terms of
duplicate individuals in different possible worlds.^^
This strongly suggests that external relations all "vary independently of
the intrinsic natures of their relata" in the sense that they all satisfy the following
"Principle of Independent Variation":
[PIV] If there is a world at which xRy, then there is a single world at which there
exists both a duplicate of x and a duplicate of y but at which the duplicate
of x does not bear R to the duplicate of y.
It should be emphasized that here Lewis making a claim only about
natural external relations; it is only the external relations in the sparse sense of
'relation' that he thinks must satisfy [PIV] on pain of unintelligibility. Indeed,
[PrV] is clearly false of some external relations in the abundant sense of 'relation'.
Otherwise, satisfaction of [PIV] would have to follow from the definition of
'externality' alone, but it doesn't. In fact all that follows is that they satisfy the
following weak version of [PFV]:
lU’eak PIV] If there is a ^vorld at tvhich Kx_v, then there is u orld at hich
there exists a duplicate of x and there is some world at which there exists aduplicate of y and the duplicate of x does not bear R to the duplicate of y.
And satisfaction of [Weak PIV] does not entail satisfaction of [PIV]. For
satisfaction of [Weak PIV] by some relation R that x bears to y requires only that
it fails among possible duplicates of x and y, whereas satisfaction of [PIV] requires
that it fail among coexistent duplicates of x and y. And it may be, for instance, that
some relation never holds among entities at distinct worlds even though it never
fails among coexistent duplicates. Then it would satisfy [Weak PIV] but not
[PIV]; it would be an external relation that is not strongly independent of the
nature of its relata. Indeed, there is an obvious example of such a (non-natural)
external relation of this kind: coexistence! (And if MR were right in identifying
coexistence with spatiotemporal connectedness, spatiotemporal connectedness
would also be a counterexample.
Now the problem for ME is clear: it is logically impossible for any natural
relation to satisfy both [PFV] and [M]. So since selection must satisfy [M] (in order
to make sense of the idea that the ersatz worlds are representational), if the
ersatzer insists on classifying selection as external, then she is committed to the
existence of a quite unprecedented sort of external relation - one which does not
vary independently of the natures of its relata, one that violates [PFV']- And,
according to Lewis, this is just unacceptable — such a relation is simply
"unintelligible" or "magical":
It seems to be one fact that somewhere within @, a donkey talks; and an
entirely independent fact that @ enters into a certain external relation with
this proposition and not with that. What stops it from going the other
way?...What spell constrains it to correspond rigidly to the goings-on in
the concrete world?^^
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This argument perhaps has some initial appeal, but I ^vill argue that the
magical ersatzer need not be worried by it. For the second putative fact is not
really a fact at all: there is just no good reason to think that it really is of the
nature of external relations quite generally to satisfy [PFV'].
Why then does Lewis think there is?
I find Lewis s discussion here a little obscure, and I cannot be sure exactly
what he intends. However, I think three connected justifications can be discerned
in what he writes and it seems to be worth considering each regardless of which
best represents his views. The first consists in an invitation to generalize our
intuitions about the nature of spatiotemporal relations. Lewis points out first that
...we know of no external relations except the (strictly or analogically)
spatiotemporal ones. ..37
And spatiotemporal relations, he notes, intuitively could not fail to satisfy [PIV].
It is just unintelligible that there should be
a necessary connection between the intrinsic character of a thing and its
[spatiotemporal] relations to other things. It cannot be.. .that there is an
absolutely necessary connection...whereby every charged particle must be
exactly a certain distance from another particle. It’s one thing for a particle
to be charged, another thing for two particles to at a certain distance - the
common involvement of the same particle is not enough to make the
alleged connection intelligible...spatiotemporal arrangement may var\'
independently of the intrinsic nature of the things arranged .3^
But if spatiotemporal relations are the only natural external relations we
know of and these all satisfy [PIV] then.
Once we suppose that there are further external relations [than
spatiotemporal relations], for instance the one by which the concrete
I7<)
u-wld allegedly selects abstract simple propositions, then our prmdple ofindependence |i.e. the pnndple that all spatiotemporal relations satisfy
IPIV II needs to be generalised...|But this generalizahon is lustitied
'
because] No matter what novel external relations there may be, it remains
unintelligible that the intrinsic nature of a thing should constrain the
external relations in which it stands.^‘^
Thus, all natural external relations satisfy [PW].
This is an argument from analogy: all spatiotemporal relations satisfy
[PIV], these are the only (natural) external relations we know of, so, if we
suppose there are more, then they must be analogous to spatiotemporal relations
and so we must suppose that, like spatiotemporal relations, they too satisfy [PIV].
Arguments from analogy are notoriously difficult to assess. But this seems
particularly weak for two reasons.
First, Lewis is trying to establish a claim about natural external relations
quite generally, but he holds that we have only a single model of such relations -
spatiotemporal relations. And this is an extremely skimpy basis from which to
generalize to all external relations.
Second, notice that the second relatum of a putative external selection is an
abstract and probably necessarily existent entity, a proposition. But spatiotemporal
relations take only concrete contingent particulars as their relata. So if there were a
perfectly natural selection relation, it would clearly have to be a quite different
kind of relation from spatiotemporal relations. And this greatly diminishes the
force of the analogy.
The second connected sort of justification for holding that external
relations quite generally would have to satisfy [PIV] consists in an appeal to the
recombination principle. The recombination principle has two parts, the first of
which
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requires that anything can coexist with anything, and which thereby
prohibits a necessary connection between the intrinsic character of a thine
and the intrinsic character of distinct things with which it coexistsd«
The second, roughly, prohibits a necessary connection betw^een the intrinsic
character of a thing and the intrinsic character of distinct things with which it fiiils
to coexist; roughly, it guarantees that a duplicate of anything can coexist with a
duplicate of anything elseT^
The recombination principle is very plausible and no metaphysical theory
of modality can do without something like it. But the principle explicitly
concerns only two relations: the relations of coexisting with and the relation of
failing to coexist with. So neither part of the recombination principle itself
actually guarantees that external relations must satisfy [PIV] quite generally.
"Nevertheless" Lewis writes,
...I take it that we are dealing with something akin to our...principle of
recombination...We equally need a companion principle which prohibits a
necessary connection between the intrinsic character of a thing and its
external relations to other things.. .42
But the fact that selection relates concrete particulars to abstract, necessarily
existent entities rather than other concrete particulars also undermines this appeal
to generalize the recombination principle. For it seems that we do not equally
need such a companion principle to cover relations that take necessary entities
among their relata. Any metaphysical theory, like ]VIR or ME, that adopts a
quantification theory of modality "needs" some form of recombination principle
in order to guarantee a plenitude of worlds. And the plenitude is needed in order
to do justice to the pre-theoretical data of modality. But the data in question
consist only of intuitions concerning distinct concrete, contingent particulars.
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Roughly, any such particulars could exist or fail to coexist with any other. But the
range of the selection relation consists entirely of abstract, necessanly existent
entiHes
- propositions. And we just have no corresponding intuitions about the
recombination of entities that are either abstract or necessarily existent. So there is
no need for a theory to incorporate a principle to express them. If an entity exists
necessarily, then there is no sense in which it can fail to coexist \vith anything. At
best the recombination principle requires generalizing to cover only external
relations among concrete contingent particulars.
Like the appeal to analogy to with spatiotemporal relations, the appeal to
the recombination principle cannot be taken to establish that a relation like
selection that takes abstract and probably necessarily existent relata would have
to satisfy [PFV'] on pain of unintelligibility.
But perhaps we can also discern a third sort of justification in what Lewis
writes. Often he seems to be making a straightforw'ard appeal to our intuitions
about the nature of external relations:
What makes a relation external, I would have thought, exactly is that it
holds independently of the natures of the hvo relata.^^
No matter what novel external relations there may be, it remains
unintelligible that the intrinsic nature of a thing should constrain the
external relations in which it stands.*^
I ask: how can these connections be necessary? It seems to be one fact that
somewhere within @, a donkey talks; and an entirely independent fact that
@ enters into a certain external relation with this proposition and not udth
that. What stops it from going the other way?^^
Perhaps then, even if parallels with spatiotemporal relations and intuitions
about recombination are rejected, it is still just plain unintelligible that an
external relation should fail to satisfy [PR1.
One way to respond to this would be to dismiss it as rhetorical. I have
argued that the claim that all external relations satisfy [PFV^] does not follo\v from
the definition of 'externality' and so that it is false if 'relation' is taken in the
abundant sense. Now, if Lewis is right that spatiotemporal relations really are the
only natural external relations we know of, then it is hard to see how this appeal
to bare intuitions could be anything but a mere rhetorical flourish to the
argument from analogy. For what other source for intuitions about the nature of
external relations could there possibly be than meditation on the "nature" of
spatiotemporal relations (if spatiotemporal relations have a nature)
A second way to respond would be to argue that in trying to envisage a
natural external selection relation we should be guided not by our intuitions
about the nature of spatiotemporal relations but by our intuitions about external
relations that take abstract, non-contingent entities among their relata. These are
not as natural as we are supposing selection to be and perhaps not as natural as
our typical spatiotemporal relations. But, unlike spatiotemporal relations, at least
they take the same type of relata as the putative external selection relation.
However, it is far from clear that these do satisfy [PFV]. Suppose that some stick s
is exactly one meter in length. Now consider the has a length in meters 0/ relation.
The stick bears this relation to the number one. Like selection and spatiotemporal
relations, this relation takes as its first relatum a contingent concrete entity. And,
also like selection and spatiotemporal relations, this seems to be an external
relation. For whether or not x bears the has a length in meters o/relation to some
number n has nothing to do with the intrinsic properties of the number n
(whatever they might be).'^^ like selection but unlike spatiotemporal
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relations, this relation takes as its second relatum a non-contingent abstract
entity. But it fails to satisf\' [PW]. Like selection this relation "corresponds
rigidly" to the intnnsic properties of its first relatum: any duplicate of s at any
world whatsoever must also bear the relation to the number one. For the length
of a thing is one of its intrinsic properties and so does not var>' among duplicates.
In conclusion then, neither appeals to the analogy with spatiotemporal
relations, nor appeals to something "akin" to the recombination principle, nor
even appeals to bare intuitions about external relations establish that they would
have to satisfy [PIV]. This is principally because selection is a relation between
concrete particulars and abstract, necessarily existent entities. So it is of a quite
different kind from spatiotemporal relations and there just are no corresponding
recombinatorial intuitions to justify extending the recombination principle. Lewis
has failed to make his case that it is unintelligible how an external relation could
fail to satisfy [PIV].
In fact, if there is a mystery here, it seems to be a quite general one having
to do with the nature of abstract entities and their relations to concrete
particulars. Every plausible metaphysical theory of modality posits the existence
of some abstract entities, e.g. sets, universals, propositions etc., together with a
relation that concrete particulars bear to these entities e.g. membership,
instantiation, selection etc. And in all cases this relation is differential: some but
not all concrete particulars bear the relation to a given abstract entity. But all
these relations are modal in some sense or other; they all violate some initially
plausible form of recombination. If x is a member of y, then this is necessarily so;
sets have their members essentially. And if x instantiates universal U, then so
must any duplicate of x; universals correspond to perfectly natural intrinsic
properties. When abstract entities are involved it is just not the case that
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"anything can coexist with or fail to coexist with anything else." .And as van
Inwagen points out^, this even poses a problem for Lewis himself. For he can
hardly reject the intelligibility of membership on pain of rejecting both MR and
classical mathematics as unintelligible. Lewis replies that the necessity involved
membership is not quite the same as that involved in selection or instantiation:
membership "corresponds rigidly" to the identities of its relata, whereas selection
and instantiation "correspond rigidly" to the qualitative natures of their relata.
But, as Lewis concedes, this type of necessary connection seems to be scarcely
less mysterious.49
Nor, of course, is there much prospect of gaining a better understanding of
abstract entities and their relations to concrete particulars by supposing these
relations to be internal. For then the differential membership of concrete
particulars in sets, or their differential instantiation of universals, would have to
be in part a matter of the intrinsic properties of the sets or the universals. But
how could the relations depend on that? For one thing, no-one seems to have any
idea what the intrinsic properties of abstract entities really are (Plato's Forms are
self-predicating but Moore denounced such a view as absurd).^^^ For another
thing, it is hard to see how abstract (or any other) entities really could be
intrinsically intentional in the required way. Finally, if Lewis is right and some of
these abstract entities are simple — and most philosophers who believe in abstract
entities believe that some are simple^^ — these relations would be unnameable.
To summarize: Lewis has failed to give us a compelling reason to think an
external relation that violates [PIV] would be magical. Moreover, the existence of
external relations that violate [PFV] is not unprecedented - the has a length in
meters 0/relation may be an example. Indeed, such relations may well be quite
common if one relatum is concrete and the other abstract. Finally, if there is really
IS a mysten- here, it is eveiyone's mysterj-. Similar difficulties seem to beset any
metaphysical theory that posits abstract entities differenhally related to concrete
particulars, even Lewis's own modal realism. So the problem cannot legitimately
be wielded against ME in particular.
Since both horns of Lewis's dilemma are inconclusive, he has failed to
establish a compelling case for rejecting ME on grounds of unintelligibility
whichever way it classifies its primitive relation of selection.
1 See chapter two for details.
^ Indeed there are some interesting and prima facie plausible arguments to the effect that
such an analysis is compulsory; there is no adequate altemahve to explaining the effect of
modalization other than as altering the domains of the quantifiers in some way. For a
discussion of these arguments and some possible responses see P. Bricker, "Quantified Modal
Logic and the Plural De Re", in MtdWest Studies in Philosophy XIV: Contemporary Perspectives in
the Philosophy ofLmgua^e II, Peter A. French, Theodore Uehling, Howard K. Wettstein (eds.),
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), pp. 372-94; C. Parsons, "Sets
and Modality", in his Mathematics in Philosophy, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp.
298-341; A.P. Hazen, "Against Pluralism", in Australasian journal of Philosophy, vol. 71 No. 2
(1993), pp. 132-44; and others.
^ D. K. Lewis, Plurality p. 137. Lewis adds that "not only the entire concrete world, but lesser
concrete individuals as well, have abstract representations: these are ersatz individuals.." But,
as stipulated in chapter one, 1 am ignoring the part of metaphysical theories of modality that
has to do with possibilities for individuals where this is distinct from possibilities that have to
do with entire worlds.
'^See Plurality 3.2 Linguistic Ersatzism pp. 142-165 and Pluraliti/ 3.3 Pictorial Ersatzism pp. 163-
174.
5 Here of course 'the actual world' is not to be construed as a rigid designator.
^ The definition of 'selection' would run roughly as follows: For any property F and
proposition p, the actual world selects or makes-true p =df. p represents that the actual world is
F, where p is the (unique) element necessarily selected iff the actual world really is F.
^Plurality, p. 175. This quote is actually a little misleading. For MB's denial that the elements
are concrete does not clearly rule out either MR or the other forms of ersatzism. For, as 1
mentioned above, in saying that its elements are abstract all that the magical ersatzer is
committing himself to is their causal inertness. And all the other theories also agree that
worlds are causally inert or at least causally isolated. It is the magical ersatzer's denial that
her elements have any structure that rules out these other interpretations. Indeed, even this
may overstate the case. For MB's maximal elements -- its worlds — correspond to MR's unit
sets of worlds. And then if we interpret 'selection' to mean 'membership', then MR is ruled
out as an instance of MB only because MB calls 'worlds', what MR would call 'unit-sets of
worlds'. So the reader should consider whether when the adjustments are made for this
difference, Lewis's objection to magical ersatzer can be recast as an argument against his own
MR!
^ Lewis objects to this usage:
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It vvou d be wrong tor the ersatzer to say m general that abstract representat.ons areto be caUed worlds, unless they say ,t even when there ,s a concrete claimant to the
narne...\ot a good position tor the would-be triends of common sense! {Plnml.h/ p
ut of course the ersatzer is not m the business of quibbling about names; for her 'world' is aterm of art that refers to whatever it is that is implicitly quantified over in modal discourseShe IS certainly not denying that @ exists. Nor need she deny that it deserves to be called a'world
; she could easily accept some sort of terminological revision to her theory to
accommodate this. However, she is denying the modal realist's claim that @ is one of the
entities implicitly quant^ied over m ordinary modal discourse and she is denying the modal
eahst's claim that in order to analyze modalization we need to suppose that there is morethan one maximal fusion of spatiotemporally interconnected particulars. She also holds that
what pts quantified over m modal talk are actual entities, albeit abstract ones, a thesis the
modal realist denies. Such differences with the modal realist presumably need to be marked
termmologically somehow, common sense notwithstanding.
^ This definition is justified by the mereological axioms set out in chapter two. For as Lewis
points out these axioms justify us in talking of "the fusion oP', and relying on it to be a
unctor defined for any plural argument whatsoever. See D. K. Lewis, Parts of Classes p 74
Pluralih/, p. ]82.
' r
’1 In what follows I will consider only binary relations. This simplifies the discussion and
since selection is clearly a binary relation this is all that is needed.
The parenthetical remark is required to avoid conflating the distinct possibilities aRb andbRa when the relation is asymmetrical.
^ The reticence about charges is due to the fact that charges may be relational rather than
intrinsic properties. For more on this issue see chapter four above.
Again I should note that if duplication thus defined is to hold among complexes as well as
simples, it needs to be assumed that some structural properties are perfectly natural
Here clause (b) is required to guarantee that the account gets the order of the relata right so
as to cover asymmetric relations (cf. fn. 12).
Plnralitif, p. 176.
l^P/z/m/ih/, p. 177.
Plnralih/, p. 178.
M. jubien, "Could this be Magic?", Philosophical Revieiu, 100 (1991), pp. 249-67.
M. Jubien, "Could this be Magic?", pp. 254-5.
M. jubien, "Could this be Magic?", pp. 254-5.
Jubien recognizes this point but dismisses it:
What is true of solubility and burning ought to be true of selection as well. TTiere is
indeed a fundamental difference between the former relations and selection. It is that
we are necessarily isolated from the intrinsic features of propositions, whereas we are
not so isolated from those of material things. But if we agree that grasping can take
place without a knowledge of these intrinsic features, then this difference, though
fundamental, is inessential. ("Could this be Magic?", p. 255) [Jubien calls selection
"makes-true", but 1 have restored Lewis's original term.|
Surely the reply is that a knowledge of these features is essential unless we have
knowledge of their outward manifestations. This we have in the case of Jubien's propensity to
be burned by relation, but not in the case of the selection relation.
Here is an argument to show that there are at least two-to-the-continuum-many worlds.
There are continuum-many space-time points at the actual world. Each may be occupied by
some matter or be vacant. And whether or not any point is occupied or vacant is logically
independent of whether any other point is occupied or vacant. So any pattern of occupancy
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cyid xacancv is a way that the world might have been and so is a wav some world is Thereare two-the-contmuum-many such patterns and so at least that many worldsThere are enough mathematical properties of course. And it seems that we can legitimatelyaim to grasp them, and that they are capable of instantiation by abstract entities But it is
'
unclear whether these properties are capable of instantiation by simples. Perhaps these are allproperties of sets and (many) sets have internal structure ^
'
1978^1.6.""'"' Clarendon Press,
2^
But even to claim that we grasp this kind is problematic. It ,s far from clear that they wouldcoun as (sparse) determinables in the sense explained in chapter three. However since it is a
?7 pi
^ postpone consideration of it.
l-’lurality, p.\7S.
Philosophical Investigations, (Oxford, New York: Basil Blackwell
953), N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Fourth Edition, ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Ln.vers.ty l^ress 1^983) esp. chapter 4; W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object, (Cambridge, MA:
IT Pre'ss 1960), S. A. Knpke,Wiri^eiisf(’m on Rides and Private Language, (Cambridge MA-Harvard University Press, 1982); H. Putnam, “Models and Reality", repnnted in his Realism
and Reason, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 1-25.
"Potnam's Paradox", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 62 (1984) pp.221-36. ' '
P. van Inwagen, 'Two concepts of Possible Worlds", in MidWest Studies in Philosophy XI
Studies in Essentiahsm, Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehlingjr. and Howard K. Wettstein
(eds.) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 185-213. The quote is from p70A ^ T
It might be wondered whether this condition is trivially sahsfied by selection: does ME not
hold that that there is just one concrete world, @, and that @ has no duplicates? It is correct
that there is a single concrete world @ according to ME. And that there is a single world that
represents things exactly as they are, p*, one actualized world. But ME also aims to analyze
Iterated modalities and the modality involved in restricted quantification. Eor, as I pointed
out in 2.2.2 one of the great advantages of an analysis of modality in terms of quantification
over worlds is that it subsumes a great many apparently disparate idioms, e.g. ethical
contexts, scientific contexts by treating them as involving restricted quantification over
worlds. And restricted quantification and contexts involving iterated modalities must be
understood as involving implicit reference to the actual world. And that is why sense must be
made of worlds representing duplicates of the actual world.
^2 p. van Inwagen, 'Two concepts of Possible Worlds".
Plurality, p. 181.
Plurality, p. 181.
^^This discussion does however bring out an odd feature of Lewis's use of 'naturalness'. He
uses in two ways corresponding to the two traditional roles that properties (and relations) are
called on to play ~ a semantic role and a metaphysical role. On the one hand, Lewis suggests
that if the denotation of a predicate cannot be fixed by listing the instances of the property or
relation it expresses, then that property or relation must have a certain degree of naturalness.
Otherwise, it just would not be nameable at all (see e.g. D. K. Lewis, "Putnam's Paradox"). By
this criterion, coexistence and spatiotemporal connectedness cannot be completely non-
natural. For we have predicates for them. (It may be objected that we have a predicate of
coexistence because it is defined in terms of parthood (and spatiotemporal connectedness).
But the same objection applies to parthood: we can name it, even though its instances are as
miscellaneous as can be.) On the other hand, the naturalness of a property or relation is
supposed to be a measure how objectively similar its instances are. By this criterion,
coexistence and spatiotemporal connectedness are non-natural. For the recombination
S
rinciple guarantees that their instances are about as miscellaneous as can be.
’ Plurality, p. 180.
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P/ p. 181 Here he means that there are no mtnral external relations other than theseThis eaves open the possibility that the argument might be circumvented by classifying
'
selecbon as external but non-natural. But this is not a promising line to take: Below we willonsider an arg^ument against the supposition that selection could be an internal relationewis argues that in that case it is only by magic that 'selects' could be our word for such arelation, it would be entirely out of reach of our thought and language". 1 will suggest that
seller V ^ argument, but only if we can appeal to the naturalness ofection. Since this argument would also seem to go through even if the relation were
external we had better allow that selection is a natural relation. For if it is not, then ME fallsto Lewis s objection that we could not grasp it.
Pliiralitif, p. 181.
Plurality, p. 180.
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Moreover, the principle is not quite right as it stands. For x and y may be duplicates. Andthen at any world at which x exists, so does a duplicate of y. But this problem arises onlybecause coexistence is reflexive yet clearly Lewis has in mind relations among distinct
entities. And if we restrict the principle to distinct entities, it seems correct. If x is distinct
f^rom y, even if they are duplicates, then a duplicate of x may fail to coexist with any distinct
duplicate of y. ^
abovIT^'^'
because we are ignoring the "size and shape permitting" proviso (see chapter two
Plurality, p. 181.
Plurality, p. 180.
Plurality, p. 181.
Plurality, p. 180.
Moreover, Lewis does say that if selection is external, we may as well suppose that the
elements ''lack any intrinsic nature". Many might doubt that the notion of something lacking
in any intrinsic nature really makes sense. Though, as Lewis points out, perhaps the
spatiotemporal relations provide us with a precedent. But this supposition only seems to
strengthen the case for saying that Lewis's appeals to intuitions about the unintelligibility of
an external selection relation derive any force they have from analogy with spatiotemporal
relations.
For if it were internal, an adaptation of Lewis's argument would commit him to holding
that it is unnameable, which it clearly is not.
P. van Inwagen, 'Two Concepts of Possible Worlds", pp. 207ff.
See his Parts ofClasses, 2.2.
30 See e.g. Plato, Parmenides, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, E. Hamilton and H. Cairns
(eds.), (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), especially Part 1, and G. E. Moore,
Pnncipia Etliica, (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988), p. 7ff.
Lewis thinks that singletons are simple (see Parts of Classes, chapter two).
CHAPTER SIX
MATHEMATICAL ERSATZISM
The final metaphysical theory to be examined in this dissertation, what I
wQl call mathematical" ersatzism, also endorses the quantificational account of
the modal statuses of propositions: where p is anv proposition,
(Al) Possibly p iff there is some world at which p is true.
But it aims to define or logically construct all the notions and entities involved in
this analysis
- propositions, worlds and the true-at relation - using only the
resources of impure set-theory. And it aims to do so in such a wav that given the
analyses and logical constructions, all the data of modality are seen to be logical
consequences of the axioms of impure set-theory alone.i In short, it aims to reduce
modality to impure set theory, in much the same sense that Russell showed how
to reduce mathematics to pure set theory.
^
In section 6.1.1 a naive version of mathematical ersatzism - "NT" - is
presented. NT is very crude: many of its faults are glaringly obvious and no
author has or would have seriously endorsed it. Nevertheless, focusing on it
permits a clear view of the advantages and disadvantages of NT's guiding
philosophical ideas. Some of these advantages are discussed in section 6.1.2, and
three of the more important disadvantages are discussed in sections 6.3, 6.4 and
6.5. In the final section, 6.6, a version of mathematical ersatzism that incorporates
Structural Nominalism is taken up. Achieving a complete and satisfactory
reduction of modality to impure set-theory is a very tall order and this version
still falls considerably short. It does however point to a promising direction in
which the mathematical ersatz project might be pursued.
6.1 A Naive Mathemarical Ersatz Theoryf NT
6.1.1 Definitions, Analyses, Logical Constructions
Consider first our positive modal intuitions, those that tell us that logical
space comprehends a plenitude of possibilities. In 1.3 I suggested, following
Lewis, that a first step in characterizing these intuitions consists in thinking of the
actual world as articulated in a certain way. Specifically, it is to be thought of as
consisting of four elements: a stock of individuals or point-instants, a system of
external relations among them, a stock of perfectly natural properties, and an
instantiation relation that determines how the intrinsic properties are distributed
among the individuals. All else supervenes on this.
Roughly, the instantiation relation determines how the various elements
that constitute the actual world — its framework, its individuals, and its
properties - are "combined" to determine all the facts about it. Intuitively,
however, the way these elements are actually combined is just one way among
many. Actually my car is red and my computer grey, but an alternative
combination of the very same elements would have my car instantiating greyness
and my computer redness. And intuitively the plenitude of logical space requires
that it comprehend all such alternative combinations.
NT aims to characterize these intuitions set-theoretically. The first step is
to define the notion of a 'combination' or 'possible fact':
(Dl) X is a combination or a possible fact =df. x is an (n-t-l)-tuple of an n-place
relation followed by n individuals (a property is taken to be a one-place
relation).
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Possible facts can be thought of as encoding or "representing" how individuals
are combined with properties and relations:
(D2) Possible fact f represents that xi,...,Xn instantiate R =df. f is <R, xi,...,Xn>.
For instance, the possible fact <redness, my car> may be taken to represent that
my car is red, and <redness, my computer> may be taken to represent that my
computer is red. The former happens to represent things as they actually are; the
latter only as they might be.
All quantificational accounts of modality appeal to the notion of a possible
world. If such theories are to get the facts of modality right, many possible facts
will have to be true at a given world, so worlds are identified not with individual
possible facts, but with collections of them:
(D3) X is a world =df. x is a class of possible facts.
A characteristic feature of ersatzism is that it takes worlds themselves to be
representational entities. So NT just takes a world to represent all and only those
possible facts that it contains:
(D4) A world w represents that so-and-so =df. there is a possible fact f that
represents that so-and-so and f is a member of w.
To relate this account of worlds and what they represent to its analysis of
modality, (Al), NT follows MR in identifying propositions with classes of worlds
and the truth-at relation with membership:
(LCl) X is a proposition iff x is a class of worlds.^
(D5) A proposition p is true at a world w =df. w is a member of p.^
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As it stands, this version of mathematical ersatzer is still silent on the
cruaal question of the nature of properties and relations. In order to stay within
the bounds of impure set theor>', XT simply adopts MR's set-theoretical
constructions of properties and relations:^
(LC2a) F is a property in the abundant sense of 'property' iff F is a class
of individuals.
(LC2s) F is a property in the sparse sense of 'property' iff F is a class of
individuals and F is perfectly natural.
R is an n-place relation in the abundant sense of 'relation' iff R is
a class of n-tuples of individuals.
R is an n-place relation in the sparse sense of 'relation' iff R is a
class of n-tuples of individuals and R is perfectly natural.
This completes NT.^ As I mentioned above it is a very crude theory.
Nevertheless, it has a number of significant advantages over modal realism. And
before considering its flaws, it is instructive briefly to consider these advantages.
6.1.2 Some Advantages of NT over MR
Modal realism identifies its worlds with maximal spatiotemporally
interconnected fusions of concrete particulars. And to guarantee the adequacy of
(Al), MR posits the non-actual existence of a vast plurality of such particulars:
one for each way that, intuitively, the actual world might have been. But the
existence of such a vast plurality does not follow from any principles to which we
are already committed e.g. the axioms of set-theory, mereology or principles
about the existence of ordinary concrete particulars. MR requires additional
existential commitments. And many think these additional commitments wildly
implausible. Furthermore, by identifying worlds with maxmal spatiotemporally
interconnected fusions of concrete particulars, MR thereby incurs an implausible
a priori commitment to the impossibility of "island universes", worlds whose
(LC3a)
(LC3s)
193
spatiotemporal structure is spatiotemporally disconnected. For no fusion of
concrete particulars having such a structure is maximal.^
By contrast, x\T identifies its worlds with sets of a certain kind. Since these
sets are not deftned by reference to spatiotemporal connectedness, there is just no
prima facie reason to think that NT will entah the impossibility of island
universes.
Prima facie, NT is now also more economical than MR. NT and MR are
both committed to the axioms of impure set-theory, mereology and to the
existence of actual concrete particulars. But the axioms of impure set theory
already guarantee a plenitude of sets. So to guarantee that its worlds constitute a
plenitude NT, unlike MR, needs no additional existential axioms. And, of course,
NT thereby avoids precisely those of MR's existential commitments that
provoked so many incredulous stares: a commitment to countless infinities of
people just like you and me, cities of cheese and purple cows. In Lewis's words,
NT's existential commitments are "safe and sane".
xA third advantage of NT is that it seems to explain the positive data of
modality better than MR. If a metaphysical theory is genuinely to explain the
positive data of modality, this data should follow from the theory. In particular,
if modality is to be understood in terms of quantification over worlds, it is not
enough simply that for every way that the actual world might have been, there
exists a world that is that way; the theory should entail the existence of aU these
worlds. For the modal realist this requires framing additional axioms to those of
set-theory and mereology. Thus, according to MR would have to regard modal
reasoning as constituting an additional and autonomous subject-matter.^
Moreover, it is hard to see how the modal realist could even manage to frame
such axioms without appeal to modal notions. But even if she could, they would
have to assert the existence of causally isolated, mind-independent, concrete
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particulars. And it is hard to see how we came to know them, especially how ^ve
could have come to know them a priori. MR would render the origin of modal
knowledge mysterious.*^
By contrast, since NT identifies worlds with impure sets, it can claim to
have genuinely explained this data. For given the analyses and logical
constructions, the axioms of impure set theory alone then entail the plurality of
worlds required for the analysis of modality. And modal reasoning is thereby
reduced to axioms to which we already have a pre-theoretical commitment; it is
no longer autonomous in its subject-matter. Moreover, any problems about
explaining the origin of our modal knowledge or its a priori status are then
reduced to the problems of explaining the origin and a priori status of the axioms
of impure set-theory. And although this too is problematic, that we know these
axioms (indeed that we know them a priori) is not in dispute. How the origin and
a priori status of the theorems of impure set-theory are to be explained is
everyone's problem, including of course the modal realist's.
Unfortunately, despite NT's immense theoretical economy and its
epistemological attractiveness it simply fails to get the facts of modality right.
6.2 The Problem of Accidentally Coextensive Properties
Since NT identifies properhes and relations with sets of their actual
instances, it entails the identity of any prop>erties or relations that are actually
coextensive. Hence it is susceptible to the famous problem of accidentally
coextensive properties. It entails for instance that the properties of having a heart
and having kidneys are one and the same property, and so that there are no
worlds where something has a heart but lacks kidneys or vice versa. Since,
however, these are genuine possibilities, (Al) as understood by NT is false: there
are some genuine possibilities which are not represented by any of its worlds.
To reject the set-theoretical axiom of extensionality and still use set-talk is
specious; this axiom is the defining characteristic of sets. And no form of
ersatzism worthy of the name can accept the existence of non-actual entities. Nor,
given NT's actualism, can properties be identified with mereological fusions as
that would still entail the identity of accidentally coextensive properties. For, like
sets, fusions are identical whenever constituted by the same entities (this is what
the mereological axiom of the uniqueness of composition saysj.^o It seems then
that the only real option for amending NT to deal vvdth the problem of
coextensive properties is to reject the identification of properties with sets of their
instances.
Consequently, most philosophers who have discussed forms of
mathematical ersatzism seem to have despaired of trying to provide logical
constructions of properties on the basis of set-theory and mereology alone. They
have simply assumed an additional ontological category of properties over and
above those of particulars and sets.^i And although these philosophers disagree
on exactly what properties are hke - some take them to be Forms, others tropes,
still others universals of various varieties - all agree that for the purposes of
mathematical ersatzism, properties are taken to be sui generis entities, not
reducible to sets or sums.
This, however, is not an attractive line to take.
For one thing, the ontology-cum-ideology of mathematical ersatzism
would then be less parsimonious than that of modal realism. The ontology would
have to be expanded to include an additional category of properties and
relations. And since instantiation can no longer be identified with membership.
1%
the ideology may also need to be expanded to include some additional primitive
relation that entities bear to properties.'^
For another, any claim to a pre- theoretical grasp of these new elements is
clearly more questionable than a claim to grasp the old elements - witness the
long history of dispute over the nature of properties and instantiation and the
number of widely divergent accounts proposed in the current literature.
In short, if NT abandons the attempt to set-theoretically construct
properties and relations in terms of actual particulars in response to the problem
of accidentally coextensive properties, it is no longer clearly preferable to MR.
6.3 The Problem of Implicit Representation
All of NT's possible facts are ordered (n+l)-tuples of a n-place relation
followed by n concrete particulars. They are all atomic in form. So none represents
any "molecular" facts. These include "existential" facts such as the fact that there
are flying pigs, "conjunctive" facts such as the fact that my computer and my car
are red, "negative" facts such as the fact that my car is not red, and so on. Notice
also that the possible facts concern only concrete particulars and the relations and
properties they instantiate. So none represents any facts about abstract entities.
These include mathematical facts (e.g. that 2 + 2 =4) and certain metaphysical
facts (e.g. that the worlds of NT itself constitute a plenitude, that no two
determinates of a determinable may be coinstantiated, and so on).
Now, since NT's worlds represent only those possible facts it contains,
and, by (Al), something is possible only if represented by some world, NT
incorrectly entails that all these molecular, mathematical and metaphysical facts
are impossible. (Either that or it must renounce the attempt to explain the modal
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statuses oiall propositions. But then it fails to match to the theoretical po\ver of
MR.)
Lewis suggests two strategies for amending NT in response to this
difficulty.
6.3.1 Strategy 1: Redefining 'Representation'
Intuitively, if my car were red, then it would also have to be that
something is red, it would have to be that my car is red or blue, and so on. So, in
a sense, any world that represents that my car is red, already thereby implicitly
represents the "molecular" facts that something is red etc. And this is the case
quite generally: since, intuitively, the molecular facts aU supervene on the atomic
facts, worlds that represent the atomic facts, thereby implicitly represent the
corresponding molecular facts. Moreover, since the mathematical and
metaphysical truths are true come what may, we may stipulate that they are
implicitly represented by any facts whatsoever.
The first strategy exploits this insight. First, distinguish what a world
explicitly represents from what it thereby implicitly represents:
(D6) A world w explicitly represents that so-and-so =df. there is a possible
fact f that represents that so-and-so and f is a member of w.
(D7) A world w implicitly represents that so-and-so =df. there is a possible
fact f that w explicitly represents and f implies that so-and-so.
Then, simply redefine 'representation' to cover implicit as well as explicit
representation:
(D4') A world w represents that so-and-so =df. either w explicitly represents
that so-and-so or w implicitly represents that so-and-so.
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\\ ith this amendment in place, XT's worlds now represent the
troublesome molecular, mathematical and metaphysical facts. Since some world
explicitly represents that my car is red, it also implicitly represents whatever this
implies — that something is red, that my car is either blue or red, and so on. And
since, intuitively, the mathematical and metaphysical truths are implied by any
fact whatsoever, these are represented by every world.
But, Lewis argues, this strategy cannot succeed. For the above definition of
'implicit representation' appeals to the relation of implication. And prima fade
this is a fnodal notion; to say that my car' s being red implies that something is red
is to say that my car couldn't be red unless something is red; to say that anything
implies that 2 + 2 = 4 is to say that it coiddn't but be that 2 + 2 = 4. And if
implication is a modal notion, then so, implidtly, are those notions defined in
terms of it: implidt representation, representation, true-at and so, ultimately,
(Al). With 'representation' thus redefined, NT fails to account for modality in
entirely non-modal terms, it fails to provide a reductive analysis.
6.3.2 Strategy 2: Redefining 'Possible FacF
The notion of representation employed by NT as originally formulated, is
not a modal notion; it is simply the membership relation of set-theory. So rather
than tinkering with it and invoking the implicitly modal notion of implidt
representation, Lewis suggests that NT might attempt instead to expand the
notion of a possible fact. The idea is to redefine 'possible facF so as to include all
facts of the form <R, Xn> where the xi,..., Xn's and the R's are abstract
entities and their relations; all pairs of an existential quantifier and a property,
<3, F>; all tuples of an n-place sentence hmctor and n-facts, < &, <F, xi>, <F',
X2», <not, <F, XI», etc.^3 Thus redefined, possible facts will indude what are
intuitively nil the possible facts - molecular as well as atomic facts, and facts
about abstract entities as well as facts about concrete entities. Now, since worlds
are sets of possible facts and they represent all those facts that they contain, these
molecular and abstract facts will also be represented by various worlds. Thus,
implicit representation is avoided without having to deny that it is possible that
something be red, that my car be red or blue, or that it is possible that 2 + 2 = 4. In
effect, all representation is explicit.
There are a number of different ways in which such a redefinition might
be carried out and different approaches encounter different technical
difficulties. 14 g^t Lewis again argues that this entire strategy is doomed.i^
First, some worlds will now contain tooJmv facts.
Intuitively, it is not possible that my car be red unless it is also the case
that it is either red or green, something is red, and so on. And it is not possible
that my car be either red or green unless it is also the case that it is red or it is the
case that it is green; it is not possible that something be red unless it is also the
case that either my car is red, or my computer is red, or the Empire State Building
is red, or...Roughly, a world should contain certain atomic facts only if it contains
also the molecular facts that supervene on them; and if it contains certain
molecular facts it should also contain some of the atomic facts on which they
supervene. But cmi/ set of possible facts whatsoever qualifies as a world. In
particular, there is nothing in the definition of a 'world' to guarantee that a world
will contain an atomic fact e.g. <redness, my car> only if it also contains those
molecular facts that supervene on it e.g. <3, redness>. So some will contain
molecular facts e.g. «redness, my car>, or, <greenness, my car» without the
requisite atomic facts — either <redness, my car> or <greenness, my car>. Nor is
there anything in the definition to guarantee that any world contains the
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mathematical and metaphysical facts. So some worlds will not contain some of
them. But mathematical and metaphysical truths are necessarily true and so they
should be true at all worlds. In short, this strategy fails to respect the very facts
about supervenience that motivated the first strategy.
Moreover, Lewis even argues that some of the metaphysical truths - the
truths about the worlds themselves and what they represent
- just could not be
explicitly represented. So the problems of implicit representation cannot be
avoided entirely. Consider for instance any world E of NT.
...E represents that the concrete world is as E says it is, and not as any
other ersatz world says it is; and thereby E implicitly represents that it
alone succeeds in correctly representing the concrete world, therefore, that
it alone is actualised. This is a special case, because here it seems that the
representation almost has to be implicit. How could an ersatz world
explicitly represent its own success and the others' failures? It would have
to explicitly represent the concrete world, and itself correctly representing
the concrete world and countless other ersatz worlds incorrectly
representing the concrete world. But each ersatz world thus represented
must itself represent, inter alia, all of the ersatz worlds. It is as if we had a
library, and every book in the library describes fully - say, by unabridged
direct quotation -- every book in the library.
Second, again because NT's world are identified with any set of possible
facts whatsoever, some will now also contain too many facts. If NT is to get the
facts of modality right, it should entail that logical, mathematical and
metaphysical truths are necessarily true. So they should be true at every world of
NT. But (<or, <A, B>} qualifies as a world. So NT entails the existence of a world
at which a disjunction is true even though none of its disjimcts is. Thus, not all
logical truths are true at every one of NT's worlds. {<=, <+, 2, 2>, 5>} also
qualifies as a world even though it is a mathematical truth that 2 + 2 5. So NT
also fails to guarantee that mathematical truths are true at all worlds. And
{<redness, a>, <blueness, a>} and {<Redness, a>, <redness, b>, <blueness, a + b>|
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also qualih- as worlds even though it is a metaphysical truth that nothing can
instantiate two determinates of the same determinable, and it is a metaphysical
truth that the colour of a complex particular supervenes on the colour of its parts.
Thus NT fails to guarantee that metaphysical truths are true at all worlds.
In short, this strategy fails because, thus amended, there are now worlds
which represent too few facts and worlds which represent too many facts. And
each of these represents a way that, intuitively, the actual world could not have
been; its worlds are thus, in some broad sense of the term, inconsistent. Nor will it
help to supplement this strategy by also redefining 'world' to require that worlds
be consistent. For clearly consistency, like implication, is also a modal notion: a
world is consistent iff it represents only what is possible.
In summary, the problem of implicit represent is this. If NT is to explain
the modal statuses of all propositions, its worlds must represent more than they
do. They must represent molecular as well as atomic facts, and they must
represent all the necessary truths — logical truths, mathematical truths and
metaphysical truths. But the mathematical ersatzer is faced with a dilemma: if
she attempts to expand what her worlds represent by redefining 'representation',
she must find some way of doing so in non-modal terms on pain of abandoning
the reductive enterprise. In particular, she must avoid a primitive notion of
implication. If, on the other hand, she attempts to expand the definition of
'possible facf
,
she must somehow guarantee that none of her worlds are
inconsistent, that none represents what are, intuitively, impossibilities. And again
since consistency is a modal notion, she cannot simply adopt it as a primitive on
pain of abandoning the reductive enterprise. (Al) is either false or circular.
As Lewis points out, really
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It matters little whether vve...[take the latter option] and face a problem of
saying which... [worlds] are consistent, or whether instead we take...[the
former option] and face the problem of saying what.. .[the possible facts]
imply. 1
7
But, he also points out that there is a natural response to the above
argument;
Either way the same remedy comes to mind: we could replace our
primitive modality by a syntactic surrogate. We define consistency or
implication in terms of formal deduction, and we define our ersatz worlds
or their implicit representation from that.^^
First, we must think of NT as a language of some kind in order to make
sense of references to its "syntax". But the idea is pretty straightforward
(though there are some formidable technical details if worked out in full).20 Let
Lnt be the following language: each individual (and each abstract entity, each
set) is its own name in L; each property and relation is a self-expressing predicate
of Lnt; and the existential quantifiers and other logical devices, are also self-
expressing existential quantifiers and other logical devices of Lnt- In the same
way we also add any variables and punctuation marks that are required. An
atomic sentence of Lnt is any n+1 tuple consisting of an n-place predicate
followed by n names. It means that the individuals named (i.e. the names
themselves) instantiate the property or relation expressed by the predicate (i.e.
the predicate itself). The other sentences of Lnt are defined in the usual recursive
way from the atomic sentences. And their meanings are specified in terms of
composition from the meanings of their parts. The upshot of all this is that the set
of weU-formed sentences of LNrji^st is the set of possible facts of NT expanded so
as to include the molecular facts and the facts about abstract entities. For
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instance, any possible fact of the form, <R, xi,..., Xp> is also a sentence of that
means that <xi,.., Xn> instantiates R. So now we can think of each tuple in this set
either as a possible fact of NT or as a sentence of Lnj which means just what the
fact represents. VVe can henceforth speak indiscriminately of the possible facts of
NT and the sentences of
Next, we define what it is for a set of sentences to be maximal and
consistent, or we define what it is for one set of sentences to imply another, in
ways familiar from our study of formal languages.22 These definitions are
couched in terms only of si/ntactic features of the sentences of Lnt; they involve
no reference either expUcitly or implicitly to any modal notions. So the
mathematical ersatzer can after all follow the first strategy and define 'implicit
representation in non-modal terms by exploiting the (purely syntactic) notion of
implication. Or perhaps she could follow the second strategy and expand the
notion of a possible fact as before, but redefine instead the notion of a world as a
maximal and consistent set of sentences of Lnj. So perhaps, after all, the
mathematical ersatzer can analyze modality.
Unfortunately, this syntactic approach is bound to fall short of a full
solution to the problem.
First because purely syntactical methods cannot guarantee that that every
mathematical truth is represented by every world and that no violation of any
mathematical truth is represented by any world. For purely syntactical methods
cannot suffice to characterize all the mathematical truths; this, of course, is one
the great lessons of twentieth-century logic.
Moreover, certain metaphysical truths are also bound to elude
characterization in syntactic terms. Lewis mentions three categories of
metaphysical truth. First, there are the facts about logical space as a whole such
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as the ones mentioned above. Second, there are facts about the inter-relations
among properties such as the fact that nothing can instantiate hvo determinates
of the same determinable and the fact that anything that instantiates a
determinate also falls under the corresponding determinable. Finally, there are
facts about the supervenience of properties of complex particulars on the
properties of and relations among their parts e.g. the fact that the colour of my
car supervenes on the colour of its parts. Clearly, there is nothing in the syntax of
sentences of Lnt that suggests that what they express is a metaphysical necessity
or that they violate some true metaphysical principle. To characterize these non-
logical necessities, we must look elsewhere than to the syntax of the sentences in
terms of which they are expressed.
However, syntactic methods are not the only tool available to the
mathematical ersatzer. All that is required is that the mathematical ersatzer find
some way of specifying the mathematical and metaphysical truths in non-modal
terms. Following Roper23, Lewis points out that the mathematical truths can be
specified as that set of sentences of the mathematical portion of the language (a
portion that can defined syntactically) which are true on the standard models of
arithmetic. This is a semantic or model-theoretic rather than syntactic
specification but it does not seem to involve any modal terms and so is
acceptable. Now, the mathematical ersatzer can stipulate in his definition of a
world or of representation that worlds represent mathematical claims iff they are
true on the standard models.
But this still leaves the metaphysical truths. Lewis again suggests a
method:
specify that certain sentences of the world-making language [i.e. Lnt] -are
axiomatic: then...logical consistency can take us the rest of the way.^'^
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One way to specify a set is intensionally, in terms of some condition that is
necessary and sufficient for membership. But having ruled out syntactic
methods, the prospects for specifying the axiom set intensionally without appeal
to modality look bleak. There seems to be little point in simply casting around for
a non-modal condition that characterizes all and only the metaphysical truths.
That would be tantamount to trying to guess at an analysis of modality!
But nor can the axiom set be specified extensionalli/, by listing its members.
For the required metaphysical axioms will be probably be infinite in number and
some may well be infinite in length.
To guarantee, for instance, all the metaphysical truths in the second
category, the axioms must entail, among other things, that no particular
instantiates two incompatible properties. But no axiom can appeal to any
explicitly or implicitly modal notion on pain of renouncing the reductive
enterprise. That rules out primitive reference to incompatzM/fy or to a
determina/7/e. It seems that the only option is to include each of the following: if
something is red, then it is not blue; if something is red, then it is not green; if
something is red, then it is not yellow...etc; and if it is positively charged, then it
is not negatively charged; and if something is Ig, then it is not 2g; and so on. But
clearly there will be infinitely many of these.25
And to guarantee all the metaphysical truths in the third category, the
axiom set will also have to include sufficient axioms to cover all the connections
between global facts and the local facts on which they supervene; for instance,
axioms about the connection between the arrangements and properties of
particles with global facts about the existence and intrinsic properties donkeys.
Each such an axiom will presumably be some kind of
conditional to the effect that if - here follows a ver\^ long, perhaps
infimtan', description of the arrangement and properties of the point-
particles - then there is a talking donkey
But even if the mathematical ersatzer did have the ability to list infinitely
many things, to define the axiom set by an explicit list she would still have to
know exactly which axioms to include. She would need a sort of modal
omniscience. For instance, she would need to know precisely which conditionals
of the form, 'if point-particles are arranged in such-and-such a way and have
such-and-such properties, then there's a talking donkey' are true. And it just
seems that if a theory requires this kind of omniscience in order to complete its
analysis of modality, then that theory is misguided. Lewis:
In fact, before [the mathematical ersatzer] could finish with modality, he
had to complete a wholesale analysis of the global in terms of the local!
Why should the analysis of modality have to wait on that? Surely it ought
to be possible to take 'talking donkey' or whatnot as primitive when we
are analyzing modality, whatever other project we might care to
undertake on another day.^7
In short, even if NT were amended so that its worlds are identified with
maximal consistent sets of sentences that include all the mathematical truths, this
would still not guarantee that every world represents every metaphysical truth
and that none represents the violation of any such truth. The suggestion that each
world also contain some set of axioms that entail all the metaphysical truths does
not seem promising. For the completion of the theory would still requires that the
axiom set be defined in non-modal terms. And it is hard to see how to do this.
6.4 The Problem of '^Aliens"
Intuitively, the actual stock of individuals or point-instants is just one
instance of the kind possible stock of individuals of which there are many other
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instances. Similarly, the stock of perfectly natural intrinsic properties that are
actually instantiated is, intuitively, just one possible stock among many, just one
instance of the kind possible stock of perfectly natural intrinsic properties?-^ And
logical space must comprehend each instance of each of these kinds if it is to
constitute a plenitude.
But it seems that there might have been more or other individuals than
there actually are, “alien individuals"; it seems that the kind possible stock of
individuals comprehends instances that are “augmentations" in some sense of the
actual stock. And it also seems possible for there to have been instances of
properties which are not actually instantiated, “alien properties"
- perhaps
Hume's missing shade of blue, perhaps some “missing physical value", perhaps
some different properties entirely beyond our ken.29
And this generates a difficult problem for NT. For NT is an actualist
theory: it attempts to define all the entities and notions involved in its analysis of
modality solely in terms of actual entities. Its resources are thus, in Bricker's
words, “imprisoned within the actual world". In particular, its possible facts
are all of the form <R, xl,...,xn> where xl,...,xn are actual particulars and R is a
class of actual n-tuples of particulars, an actually instantiated relation. Among
these possible facts will be non-actual combinations of these actual particulars
and actually instantiated relations. But none of them will involve non-actual
particulars or actually uninstantiated properties, so-called alien particulars and
relations. And given the definition of 'representation', this means that none of
NT's worlds will represent any possibilities involving alien particulars and
relations. Hence NT fails to provide for a sufficient plenitude of worlds to do
justice to our intuitions about aliens.
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6.4.1 Aliens and Doxastic Possibilitv
These intuitions cannot be denied, but maybe they can be reinterpreted.
And this gives NT a way to draw the sting from this objection.
Metaphysical possibility is easily confused with episteinic or doxastic
possibility. When we say 'There might have been talking donkeys' we probably
mean that this is a metaphysical possibility'^ but when we say 'There might have
been someone who memorized all of Shakespeare' we probably mean that /or all
we knoio, there might have been such a person, that this is doxastically possible.
And these are not the same thing; something might be epistemically possible yet
metaphysically impossible, or vice versa. Goldbach's conjecture like all
mathematical claims is either necessarily true or necessarily false. Suppose it is
necessarily true. We don't know this and it is perfectly in order to express our
ignorance by saying that it is possibly false or that it might be false. What we
mean is that this is doxastically possible, not that it is metaphysically possible;
and that's why we speak truly when we say it is possibly false, even if it is
necessarily true. On the other hand there are metaphysical possibilities that are
doxastically impossible. For instance, many before the nineteenth century
thought that space couldn't but be Euclidean but we now know that it might be
and probably is non-Euclidean. So a non-Euclidean spatial framework is
metaphysically possible, despite being doxastically impossible for those before
the nineteenth century.
Part of the project of mathematical ersatzism is to show how to define the
notion of a world that is adequate to the analysis of metaphysical possibility; it is
not to be assumed that these worlds can also be used to analyze doxastic
possibility. And perhaps when we say 'There might have been more or other
particulars and properties than there actually are' we are expressing a doxastic
not a metaphysical possibility. Prima facie, it seems metaphysically possible for
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such individuals and properties to exist, but once we study the analysis of
modalitv^ we realize that really it is not. So perhaps our intuitions about aliens are
not genuinely metaphysical intuitions at all and NT is not to be faulted for failing
to accommodate them.^i
This reply does not seem to me to be convincing for several connected
reasons. And although none of these reasons is conclusive, they do show, I think,
that this sort of reply to the problem of aliens should be endorsed only if none
better can be found.
First, if the doxastic possibilities outstrip NT's possible worlds in this
respect, then it will prove very difficult for NT to provide a possible worlds
analysis of belief. And this surely diminishes the theoretical utility of NT vis a vis
modal realism.^2
Second, we seem to be able to describe possibilities that involve aliens in
perfectly straightforward and simple terms (see, e.g., BrickeTs cube-worlds to be
discussed below). And the cogency of the descriptions of such possibilities just
does not seem to trade on our ignorance. Even when it is pointed out that our use
of 'possibility' is sometimes doxastic, we still have no inclination to classify them
as descriptions of what is metaphysically impossible but doxastically possible.
Note that this is not the case with our paradigm doxastic possibility, Goldbach's
Conjecture: once the distinction is pointed out, its classification is easy.
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, to hold that it really is
metaphysically impossible that there should have been more or other particulars
than there actually are, is to hold that the actual world is as rich as
metaphysically possible in its stock of particulars and instantiated properties.
But, as I mentioned in 1.3.1, this seems arbitrary and parochial: everyone accepts
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there could have been fe^ver particulars and properties, so ^vhy not morei> Why
should the actual world occupy so privileged a position in logical space?
Indeed, to deny the possibility of aliens may well be to distort the nature
of modal thought. For modal reasoning seems to involve generalizing from what
we know is possible, perhaps according to principles of the kind set out in 2.2.4.2.
For example, in 2.2.4.4 I argued, following Bricker, that a geometry^ is a
metaphysically possible way that the spatiotemporal structure of the actual
world might have been if it is a natural generalization of the actual geometry'; one
with more or fewer points, or more or fewer dimensions, or a different curvature,
and so on. Now, the possibilities generated by these principles just do not seem
to be doxastic but genuinely metaphysical, yet they seem to entail the existence of
possibilities involving aliens. For a stock of particulars that contains more
particulars than the actual stock seems to be a natural generalization of the actual
stock. At least it seems just as natural to generalize the facts about the actual
stock of particulars to generate stocks that contain more particulars as it does to
those that contain fewer (stocks that NT does recognize). The generalization in
both cases seems to be mathematical yet there seems to be no tnathematical basis
for distinguishing just one as generating metaphysical possibilities. And what
other grounds, independent of a commitment to theories like NT, could we have
to distinguish these ways of generalizing the actual stock of particulars? To
maintain that we speak of metaphysical possibility when we say there might
have been fewer particulars and properties, but of mere doxastic possibility when
we say that there might have been more seems ad hoc.^^ And exactly parallel
remarks apply to the case of alien properties: their possibility seems to be arrived
at by reasoning from general principles which it seems arbitrary to restrict.
6.4.2 Distinguishing the Existence of a Property from its Instantiation
Perhaps, instead of exploiting the distinction between metaphysical and
doxastic possibility, the advocate of XT might attempt to distinguish what it is
for a property to exist from what it is for one to be instantiated. This offers the
prospect of a solution to the problem of alien properties at least.
Some properties, such as being blue, and being positively-charged, are
actually instantiated; while many others, such as being a unicorn, and having a
mass of exactly 3g, are not. But, it may be argued, this is not to say that the latter
properties do not actually exist. There is a long tradition, inspired perhaps by
Plato, that holds that properties, like mathematical entities, all necessarily exist,
whether or not they are instantiated. After all, we seem to have no trouble
naming actually uninstantiated properties.
So NT is not after all susceptible to the problem of alien properties. All
properties actually exist and so all will appear in the possible facts of NT. Thus,
NT's worlds do after all represent facts involving even alien properties. And
although, strictly speaking, there are no alien properties, NT still manages to
accommodate the intuition that there might have more properties than there
actually are. For NT can hold that this intuition is about which properties are
actually instantiated, not which properties actually exist. And NT does entail that
there are some properties that are not actually instantiated.
Perhaps intuitions about alien properties really are just too vague to be
sure they are intuitions about which properties actually exist rather than which
are actually instantiated. And to this extent the reply may well succeed. But it is a
pyrrhic victory.
The aim of all forms of ersatzism is to show, contra modal realism, that
there is no need to posit the existence of non-actual entities to explain any of our
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modal intuitions. But unless much more is said, the above solution amounts
merely to the exchange of one problem for another: the mystery of intuitions that
apparently concern non-actual properties is dispelled only by making the notion
of a property and the instantiation relation it bears to concrete particulars
correspondingly more mysterious.
If properties were classes of their instances, then their identity conditions
would be clear. And since philosophers are not entitled to reject the primitive
ontology and ideology of the mathematicians, their existence and a grasp of the
relation of instantiation, i.e. membership, would be beyond dispute. But since,
intuitively, sets exist only if their members do, no alien properties would actually
exist. And NT would be unable to account for intuitions about aliens. Moreover,
as we have already seen, identifying properties with classes of their instances
commits the ersatzer wrongly to the identity of accidentally coextensive
properties.
Maybe the ersatzer might do better to follow the tradition, inspired by
Aristotle, and regard properties as sui generis entities that exist iff instantiated.
This avoids a commitment to the identity of accidentally coextensive properties.
But only at the cost of leaving mysterious quite what the identity conditions of
properties really are. And although this move does perhaps respect the
traditional intuition that properties have some kind of ontological dependence on
particulars, we surely cannot maintain that we have as firm a grasp on the
relation of instantiation as we did on the membership relation. Moreover, it still
leaves the problem of aliens unsolved.
Finally, there is the option under consideration — properties are sui
generis entities that necessarily exist regardless of whether they are instantiated.
Now their identity conditions are unclear, their ontological dependence on
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particulars is lost, and the relation of instantiation is open to the difficulties that
Lewis levelled at magical ersatzism's selection relation: if instantiation is
an internal relation,... it is only by magic that..['instantiates'] could be our
word for any such relation. If, on the other hand, the concrete..
.[particulars
instantiate properties] by an external relation, it is the relation itself that is
magical. ..Either way, ersatzism that relies on such a relation is justly called
'magical'; and is to be rejected.
And it is hard to resist the suspicion that the distinction between necessarily
existent but actually uninstantiated properties and the modal realist's genuinely
alien properties is a mere terminological sleight of hand. Why are the former
more properly called "actual" than merely "possible"
In short, even though most philosophers admit the necessary existence of
some entities, e.g. mathematical ones, the ersatzer cannot legitimately claim to
have explained our intuitions about aliens in actualist terms by merely
distinguishing the existence of a property from its instantiation. For unless more
is said about the nature of properties and relations, e.g. that they are
mathematical entities of some kind, any gain in our understanding of the
intuitions about aliens is offset by a loss in our grasp of the ontological category
of properties and the primitive notion of instantiation.
6.4.3 Aliens and Ramsey Sentences
Skyrms offers the mathematical ersatzer a third response to the problem of
accommodating intuitions about aliens:
To cash these intuitions we must think of possibilities analogically. There
might be other things that play the role of our objects; other things that
play the role of our relations...
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The idea seems to be this. Although alien particulars and properties do not
actually exist, this shows shows only that none of NT's atomic facts represents
anything about them. Yet we have already seen that NT needs to be modified so
that Its set of possible facts also includes molecular facts. And among these
molecular facts will be the fact that represents there is some particular that is F
but which is not identical to my car, and not identical to my front door, and not
identical to...(and so on through all actual particulars). For this (molecular)
possible fact is constructed entirely from actual materials, materials available to
the ersatzer: the existential quantifier, variables, the property F, the non-identity
relation and sentential connectives.^^ Such molecular facts represent, in effect,
that there is some particular that is other than every actual particular. So they can
act as surrogates for representing the information about aliens not representable
by atomic facts. Since some such facts will be members of various worlds NT
does after all entail the existence of worlds at which there are more or other
individuals than there actually are. In effect, including molecular facts enables
NT to represent facts about aliens by quantification.
Thinking once more of the possible facts as sentences, we could put the
point linguistically. Lnj cannot speak of aliens by means of subject-predicate
sentences because it lacks the relevant names and predicates, but it can speak of
them by quantification, as that which is other than all the actual particulars and
has such-and-such properties. In Skyrms's words, "...a kind of Ramsey sentence
(on the level of models) approach to the 'new' elements prevails."3^
And similar remarks apply to properties: among the (molecular) possible
facts of NT there will be existential facts that represent that there is some
property that is not identical to redness, and not identical to being three grams,
and not identical to.. .(and so on through aU actually instantiated properties). In
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short, there ^vill be possible facts that represent that there is some propert>- that is
other than every actually instantiated property. Since some such facts will be
members of various worlds, NT does after all entail the existence of worlds at
which there are actually uninstantiated properties. And there will be worlds that
represent that such properties are instantiated. Lewis puts the point
linguistically:
...some. ..ersatz worlds. ..say by cjuantification, if not by name, that there are
extra nameless properties, alien to our world, which have instances
distributed in so-and-so way and which play such-and-such nomological
role. Then we have ersatz worlds according to which there are extra, alien
properties. Thereby we acknowledge their possibility.^^
Unfortunately, this "Ramsey-sentence" approach has two unacceptable
consequences.
The first is that the molecular facts about aliens will go "unwitnessed" at
the worlds that contain them. And such worlds will thereby represent what is,
intuitively, impossible. To appreciate this difficulty consider first disjunctions.
Intuitively, it cannot be the case that A or B unless either it is the case that A or it
is the case that B. So no world should represent that A or B unless it also
represents that A or it represents that B, on pain of representing what is
impossible. Similarly, for existentials: intuitively, it cannot be the case that there
is something which is F unless it is also the case of some thing in particular that it
is F. It cannot be that something is red, for instance, unless there is some
particular thing that is itself red. And so if a world represents that there is
something red, it cannot also represent of each particular, x, that x is not red.
Existential facts must be "witnessed"; none can be true at a world unless some
atomic fact from which that existential fact follows is also true there.
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Now consider one of the existential possible facts for which XT is unable
to provide the corresponding atomic facts because they would have to involve
alien particulars or properties. Preciseli/ because it lacks the corresponding atomic
facts, XT is unable to provide witnesses for these existentials. Worlds which
contain such existential facts will represent that something is F, even though they
will represent of no thing in particular that it is F. Thus, XT entails that it is
possible for certain unwitnessed existentials to be true. And this is just as
unacceptable as the corresponding doctrine about disjunctions.'^^
The second consequence is that XT will be unable to provide distinct
worlds for each of the possible ways that the molecular facts about aliens may be
realized. Thus, it will conflate intuitively distinct possibilities, and its worlds will
fail to constitute a plenitude.
Consider disjunctions again. If it is the case that A or B, then this may be
because it the case that A, but it may be because it is the case that B; A and that B
are both ways of realizing A or B. And these may be quite different. Existential
facts may be similarly "multiply realized": if something is F, then maybe this is
because it is x that is F, but it maybe it is because it is y, or z. Yet the possibility
that X is F may be quite different from the possibility that y or z is, even though
the fact that something is F is made true by all of them. Merely knowing that
something is F, doesn't tell us which particular something it is that is F.
Now consider again one of NT's existential facts about aliens. Those of
NT's worlds that contain such facts will represent that something is F. Once
again, precisely because it lacks the corresponding atomic facts, NT is unable to
distinguish possibilities that differ in which particulars or properties realize these
existential facts. NT cannot provide distinct worlds for the different ways in
which existential facts may be realized if these facts concern aliens (though it can
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if they concern actual particulars and relations!). And this too is just as
unacceptable as the corresponding doctrine about disjunctions.
However, if two possibilities differ only in whether alien individual a or
alien individual b plays a certain role, but are otherwise exactly alike, then it is
unclear that they really do need to be distinguished. Is there a genuine difference
between possible worlds that do not differ with respect to their geometr\' (that is,
their spatiotemporal structure), the cardinality of their sets of particulars,
properties and relations existing or being instantiated there, or with respect to the
distribution of these properties and relations about this structure? Can they really
differ only with respect to which individuals exist there - whether a or b - but not
in any other way? Maybe then with respect to alien particulars, this objection
shows only that the mathematical ersatzer fails to recognize a distinction that
maybe makes no difference. Here the ersatzer can simply stand her ground and
deny that she conflates any genuinely distinct possibilities (such a position is
often called "anti-haecceitism")-'^^. Lewis agrees:
VVe omit no information if we fail to say, by name, who is who. The
information we could give only by naming. ..[alien]. ..individuals is no
genuine information at all.'^^
However, an exactly parallel situation also arises with respect to alien
properties and here the ersatzer's denial - a position might be called "anti-
quidditism" ~ is less convincing. Lewis: “Here what correspond to haecceitistic
differences are genuine differences in how things might be; for they are
differences in what properties things might have.""^^ The problem can be seen
most clearly by considering an example from Bricker:
Consider a world that contains two kinds of uniformly dense matter, and
suppose that the two kinds of matter have all of their qualitative
properties in common. However, they are distinguished relative to one
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another by the fact that matter of different kinds mutually attracts, matter
of the same kind mutually repels. Call one of the kinds of matter p
-matter
and the other kind iz-matter. Consider the possibilih’ that there exists
nothing but a single cube of p -matter, and the possibility that there exists
nothing but a single cube of n -matter. I claim that these are distinct
possibilities. ..to deny it would be to hold. ..that we cannot specify other
worlds by stipulating what kinds they contain. Such an extreme form of
anti-[cjuidditism] is strongly at variance with modal intuitions.'^
These two cube possibilities are qualitatively indistinguishable; they differ
only in the w^ay that matter and anti-matter differ — with respect to their
properties of repulsion and attraction. Yet if both kinds of matter are alien to the
actual world, neither property appears in any of NT's possible facts, and NT
simply lacks the resources to distinguish p-matter wwlds from n-matter worlds.
None of its atomic facts contain such properties; and any of its existential or other
molecular facts that is true at one world is also true at the other. Thus, NT is
forced to identify these possibilities. And this, Bricker argues, is "is strongly at
variance wdth modal intuitions".
Skyrms responds that our reasoning about possibilities involving aliens is
just plain different from our reasoning about possibilities involving combinations
of actual particulars and actually instantiated properties;
We think about possible facts and possible worlds in two quite different
ways. For possible worlds whose objects and relations are subsets of this
w'orld our possibilities are essentially comfzznflfoni?/...Wittgenstein believes
that this is the only conception of possibility...I regard this restriction...as
rather unfortunate...To cash...intuitions [about the 'new' elements] we
must think of possibilities analogically.^^
Skyrms here simply abandons the attempt to provide a uniform account of
modal reasoning, in particular combinatorial reasoning, as it applies to
possibilities involving aliens. But, in the absence of an independent argument,
this asymmetry is implausible; prima facie, combinatorial reasoning about aliens
IV)
does not seem terribly different from such reasoning involving actual things.
Moreover, it is barely intelligible that something should be F unless it is true of
some thing in particular that it is F or that it could be the case that something is F
only in one way. And simply to declare modal reasoning involving aliens
different from combinatorial reasoning or to call reasoning that has such a
consequence analogical" does nothing to help. At the very least, to allow the
possibility of existentials that are unwitnessed and which could not be made true
in more than one way seems to involve a non-standard understanding of
quantification. (And presumably he would also have to allow the corresponding
claim about disjunctions!)
To summarize: to guarantee the positive intuitions about modality some of
NT's worlds must represent facts about aliens ~ particulars that do not actually
exist, and properties that are not actually instantiated - yet NT's set of possible
facts contains no atomic facts about aliens. And the need for atomic facts to
represent facts about aliens cannot be bypassed by appealing to existential facts
to do the same work. For the need for the original atomic facts simply reappears
as the need for witnesses or alternative realizations for the existential facts.
6.5 Mathemarical Ersatzism and SN
The theory of properties and relations developed in chapters three and
four, SN, has a number of attractive features. It entails the actual existence of
properties that are not actually instantiated, it entails certain metaphysical
principles about the inter-relations of properties, and it entails that the properties
of complexes supervene on the properties and relations of their parts. And it does
so without positing any new or mysterious primitive ontological categories,
concepts or axioms. Properties and relations are constructed using only the
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resources of actualist impure set-theory - concTete particulars and set-theoretical
constructions from them
- yet SN avoids the conflation of actually coextensive
properties. And its analyses and constructions are framed in such a way that all
the above consequences follow from the axioms of set-theory alone. All facts
about properties and relations are, in effect, reduced to set-theoretical or
mathematical facts. In this final section I will sketch a version of mathematical
ersatzism that attempts to exploit these features of structural nominalism in order
to avoid the problem of accidentally coextensive properties, the problem of
implicit representation and the problem of aliens.
Unfortunately this account will be importantly incomplete; in particular,
no attempt will be made to construct worlds that represent possibilities involving
more particulars than there actually are. And this induces certain other
limitations on which modal intuitions the theory can accommodate. TTiese
intuitions must, I believe, be accommodated in a fully adequate account of
modality, so the most that can be claimed for the account is that it represents a
promising begirming. I will also not go into the details of how to accommodate
modal intuitions concerning complex particulars and certain relations among
particulars (though I will indicate how to proceed in the footnotes). This is
mainly to keep the exposition as simple as possible.
6.5.1 Formulating a Version of Mathematical Ersatzism that Incorporates SN
Other possible worlds are supposed to be alternatives to the way the world
actually is; other instances of the kind of which the way the world actually is is
just one instance. So in order to construct the mathematical ersatz worlds, let us
go back once again to Lewis's characterization of the way the actual world is.
According to Lewis the actual world is
21 \
...a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thin^ and
then another...And that is all. ..All else supervenes on that."^
This suggests that one way to develop mathematical ersatzism would be
to construct its worlds in tw^o stages. In the first, a collection of entities is
constructed to characterize the “vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact" on
which all the other facts about the world supervene. I will call these entities
“world-bases". Then, in the second stage, a corresponding collection of worlds is
constructed and a relation of representation defined in such a way that each
world represents all the facts characterized by some world base, together with all
the relevant supervenient facts.
6.5.1. 1 Stage One: Constructing the World-Bases
Lewis describes the “vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact" on
which all the other facts about the world supervene as follows;
We have a geometry: a system of external relations of spatiotemporal
distance between points. Maybe points of spacetime itself, maybe point-
sized bits of matter or aether or fields, or maybe both. And at those points
we have local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need
nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated. For short: we have
arrangement of qualities.
This suggests that to specify the world-base of the actual world, it suffices to
specify four elements: its collection of concrete individuals, its system of external
relations, its collection of perfectly natural intrinsic properties, and, finally, how
the properties are actually distributed among the individuals. And this in turn
suggests that to specify any other world-base it suffices to specify its individuals,
relations, properties and distribution.
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So let us identify a world-base with any quadruple <1, R, P, D>, where 1 is
a possible collection of (simple) concrete individuals or spacetime points, R a
possible system of external relations among these points, P a possible collection
of perfectly natural intrinsic properties, and D is a possible distribution of these
properties among these individuals.
Mathematical ersatzism aims to provide a reductive analysis of modality
and it aims to do so in entirely actualist terms. So each of the elements involved
in a world-base ~ a collection of individuals, a collection of properties etc. — must
be characterized in entirely non-modal terms using only materials available at the
actual world. Let us consider each of these four elements in turn.
6.5.1. 1.1 Possible Collections of Individuals. I
Intuitively, the properties of complex individuals supervene on the
intrinsic properties of, and relations among, the simple individuals of which they
are composed. So complex particulars should not appear in a world-base. Rather
I should consist only of simple (concrete) individuals. The simplest approach to
characterizing possible collections of simple Individuals is to follow Lewis's
suggestion and identify them with spacetime points - their locations. This
account then identifies the first member of a world-base, its collection of such
individuals, with any subset of the set of actual spacetime points.
6.5. 1.1.2 The System of External Relations, R
The notion of a possible system of external relations is to be thought of as
defined on members of I. The idea here is that taken together I and R should
characterize a possible geometry, some way for the spatiotemporal framework of
the actual world to have been. In 2.2.4.4 1 argued, following BrickePs lead, that
any natural generalization of the actual geometry should qualify as a possible
geometn'. However, in developing this version of mathematical ersatzism I will
not attempt to define what it is for some geometry' to be a natural generalization
of the actual geometry. This is because, intuitively, this is not a job for the
metaphysician. Rather, it is the physicists' job to tell us which possible geometry
accurately characterizes the actual spatiotemporal framework, and it is the
mathematicians' job to tell us what a natural generalization of some geometry' is
supposed to be.
6.5. 1.1.3 The Collection of Perfectly Natural Intrinsic Properties, P
It is in defining the third element in a world-base, P - a characterization of
the collection of "perfectly natural intrinsic properties which need nothing bigger
than a point at which to be instantiated" - that SN enters the picture.47
One convenient way to exploit SN's ideas about the nature of properties in
the construction of P is to think of P as itself a quadruple <C, N, D*, d*>.^ The
first element C is the collection of all classifications of the members of I. It will be
recalled from chapter three, that a classification is a triple <F, S, m> where I' is
some subset of the set of members of I, S is some equivalence relation that is total
on r and m is some metric defined on the set that consists of the equivalence
classes induced by S on T together with the empty set. The second element, N, is
an assignment of "naturalness" to the classifications. It is any total function from
the collection of classifications C to the positive reals. The third element, D*, is
the collection of those classifications that are assigned a "sufficiently high
degree" of naturalness by N. The final element, d*, is the collection of pairs the
first member of which is some sufficiently natural classification — some member
of D* — and the second is some equivalence class on that classification indexed to
indicate its position in internal structure of the classification defined by its metric.
224
The idea is that if SX is right, then any classification with a sufficiently
high degree of naturalness yasf is a sparse determinable properh'd*^ And any pair
of any sparse determinable and one of its cells (or the empty set) indexed to
indicate its location in the determinable space defined by the determinable's
metric /Hsf is a sparse determinate property. So, if SN is right, the final two
elements of P of a given world-base - D* and d* - can be thought of as the
collections of the sparse determinables and determinates respectively that would
exist at the world to be constructed from this world-base.
6.5. 1.1.4 The Distribution of the Properties Among the Individuals. D
The distribution relation, D, is supposed to characterize how the perfectly
natural intrinsic properties characterized by P are arranged or distributed within
spatiotemporal framework characterized by I and R; D is supposed to specify all
the "local matters of particular fact". So D should contain all the facts about
which individuals fall under, or instantiate, which properties.
Now, if SN is right, then fixing which sets are to be the determinables and
their determinates of a given world-base already fixes which individuals fall
under, or instantiate, which properties, the "local matters of particular fact". So to
exploit this idea, let us define D simply as follows:
D is the collection of pairs of the form <F, x> such that either:
(i) F is a classification <F, S, m> that is a member of D* and x is a
member of T; or
(ii) F is a classification-equivalence class pair «!', S, m>, [u]p that
is a member of d* and x is a member of [u]j.
The idea is this. According to SN, if (i) is true of some pair <F, x>, then F is
a sparse determinable and x falls under F, And if (ii) is true of some pair <F, x>,
then F is a sparse determinate and x instantiates F. So if SN is right, collectively
these pairs i.e. D suffice to determine all the facts about which individuals fall
under or instantiate which properties at the w'orld-base in question.
To summarize the account of a world-base:
X is a ivovlcl-bcisd
—df. x is a quadruple, <1, R, P, 0> vv'here:
(1) I is any subset of the set of actual spacetime points;
(2) R is any geometry dehned on I that is a natural generalization of the
actual geometry;
(3) P is a quintuple, <1, C, N, D*, d*> where:
(i) C is the collection of classifications definable on 1 (i.e. the
abundant determinables, if SN is correct);
(ii) N is any total function from C to the positive reals;
(iii) D* is the collection of classifications having a sufficiently high
degree of naturalness (i.e. the sparse determinables, if SN is
correct); and
(iv) d* is the collection of pairs of a member of D* and one of its
cells (or the empty set) (i.e. the sparse determinates, if SN is
correct).
(4) D is the collection of pairs of the form <F, x> such that either:
(i) F is a classification <F, S, m> that is a member of D* and x is a
member of F (i.e. the facts about which particulars fall under which
sparse determinables, if SN is right); or
(ii) F is a classification-equivalence class pair «F, S, m>, [u]p that
is a member of d* and x is a member of [u]j (i.e. the facts about
which particulars instantiate which sparse determinates, if SN is
right).
Next I will move on to defining the mathematical ersatzePs worlds and
what they represent. However, in going straight to this part of the theory, h\^o
important elements will have been omitted: some account of the fundamental
intrinsic properties of the complex particulars, the fusions of members of I; and
some account of the fundamental intrinsic relations among the members of I (and
their fusions). Any fully adequate theory must accommodate these facts. But, as
announced above, I have ignored them for simplicity of exposition.^o
6.5.1 .2 Sta.^e Two: Worlds and What They Represent
The idea here is to define world and 'represents' in such a w ay that each
world represents only that set of facts encoded by some particular world-base
together with the facts that supervene on them. To guarantee that something is
possible iff it is represented by some such world, the theory' needs also to
guarantee that ever}' world explicitly represents all logical, mathematical and
metaphysical truths. And it needs to guarantee that none represents any violation
of these truths.
We saw in the previous sections the essentials of how this might be
achieved, so again I will not go into the details. Roughly, we define first a
language L using the "Lagadonian" method. This allows us to think of the
possible facts determined by any world-base (i.e. the members of its final
element, D) as atomic sentences of this language that mean just what these facts
represent.^! Then, we find some way to define 'maximality' and 'consistency'
relative to the syntax and semantics of this language. Finally, we define the
collection of mathematical truths M model-theoretically (as those sentences of the
mathematical part of L that are true in the standard models). With this done we
are in a position to define the worlds and what they represent:
[W] X is a world =df. x is a maximal, consistent extension of some D that
includes M, where;
(a) D is the distribution relation of some world-base; and
(b) M =df. the set of theorems in the mathematical portion of L
that are true in the standard models;^^
[R] A world w represents that so-and-so (i.e. that so-and-so is true at w)=df.
w contains some L-sentence that means that so-and-so.^3
6.5.2 Evaluatine the Theon^
This version of mathematical ersatzism is really no more than a
sophisticated version of NT. The principal difference is that where NT identifies a
world with any set of possible facts (atomic sentences) whatsoever, in this
version we first make sure that we have a set of facts that encodes the
determining features of a way that things might have been. And it is in doing this
that we are guided by the account of properties proposed by SN. Only then do
we extend this collection so that the resulting worlds represent the logical,
mathematical and supervenient facts.
However, this theory can still legitimately claim many of the advantages
that NT has over MR discussed above. In particular, a world-base consists only of
elements that actually exist: I consists only of actually existent spacetime points;
and R, P and D consist only of subsets of these spacetime points and set-
theoretical constructions from them. So the mathematical ersatzer can
legitimately refer to world-bases in her constructions of worlds without stepping
beyond the boimds of actualism. And notice that this is achieved without
introducing any modal notions into the definitions the "worlds" and what they
"represent".
This version of mathematical ersatzism can also claim several advantages
over NT. Many of these advantages are due to the fact that it has been developed
so as to incorporate the ideas developed in SN. For SN was developed in such a
way as to avoid the identification of accidentally coextensive properties and to
guarantee the various logical relations among properties. So, unlike NT, this
version of mathematical ersatzism guarantees, for instance, that even if being
positively charged and 3kg in mass are coextensive at some world, there are still
worlds where they are not. And it guarantees that none of its worlds represents
of any particular that it instantiates two determinates of the same determinable.
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or that it instantiates any determinate without also falling under the
corresponding determinable, and so on. Moreover, it achieves all this without
requiring the ability to list infinitely many axioms or some sort of modal
omniscience. The theory entails, e.g., that no particular at any world instantiates
two determinates iff these are determinates of the same determinable. It does not
require that we be able to list all possible combinations of determinates or that
we know whether, e.g., being positively- and being negatively-charged are
indeed determinates of the same determinable.
In short, unlike NT, this version of mathematical, by incorporating the
ideas of SN into its constructions, avoids the general identification of accidentally
coextensive properties, and guarantees that none of its worlds represents any
violation of the first category of metaphysical principles - those concerning the
relations of inclusion and entailment among properties.^'^
Notice also that each of this theory's worlds represents that so-and-so iff it
contains a sentence that means just that. The sentences contained in any world
include the set of facts drawn from some world-base's last element, D. Each such
set of facts is complete in the sense that it contains <F, x> for every property F
and every particular x such that x instantiates or falls under F, according to the
definitions of those notions drawn from SN.^^ So intuitively each world will
explicitly represent all the atomic facts about which properties and relations its
particulars instantiate or fall under. And since each world is maximal, all the
molecular facts that supervene on these facts — existential facts, disjunctive facts
etc. — will also be explicitly represented. Moreover, each world also includes M,
so each represents every mathematical truth. Finally, notice that this theory's
primitive ontology and ideology employ only mathematical entities and notions -
- even naturalness is identified with a mathematical function in the construction
of worlds — and its only axioms in addition to the logical constructions and
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analyses (including those of SX) are those of some standard impure set-theory
and mereology. In effect, all the truths about logical space over and above those
short list of axioms specifying the analyses and constructions are mathematical
truths. So, if we add SN's analyses and constructions to each world, since each
world contains M, each explicitli/ represents all the truths about logical space,
even those that Lewis claimed could not be explicitly represented. Thus, the
theory is not susceptible to the problem of implicit representation. All
representation is explicit and yet no world is logically, mathematically or
metaphysically inconsistent.
Finally, let us consider whether this theory generates a sufficient plenitude
df worlds to do justice to our positive modal intuitions.
Inspection of the constructions reveals that there will be some world that
represents that the actual world has a certain collection of (simple) individuals iff
there is some world-base whose first element consists of just those individuals.
And these collections of individuals include any that are subsets of the set of
actual spacetime points. Since, intuitively, there actually are continuum-many
such points, their subsets will include those containing only finitely-many
individuals, those containing only denumerably-many individuals and those
containing continuum-many individuals. Thus, there are world-bases whose
collections of individuals I are "contractions" in a straightforw^ard sense of the
collection of those at the actual world. So the theory entails roughly that if I is the
actual stock of particulars, then any contraction of I is also a possible stock of
individuals.
However, the collections of individuals at the world-bases do not include
any that are "augmentations" of this stock. The account thus fails to explain the
intuition that there might have been more individuals than that actually are. And
this is an important respect in which the account is incomplete with respect to
explaining our positive modal intuitions. And it cannot be accounted adequate
until some way of removing this limitation has been found.
Inspection of the constructions also reveals that there will be some world
that represents that the actual world has a certain spatiotemporal structure iff
there is some world-base whose first two elements I and R encodes the geometr\'
of such a structure. And this includes any "natural generalizations of the actual
geometry" that are definable over some subset of the set of actual spacetime
points. If current physics is right, then the actual geometry is a non-Euclidean,
four-dimensional geometry defined over continuum-many points and having a
certain curvature. Probably, its natural generalizations include geometries having
five, fifty or maybe even infinitely-many dimensions. Probably, they include
those having many different sorts of curvature. Probably they include geometries
defined over finitely-many, denumerably-many and continuum-many points.
And if so, then there will be some world-base for each such geometry. Notice that
here we defer to the mathematicians to tell us whether or not natural
generalizations of the actual geometry include "island universe" geometries and
so whether or not there are worlds that represent the actual world as having such
a structure. They are neither ruled in nor out a priori. This seems to be another
advantage that the theory has over MR.
It should be noted also that R is not defined independently of I. This is
simply because a system of external relations must be a system of relations among
some things. This guarantees that no world-base will contain a geometry which is
impossible because it lacks a sufficient number of points for its system of external
relations. However, because R is defined only after I has been specified and
because, as mentioned above, the world-bases thus constructed do not,
intuitively, exhaust all possible stocks of individuals, the possible geometries
represented by the \vorld-bases will not exhaust all possible geometries either. In
particular, no world-base will contain elements that represent geometries defined
over more than continuum-many points. And again the theor\' cannot be
accounted adequate until some way of removing this limitation has been found.
The possible stocks of instantiated properties P have been constructed in
line with SN, so whether or not the theory guarantees that for every intuitively
possible stock of properties, there is some world having P as its stock of
instantiated properties, depends in part on whether or not SN is true. Assuming
that it is, then the theory entails the existence of worlds whose stock of
instantiated properties include those that are alien to actuality in each of the three
ways of being alien discussed in chapter four.56 in particular, it even entails the
existence of worlds representing facts involving actually "missing"
determinables, determinables none of whose determinates is actually instantiated.
This is due roughly to the liberality of the definition of a "world-base", in
particular the second element of its second member P, the collection of
properties. For notice that the definition of a "classification" does not exclude any
triple <P, S, m> on the basis of what sort of internal structure it has (as defined by
m) from qualifying as a member of C. So, by the axioms of impure set-theory, for
every sort of internal structure, there will be some world-base whose P contains a
classification having that structure in its second element. And notice also that the
definition of the naturalness function does not exclude any function from
classifications to the numbers from appearing in some P. So every permutation of
naturalness among the classifications will be represented at some world-base or
other.
For example, consider just the perfectly natural determinables at the actual
world. Presumably these comprise a pretty short list — the masses, the charges.
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and so on. And presumably among them are represented rather a small number
of possible internal structures. Clearly, there are other internal structures
definable on subsets of the actual particulars. And all these will be perfectly
natural at some world or other. So, given SN's account of the transworld
identities of properties, such worlds will represent facts involving properties that
are alien to the actual world in the most radical sense: they belong to
determinables none of whose determinates are actually instantiated. Indeed,
some worlds will also represent facts involving many more perfectly natural
determinables of any given internal structure than those that are actually
instantiated.
So this version of mathematical ersatzism seems to accommodate at least
many of the intuitions concerning alien properties that proved so problematic for
NT. Notice also that the theory thereby manages to accommodate these intuitions
without jettisoning the unobjectionable pre-theoretical grasp on the nature of
properties or the relation of instantiation that goes with any form of class
nominalism. For properties are identified with set-theoretical constructions from
actual concrete spacetime points and their fusions. (And notice that the theory
also guarantees that all existentials are witnessed and capable of multiple
realization. Though again until it is developed so as also to cover alien
particulars, this is a perhaps a rather hollow boast.)
The final collection of positive intuitions about modality concern the
plenitude of recombination or arrangements of spatiotemporal structures,
individuals, and properties. Here it may seem that the theory runs into problems.
For given SN's definitions and constructions, once the collection of individuals I
that exists at a world-base and the degree of naturalness of each classification of
these individuals has been fixed, so have all the facts about which individuals
instantiate or tall under which perfectly natural intrinsic properties at the world.
So the required variet\' of distributions of properties among a given collection of
individuals within a given framework can be guaranteed only by varying N.
And this, it may be argued, just will not generate enough recombinations.
For altering the degree of naturalness of any classification can alter only how
natural a given classification is, roughly whether a property is sparse or
abundant. It cannot alter which particulars are classified with which others; so it
will not cause any sparse property to be differently distributed among these
individuals.
But this would be to ignore SN's account of the transworld identity
conditions of properties. According to SN, the identity of particulars across
worlds is irrelevant to the identities of properties across worlds. SN entails the
identity of properties across worlds goes instead by their degrees of naturalness
and their internal structures. Fixing the individuals that exist at a world does
indeed fix which classifications exist there. And it does indeed fix which sorts of
internal structure they have (though the axioms of set-theory will guarantee that
every possible sort of internal structure definable on these individuals is
represented among these classifications). But it is because the identity of
properties goes by their naturalness, not their extensions, that varying the
distribution of naturalness among these classifications will suffice to generate all
possible redistributions of properties. Consider h\'o worlds having the same
particulars and the same geometry. Exactly the same classifications exist at both
worlds. Now consider two classifications C and C' at the first world that have the
same internal structure but partition the particulars differently and have different
degrees of naturalness — n and n' respectively. Now suppose that at the second
world the degrees of naturalness of these two classifications have been swapped;
at the second world, C has naturalness n' and C' has naturalness n. According to
S.\, C at the first world is the same determinable as C' at the second, and C at the
first world is the same determinable as C at the second. Since C and C partition
the ver\' same pariticulars differently, allowing the degree of naturalness to vary'
has the effect of "exchanging" the extensions of properties across worlds. In
effect, it does amount to "redistributing" the properties.
In this section, I have, of course merely sketched one direction in which to
search for a fully adequate version of mathematical ersatzism. But it seems to me
that to approach mathematical ersatzism by attempting to incorporate SN,
perhaps along the lines indicated, at least holds out the promise that some of the
more troublesome difficulties may be solved. For, subject to the announced
limitations having to do with the number of possible individuals and geometries,
this version of mathematical ersatzism seems to entail, and so genuinely to
explain, much of the positive data of modality. And yet it seems to avoid many of
the difficulties that beset NT — the problem of accidentally coextensive
properties, the problem of implicit properties and, perhaps, the problem of alien
properties.
^ Throughout I will rely on intuitions to tell us when a given notion is modal, no official
criterion of when a notion is modal is given.
^See B. Russell and A.N. Whitehead, Pnnctpia tvlathematica, Three Volumes, (Cambridge,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1961).
^This account of propositions is presented as a logical construction rather than a definition
because the notion of a proposition is supposed to be antecedently familiar from the
literature, and MR's propositions are supposed to be suitable entities to play the roles
traditionally assigned to propositions. Often, however, quite what roles they are supposed to
play is not spelled out as fully as one would like. And it is even unclear whether there really
is a unified role. For our purposes it is sufficient to point out that it is propositions that are the
bearers of the modal statuses; whether or not propositions thus constructed are also suited to
play the various other philosophical roles they are assigned, e.g. being that towards which we
bear propositional attitudes, is left open. The literature on the nature and role of propositions
is vast. See Plitralihj, section 1.4 for discussion and (the beginning of a chain of) references.
^To illustrate how NT explains the modal statuses of propositions, consider the proposition
that my car is grey. By (Al) this is possible iff there is some world at which it is true. But by
(LCl) a proposition is simply a class of worlds which, by (D5), is true at every one of its
members. So the proposition is possible iff it is non-empty; i.e. iff there is a world which
represents that my car is grey. Is there such a world? (LC2) identifies greyness with a class of
particulars; intuitively, all and only those particulars that are grey. Since my computer is
actually grey, the axioms of impure set-theor\ entail the existence of greyness. I hese axioms
also entail the existence of the pair <greyness, my car> and its singleton, {<greyness, my
car>}. By (Dl), the former is a possible fact - call it "f" - and by (D3) the latter'is a possible
world - call it “w". By (D2), f represents that my car is grey and by (D4) so does any world
such as w which contains it. Thus, there is a world that represents that my car is grey. So the
proposition that my car is grey is non-empty and .\T correctly entails that it is possible that
my car be grey. It thereby accounts tor the truth of modalizations of sentences expressing this
proposition - 'It is possible that my car be grey', 'My car might be grey' and so on.
Here I have suppressed complications having to do with the fact that naturalness comes in
degrees. See above chapters three and four for further discussion and clarification.
6 A few terminological remarks may be helpful here. NT analyzes modality in terms of
quantification over objects that represent various ways things might have been, rather than
over things that are that way. So, in Lewis's terminology, it is a form of ersatzism. And
because NT identifies these representational objects with mathematical objects of a certain
kind - sets ~ 1 have called it mathenmtical ersatzism. The literature, however, contains at least
two other terms for such forms of ersatzism.
Any theory of modality that takes its cue from the above sort of reasoning and
...traces the very idea of possibility to the idea of the combinations - all the
combinations — of given, actual elements...
Armstrong calls "combinatorialisr (D. M. Armstrong, A Cotnbimtorml Theory of Possibility,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.37). Combinatorialist theories of
possibility have been articulated, though not necessarily endorsed, by a number of
philosophers including Quine, Cresswell, Skyrms, Armstrong, and Wittgenstein. See W. V. O.
Quine, "Propositional Objects", in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 139-60; M. J. Cresswell, 'The World is Everything that
is the Case", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50 (1972), pp. 1-13; B. Skyrms, 'Tractarian
Nominalism", Philosophical Studies, 40 (1981), pp. 199-206; and L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus, (Trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness), (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1961). Clearly NT qualifies as a form of combinatorialism.
Lewis prefers to calls theories like NT forms of "linguistic" ersatzism. The reason for
this is that we can define a language L in such a way that the possible facts of NT qualify as
atomic sentences of L and NT's worlds as sets of such sentences. And NT can thereby be
assimilated to popular attempts to analyze modality in terms of quantification over sets of
sentences, or "world-books". The guiding idea, which seems both plausible and natural, is to
think of worlds as "stories" about how things might be.
1 will stick with the term "mathematical ersatzism" in order to emphasize the aim of
reducing modality to (impure) set-theory and because it seems to me that combination is at
best only half the story. Moreover, the most attractive forms of mathematical ersatzism can be
construed as hnguistic only in a very attenuated and not very helpful sense of "language".
^See above chapter two for a discussion of these commitments of MR.
^The point here is not simply that according to MR modal reasoning concerns a separate
domain from reasoning about the concrete part of the actual world. Indeed, that may be an
advantage — modal reasoning is, after all, reasoning about alternatives to actuality. Rather the
point is this: we are (nearly) all — the modal realist included — already committed to a
domain other than the domain containing actual concrete particulars, viz. the abstract part of
actuality that contains mathematical entities. And the mathematical ersatzer construes modal
reasoning to about entities in this domain. MR however, requires an additional domain of non-
actual concrete entities for modal reasoning to be about. And that does seem to be a
disadvantage.
\1R is a metaphysical theor\ not an epistemological theor\
,
so it need not itsell explain the
origin of such knowledge. Nevertheless, it should not render such an explanation impossible.
A metaphysical theory can legitimately be rejected on the grounds that it makes the origin of
our knowledge inexplicable.
See above 2.1.2 for this axiom.
^
^ As will become clear, 1 think this is overhasty. That properties cannot be taken to be sets of
their instances does not show that they cannot be taken to be sets at all. It shows at best that if
properties are to be identified with sets, then they should be identified with sets having more
internal structure. In particular, as 1 argued in chapters three and four, the most promising
route seems to be to take each determinate property to be a pair «P, S, m>, |xj> consisting of
a triple <P, S, m> called a "determinable" (where P is some set of particulars, S is an
equivalence relation over P and m is some metric defined on the partition induced by S on P)
and |x| is equivalence class from the partition induced by S on P. But for now let us explore
the consequences for mathematical ersatzism of giving up on the attempt to logically
construct properties.
Armstrong, in his A Theory of Universals, Volume IT. Universals and Scientific Realism,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), identifies this relation with the inverse of the
parthood relation: x instantiates P iff P is a part of x. In later work, however, (Universals: An
Opinionated Introduction, (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1989), esp. chapter V) he too rejects
this position and takes instantiation to be primitive.
1^ One of the principal reasons for thinking of NT in linguistic terms is that it gives a way to
make the "etc." here precise.
In deciding what pairs, triples etc. to include as possible facts, we must be careful not to
look simply to the forms that natural languages happen to exploit. We want our set to include
every possible fact to which a modal status might be assigned, not just those facts that natural
languages happen to have expressions for. For instance, most if not all natural languages
contain expressions for negative facts, but there are also three other one-place propositional
connectives (e.g. the truth functor that always has the value True) which natural languages
do not usually contain expressions for. And these too must be included.
Pliiraliti/, p. 150ff.
Plurality, p. 151.
Plurality, p. 152.
Pluralitif, p. 152.
This justifies Lewis's choice of the name 'linguistic ersatzism' for theories of this kind.
2*^^ One problem concerns the fact that the names of Lfvjj will include all the sets. This leads to
complicated issues having to do with proper classes and the set-theoretic paradoxes. Another
concerns the fact that Lnj will need the resources of infinitary connectives. I ignore these
complications and assume that there are ways to work out the idea satisfactorily. (See P.
Bricker, "Reducing Possible Worlds to Language", Philosophical Studies, 52 (1987), pp. 331-
355.)
21 Lewis calls such a language "Lagadonian".
22 A tmxirrud set of sentences is one that includes every sentence of the language or its
negation, and a consistent set of sentences is one that does not include both a sentence and its
negation. It is well known how to define these notions and how to construct a collection of
maximal consistent sets of sentences in purely syntactic terms. And it is even possible to
define a purely syntactic relation among sentences of implication. There is, however, a
complication: to the work required of it, L[sjx will probably have to have the resources of
infinitary connectives (see fn. 20). And then syntactic means will not suffice to define the
relevant notions of consistency etc. Nevertheless, there are model-theoretic, i.e. semantic,
methods for defining these notions. And, as I mention below, the mathematical ersatzer can
also appeal to these model-theoretic notions without introducing (implicitly) any modal
notions.
A. Roper, "Toward an Eliminative Reduction of Possible Worlds", The Philo'^ovhual
Quarterly, 32 {\9S2),pp. 45-59.
'
^
Pluralitij, p. 153.
In effect, as 1 w ill argue below (6.5), SN incorporates a finite characterization of these
infinitely axioms.
Plurality, pp. 155-6.
Pluralih/, pp. 155-6.
Roughly, the perfectly natural properties are those that features of particulars that
correspond to some genuine objective similarities among them; the intrinsic properties are
those features of particulars that they have regardless of the state or existence of any distinct
particular. Quite what it really is for a property to be perfectiv natural or for it to be intrinsic
was discussed in chapter three.
Though as w ill become clear below, some, e.g. Armstrong, deny this. See his T
Combuuitorml Theon/ of Possibility, pp. 54-7.
P. Bricker, "Reducing Possible Worlds to Language".
^is response is advocated by D.M. Armstrong in his A Combmatorml Theory of Possibility,
See above 2.2.2 for a brief discussion of this matter in relation to MR.
1 mentioned above that these reasons for rejecting this response are not conclusive. In part
however, this is because too much depends on what position is taken on the nature of
properties and relations in response to the problem of accidentally coextensive properties.
Armstrong, for instance, holds that properties are sui generis universal which may overlap
or even have other universals as parts. And by exploiting this structure, he suggest a way to
accommodate the possibility of some alien properties - those "missing determinates" that
belong to determinables some of which are actually instantiated. 1 am sceptical about this
general approach, but even if Armstrong is correct, this would still only provide a partial
solution. First, it still does nothing to accommodate possibilities involving alien determinates
belonging to determinables none of whose determinates is actually instantiated. But
generalization on the actual stock of properties seems to entail their possibility: if we allow
missing determinates of a determinable some of whose determinates are instantiated, then
surely there could be determinates drawn from determinables none of whose determinates
are instantiated. Nothing in the principles of plenitude seems to rule out these
generalizations. And it seems ad hoc for Armstrong to deny them. Indeed, Armstrong
recognizes the possibility of worlds more impoverished than our own where no determinates
of some actually instantiated determinables are instantiated. So why not recognize worlds
richer than our own that contain instances of determinates belonging to a determinable none
of whose determinates are actually instantiated? Second, this way of accommodating the
missing determinates of a determinable w ill work only if the determinable consists o( complex
determinates; simple properties do not overlap. But why could not the physical magnitudes
or Bricker's cube-prop>erties (see below) be simple?Armstrong seems to hold that if properties
are incompatible, then ipso facto they are not simple; they can't be simple because they're
incompatible. 1 considered and rejected this response in chapter four (section 4.1.3 above).
34 Plurality, p. 182.
33 Here I discuss only the attempt to accommodate intuitions about alien properties, by
reconstruing what it is for a property to exist. But if anything, extending this idea to deal with
the problem of accommodating intuitions about alien particulars is even more problematic.
For it will probably involve subscribing to the existence of actually existent but uninstantiated
"haecceities". And the idea that these are properly called "actual" rather than merely
"possible" is even harder to swallow. For a very interesting discussion of this matter see the
debate between Plantinga and Fine (A. Plantinga, "Actualism and Possible Worlds", in M. J.
Loux, The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics ofModality, (Ithaca, London:
Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 253-73; K. Fine, "Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist
Discourse", in J. E. Tomberlin and P. van Inwagen (eds.), Alvin Plantinga, (Dordrecht: Reidel,
198r'), pp. 145 186; A. Plantinga, "Replies to my Colleagues" in Alvin Plantin^a, pp. 334tf. See
also A. McMichael, "A Problem for Actualism about Possible Worlds", Plulosovliiad Rernnv
XCll No. 1, (1983), pp. 49-66.
B. Skyrms, 'Tractarian Nominalism", Philosophical Studies, AO (1981), pp. 199-206.
Assuming that F is an actual property. The problem of alien properties will be dealt with
below.
Skyrms, 'Tractarian Nominalism", p. 202.
Lewis, Pliiralih/, p. 162.
A little care must be taken in how this is expressed. NT of this Skymsian variety entails
that there are existentials that are true at a world, and it entails that some of them will be
unw itnessed at some of these worlds. It does not, however, entail that there is any world at
which it is true that some existentials are unwitnessed. So NT does not entail that: possibly,
some existentials are unwitnessed. Nevertheless, the position is still problematic, or so it
'
'
seems to me.
This medieval term was revived by D. Kaplan, "How to Russell a Frege-Church", Journal of
Philosophy, 72 (1975), pp. 716-29.
J.7
Lewis, Plurality, p. 159. Though notice that for worlds that involve recombinations of some
or all of fhe acfual particulars, the mathematical ersatzer of the Skyrmsian variety is not a
haecceitist. So there is again an asymmetry in her account, an asymmetry delineated by the
actual world. And although Skyrms endorses this, the asymmetry itself and the fact that it
assigns a special role to the actual world may both be thought objectionable. However,
relatively simple adjustments to ME could eradicate the haecceitism from the combinatorial
worlds. For instance, by identifying worlds with equivalence classes of worlds under mere
haecceitistic differences, or representatives from those classes.
Plurality, p. 159.
^ P. Bricker, "Reducing Possible Worlds to Language", p. 351.
B. Skyrms, 'Tractarian Nominalism", p. 202.
D. K. Lewis, Philosophical Papers, vol II (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986),
pp. ix-x.
To briefly recap some of the key features of SN. In chapter three, a distinction was drawn
between a sparse and an abundant sense of "property". According to SN, every property is either
a determinable or a determinate. SN identifies an abundant determinable property with a triple
<r, S, m> (called a "classification") where I' is some subset of the set of particulars, S is some
equivalence relation on V, and m defines some metric on the equivalence classes induced by S on
r (together with the empty set). And it identifies abundant determinate properties with pairs,
«r, S, m>, [u|x> where the first member is a classification and the second member, [u)x, is one of
the equivalence classes or the empty set, indexed to indicate its position in the space defined by
the metric. Each classification is thought of as possessing some unique degree of naturalness at
each world which is also "inherited" by every determinate of that determinable. The sparse
properties are simply those that have a sufficiently high degree of naturalness.
SN also included the following transworld identity conditions for properties. A
determinable at one world is the same determinable as a determinable at another iff they
have the same degrees of naturalness at their respective worlds and the same sort of internal
structure as defined by their metrics. Determinates at distinct worlds are the same
determinate iff they belong to the same determinable and they occupy the same position in
their determinable's space as defined by its metric.
As with set-theoretical constructions generally, there are many equally adequate ways of
defining the relevant constructions. So talk of convenience is not out of place here.
Although nothing has been said about how high a degree of naturalness this should be.
This is a complicated matter that would require much further discussion. Notice that once the
naturalness of the various classifications have been fixed at each world, the transworld
identity conditions for properties outlined in 3.4 determine which properties are which across
the various worlds.
In chapter three SN was developed only to account for the fundamental intrinsic properties,
f fowever, in chapter four this account was generalized so as also to cover relations. Roughly, this
generalization went as follows: an abundant n-place relation determinable was identified wdh a
triple (called an "n-classification") <1''^, S, m> where 1'^ is some subset of the set of n-tiiples of
particulars, S is some equivalence relation on 1'^, and so on. And n-place relation determinates
were identified with pairs, «l'n S, m>, |<ui,..., Urplp where the first member is an n-place
relation determinable and the second member, |<ui,..., Un>lj, is one of the equivalence classes or
the empty set, indexed to indicate its position in the space defined by the metric.
An extension of the construction of a world-base so that it also covers relations among its
simple particulars would run roughly as follows. In the construction of P, let C be the collection of
n-i lassifications of members of P; extend N so that it also assigns a degree of naturalness to each
n-classification; and let D* and d* be the resulting collections of relation determinables and
determinates respectively. In the construction of D, let D contain all tuples of the form <R, xi,.„,
Xn> such that x],..., Xp are members of and either R is a member of D* (i.e. R is a sparse
relation determinable) and xi,..., x^fall under R, or R is a member of d* (i.e. R is a sparse relation
determinate) and Xninstantkite R.
Unfortunately, this extension would also introduce certain technical problems. In
particular, some way would have to found of harmonizing the geometry of the world-base, as
determined by its first two members I and R, with the natural relations determined by P. For
intuitively a world-base should contain a certain geometry iff it also has certain relations among
its individuals. This and other problems do not seem to be insurmountable, but attempting to
incorporate solutions into the construction would make the exposition so complicated as to
severely obscure the principal philosophical ideas involved. So I have omitted them.
Chapter four also contained a discussion of how to extend SN to cover the intrinsic
properties of (and relations among) complex individuals. Roughly, the idea outlined there was to
introduce an expanded range of classifications, determinables, determinates etc. — which 1 called
c -classifications, c-determinables etc. - to be the properties of the complex entities. Their
constructions parallel those of the constructions of intrinsic properties (and relations among)
simple particulars, except that they were constructed relative to the class of complex particulars:
c-classifications were identified with identified with triples <!', S, m> where I' is some subset of
the set of complex particulars, S is some equivalence relation that is total on 1' and m is some
metric defined on the set that consists of the equivalence classes induced by S on 1' together with
the empty set; sparse c-determinables were those c-classifications having a sufficiently high
degree of naturalness; sparse c-determinates were pairs of a sparse c-determinable and one of the
equivalence classes or the empty set, indexed to indicate its location in the c-determinable-space
defined by m; and so on.
However, intuitively, the properties of a complex particular supervene on the properties
of and relations among its parts. And since this is an intuition that has no parallel in the case of
simple properties, if SN is extended to cover the intrinsic properties of complex entities, it will
require some additional constraint to guarantee this intuition. In chapter four, this was
formulated as follows: two complex should be classified alike by all c-classifications whenever
they are "part-duplicates".
For simplicity, I have also ignored the properties of complexes individuals in
constructing the worlds of mathematical ersatzism. But again complicating the account so as
to accommodate them does not seem to present any unsurmountable problems. The most
straightforward way fo proceed would seem to be as follows. Having constructed the world-
bases, we next construct for each world-base <1, R, P, D>, an extended world-base <1'*’, R, P"'',
.The idea is that P'' contains all members of I together with all fusions ofmembers of /. R is
much as before (once the issues discussed above having to do with the relations among
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individuals have been sorted out). is again a quadruple <C", N*, D**,d*'^> where C*‘ is
the collection of c-classifications of members of I*. As before, N* is an assignment of some
degree of naturalness to each of the members of C+. However, unlike before, N+ cannot be
any arbitary total function from members of C" to the positive reals on pain of violating the
intuitions having to do with the supervenience of the intrinsic properties of complex
individuals on the intrinsic properties of and relations among their parts. Rather, only those
functions from members of C*" to the positive real numbers that result in the following
conditions being satisfied should qualify: N+ matches N in its assignments to all
classifications of simple particulars; and if any two complex particulars are part-duplicates,
then they are classified alike by all sparse intrinsic property c-determinables. This latter
condition guarantees roughly that any complex particulars that are duplicates at the "atomic
level" are themselves are intrinsic duplicates (see above 4.3 for a definition of 'part-
duplication'). This change induces corresponding changes in the account of D*+, d* and D.
Where, as with NT, we take a possible fact <F, x> to represent that x instantiates or falls
under F. Or, in the extended account discussed in fn. 50, we take <R, x|,..., xn> to represent
that XI,..., Xn instantiate or fall under R.
52 This will have to include all the truths of set-theory. It is no easy task to say what all these
are, but I will assume that it can be done.
55 Here is an example to illustrate how the theory is supposed to work. According to current
physics nothing, not even the universe as a whole, has a mass of lOl^^l^kg. But intuitively it is
possible that there be something which is lOl^^kg in mass. And an adequate metaphysical theory
of modality ought to explain this intuition.
To explain this intuition the above version of mathematical ersatzism must, by (Al),
entail the existence of a world that represents that some particular has a mass of IQllll^kg. By [R],
this will be the case iff there is some world that contains an L-sentence that means that there is a
particular that has a mass of 10l*lllkg. By [W], this will be the case iff there is a maximal,
consistent extension of some D, where D is the distribution relation of some world-base. Clearly,
there will be such a world as long as there is some world-base <1, R, P, D> such that D contains
<Being lOl^^^^kg, o> where o is some particular or other.
Now, under what conditions will a world-base's final element D contain such a pair?
That depends on what the property of being IQl^^^kg in mass is, and here we must turn to SN.
According to SN, the essence of a determinate property like the property of being
IQlOOkg in mass consists in a certain classificational role. At the actual world, this role is played
by a pair «P, S, m>, having a certain degree of naturalness. The first member of the pair
is the mass determinable. This consists of three elements: P, the set containing (at least most) of
the actual concrete particulars; S, the (equivalence) relation that x bears to y iff x is actually the
same mass as y; and m, some function from the real line to the members of the partition induced
by S on P together with the empty set. Roughly, m encodes the same sort of structure as the real
line on this partition. The second member is the empty set — reflecting the fact that nothing is
actually lO^^^^kg in mass — indexed by the number to indicate the unique location of this
particular mass property in the structure built into the mass determinable by m.
And SN entails that any pair at a different world that plays the same classificational role
as «P, S, m>, is the very same property; any such pair just is the property of being
iglOOkg in mass at its world. To be a little more precise, at some other world w, a pair «P , S ,
m'>, [ujp is the the property of being lO^^^kg in mass iff: first, the degree of naturalness of <P,
S', m'> at w is exactly the same as the degree of naturalness of <P, S, m> at the actual world,
second, roughly, m and m' encode the same sort of structure — that of the positive reals, and
third, [ujjand occupy the same position in this structure — roughly, j =
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So, if S\ is correct about the nature of properties, a world-base's final element D will
contain the pair <Being 10'*^0kg, o> where o is some particular or other iff that world-base's
collection of properties P, which is itself a quadruple <C, N, D*, d*>, contains the pair «P',
S
,
m >, [o]p in its final member d*, where this latter pair satisfies the above three conditions
required for it to be the property of being lO^O^kg in mass at that world(-base). And clearly
this will be the case of many world-bases. Consider any characterization of the collection of
properties of some world-base <C, N, D*, d*>. Let o be one of the individuals that exist at that
world-base. By the axioms of impure set-theory alone, C w ill include the classification <P', S',
m'> where m' encodes the same structure as the positive reals and w here lo||o^^^ is one of
the cells on the partition induced by S' on P' indexed to indicate its position in the
determinable space defined by m'. Now, consider just those quadruples whose N is some
assignment that assigns to this classification the same degree of naturalness as the mass
determinable. Clearly, there will be many such quadruples. And their fourth members will
contain the pair «P, S, m>, lo)]0^^^>- By the transworld identity critieria of determinates,
each such pair just is the property of being in mass. So there will be many world-
bases whose D's include «<P, S, m>, and so many worlds that represent that o
instantiates the property of being 10^*^®kg in mass.
^‘^There was also a second category of metaphysical principles - those having to do with the
supervenience of properties of complex particulars on the properties and relations of their
parts. In fn. 50 above I merely sketched an approach to incorporating facts about complex
entities into the theory that guarantees that no world violates these principles. If this can be
worked out adequately, then it seems to me that the theory can be developed so as to
guarantee that none of its worlds entails the violation of the second category of metaphysical
principles.
Or in the extended version of the theory (see fn. 50), it contains <R, x|,..., Xn> for every n-
tuple of particulars Xn> (whether simple and complex) and every relation R such that
x],..., Xp instantiate or fall under R.
It entails the existence of worlds representing facts involving properties that are actually
uninstantiated, though they are compounds of properties that are. For instance, it should be
clear from the constructions and the example discussed in fn. 53, that it entails the existence
of worlds at which the property of being both gold and being (merely) lO^^kg in mass is
instantiated. As the discussion of the possibility of there being something which is 10^*^^kg in
mass shows, it also entails the existence of worlds representing facts involving actually
"missing" determinates.
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